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Abstract
The past decade or so has witnessed an increase in the number of philosophical discussions about emergence and reduction in science. However, many
of these discussions (though not all) remain too abstract and theoretical, and
are wanting with respect to concrete examples taken from the sciences. This
dissertation studies the topics of reduction and emergence in the context of a
case study. I focus on the case of chemistry and investigate how emergentism
can help us secure the autonomy of this discipline in relation to the underlying
microphysics. I develop an account of emergence (called functional emergence)
that is, I argue, capable of answering the question of why we have chemistry
instead of just applied quantum mechanics. I argue that functionally emergent
properties in chemistry – properties that are defined by their behaviour, not
by some shared microphysical constituent – can help us defend the autonomy
of chemistry; they allow for the existence of sui generis chemical regularities,
which can be used in sui generis chemical explanations. Functional emergence
generates difficulties for some accounts of inter-theoretic reduction, but unlike
other theories of emergence it is compatible with weaker forms of reductionism.

Keywords: emergence, reductionism, ontological autonomy, functional
properties, constitutive properties, functional kinds, multiple realization, physics,
chemistry, special sciences, micro-reduction, functional reduction, chemical
properties, chemical laws, chemical explanations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

The question

If all there is consists of the kinds of entities that microphysics talks about,
why do we have sciences other than microphysics? This thesis is an attempt
to answer a question of this sort. But why should this question even be taken
seriously, let alone be considered worthy of investigation? What are the prima
facie motives for asking it in the first place?
There are two motives for asking this question. First, there is an ontological motive, which rests on the asymmetry between the objects that form the
subject matter of microphysics and the objects that form the subject matter
of the other sciences (the special sciences). The asymmetry is this: if all the
objects that form the subject matter of microphysics (elementary particles,
fields, etc.) were to vanish, there would be nothing left; the objects that form
the subject matter of the special sciences (molecules, organisms, etc.) will also
vanish. They will necessarily disappear, for they are composed of the kinds of
entities that microphysics talk about. However, if the objects that form the
subject matter of the special sciences were to vanish, the objects that form the
subject matter of microphysics may persist (e.g., as plasma).
This asymmetry results simply from the direction of the composition relation: the objects that form the subject matter of the special sciences are
composed of the objects that form the subject matter of microphysics, but not
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viceversa. As a result, the latter may exist even in the absence of the former.
In this narrow and precise sense then, the microphysical has ontological
primacy. This prompts the following question. If one had a complete science
of the microphysical (i.e., a complete inventory of all the microphysical entities
and properties, and the laws governing them) couldn’t one just deduce the
claims made by the special sciences? This is the other motive underlying the
question formulated at the beginning, and I will call it the epistemological
motive.
As it stands, the question formulated above is too general. If the question
is to be investigated in detail, it needs further specification. I will specify the
question by referring to a couple of specific sciences that are usually perceived
as adjacent, such as quantum mechanics and chemistry. Our question then
becomes: If the entities forming the subject matter of chemistry consist of
the kinds of entities that quantum mechanics talks about, why do we have
chemistry instead of just applied quantum mechanics? I will call this the
specific question, to distinguish it from the more general question from which
it arises. This goal of this thesis is to investigate the specific question, and
argue for a certain way of answering it.
The prospects of deducing all of the claims made by the special sciences
from microphysics appears to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences.
For example, if all chemical truths are obtainable from quantum-mechanical
truths, then how can the belief in the autonomy of this discipline be maintained? What justifies belief in chemical properties, or belief in chemical
truths? What justifies the belief that there are chemical explanations? Are
there even such things as chemical properties, truths, or explanations as opposed to merely complicated quantum-mechanical properties, truths, or explanations?
Confronted with these sorts of questions, the defender of the autonomy of
chemistry may appeal to a variety of possible reasons that would legitimize her
position. In the next section I will discuss some of these reasons and briefly
evaluate their ability to help us answer the specific question.

2

1.2

Tentative answers

This section will give a brief presentation and evaluation of the several ways in
which an answer to the the specific question could be attempted. It is meant
to offer a bird’s eye view of the tentative answers and to cursorily expose some
of their perceived weaknesses. So why do we have chemistry instead of just
applied quantum mechanics?

1.2.1

Historical autonomy

One tentative answer may be this: we have chemistry instead of just applied
quantum mechanics for the same reason we had chemistry long before the
20th century when quantum mechanics was discovered. This kind of answer,
which points to the fact that historically chemistry has been independent from
physics, supports the idea of a historical autonomy of chemistry in relation to
physics. This view has been advocated C.D. Broad, among others. Broad
remarks that chemistry had become a science “of great extent and certainty”
long before we had any mechanistic insight into the internal make-up of the
elements. He argues that for a long time, progress in chemistry was possible
without using any mechanistic assumptions. He concludes that the possibility
of mechanistic explanation is not essential to the progress of chemistry.
“If then chemistry can be a scientific subject and can make steady
progress without using the assumption that a mechanistic explanation of chemical phenomena is possible, it would presumably have
made precisely the same progress if in fact no such explanation had
been possible.” (Broad 1925, p. 74).
While I agree with Broad that progress in chemistry happened long before
modern mechanistic explanations of chemical phenomena became available, it
is also true that the mechanistic insights that became available in the 20th
century have allowed for a great expansion of our chemical knowledge. They
allowed us to understand the chemical reactions that we knew about, and
to design new reactions. They allowed us to synthesize new molecules, and
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even new elements, and to design and create new drugs and materials. In
other words, chemistry would not have made precisely the same progress if
quantum mechanics had not been discovered, although for a long time its
own progress was independent from the progress of physics.1 Therefore, the
autonomy of chemistry in relation to physics cannot be based solely on the
notion of historical autonomy, which is also only partially defensible.

1.2.2

Methodological autonomy

Another answer to the specific question may be this: we have chemistry instead of just applied quantum mechanics because the methods of chemistry are
different from the methods of physics. In general, a chemistry lab looks very
different from a physics lab and what goes on in a chemistry lab is different
from what goes on in a physics lab. One may respond to this by saying that
while physics and chemistry differ with regard to their methodologies in general, the methods of some branches of chemistry are in fact physical in nature.
For example, the bond length and angles of molecules are determined using
various types of spectroscopy. Spectroscopy is used in physical and analytical
chemistry to identify the composition of substances or to assess the concentration of a given chemical species; computational methods that make use of
quantum mechanics are used to determine the structure of compounds. Although in general the methods of chemistry and physics are quite different, this
does not demonstrate that chemical properties are not physical properties in
disguise. That is, methodological autonomy – if it obtains – is not tantamount
to ontological autonomy. I will say more about what ontological autonomy
requires in the last section of this introduction, but for now I will just say that
chemistry and physics may have different methods of learning about their subject matter even if the subject matter of the former is coextensive with a part
of the subject matter of the latter.
1

Broad’s views will be discussed in more detail in the section on the British emergentist
view of chemistry.
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1.2.3

Antireductionism

Another tentative answer may be this: we have chemistry instead of just
applied quantum mechanics because chemistry does not reduce to quantum
mechanics. There are several accounts of reduction, and three of the most
important ones will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. For now, I will say
that chemistry would reduce to quantum mechanics if one could deduce all
chemical truths from the truths of quantum mechanics. But this has not been
achieved yet. Many kinds of difficulties stand in the way of such deductions:
i)

Chemical terms that don’t have a quantum-mechanical reference:
chemical bond (Primas 1983), chemical structure (Woolley 1978),
orbital (Scerri 1991, Scerri and McIntyre 1997, Post 1974)

ii)

Computational difficulties: analytical solutions to the Schrödinger
equation can only be obtained for hydrogenic atoms (Scerri 1991;
1994, Scerri and McIntyre 1997)

iii)

Appeal to approximations and idealizations: Born-Oppenheimer
approximation (Hendry 2006), Hatree-Fock (Scerri 1994; 2004)

iv)

Appeal to heuristic ingredients for which we don’t really possess
a quantum-mechanical justification: Madelung rule (Löwdin 1969,
Scerri 2003), Pauli exclusion principle (Hall 1986, Scerri 1995)

The difficulties of reducing chemistry to microphysics mentioned by (ii), (iii)
and (iv), are, of course, troublesome for those who deny that chemistry is
autonomous from microphysics. But they do not guarantee the ontological
autonomy of chemistry from physics, as opposed to only methodological, epistemic or pragmatic autonomy. Rather, they reveal problems with carrying out
the reduction. Unless we conflate epistemological, methodological or pragmatic matters with ontological matters, these difficulties do not conclusively
demonstrate that chemical properties are not in fact merely (complex) physical
properties. The fact that we cannot derive all chemical truths from physical
truths does not mean that these truths are not so derivable in principle (say,
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by more powerful beings, or by more clever mathematical techniques). In fact,
the success of computer-aided ab initio methods in chemistry seems to point
to the opposite.
As regards the chemical terms mentioned in (i), issues are more complicated. Such terms pose more than a practical difficulty for reductionism.
For if there are chemical truths containing terms that don’t have a quantummechanical (or microphysical) reference, it is hard to see how these truths
could be derived from the truths of microphysics. Faced with this situation,
those who would deny the autonomy of chemistry have no other option but to
deny that these terms have a reference. In other words, they would be hard
pressed to be eliminativists about the chemical terms mentioned in (i). They
may argue that terms like “chemical bond”, “chemical structure”, or “orbital”
are useful metaphors which are didactically and pragmatically helpful, but in
reality they lack a reference. This could be true for the terms mentioned in
(i). For example, the eliminativist could point out that the term “orbital”,
does not have per se a physical interpretation; only the product between the
amplitude of a wavefunction with its own complex conjugate corresponds to
an observable. Perhaps the eliminativist could find similar arguments for the
other terms mentioned in (i). However, this leaves open the possibility of
there being specific chemical terms that although lack a unique microphysical reference, do nonetheless refer to observable macro-properties (chemical
properties). Chapter 3 will consider this possibility. It will be argued that
some chemical terms do not have a (single) microphysical reference, yet they
do have a chemical reference which is observable at the macro-level.

1.2.4

Internal realism

Another tentative answer may be this: we have chemistry instead of just
applied quantum mechanics because chemistry is ontologically autonomous
from quantum mechanics; this is because there is a plurality of ontologies,
none of which is privileged with respect to the others.
Lombardi and Labarca (2005, 2006) have attempted to ground the ontolog-
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ical autonomy of chemistry in a philosophical position called internal realism
(Putnam 1981). According to internal realism, the question “What objects
does the world consist of?” only makes sense to be asked within a conceptual
scheme (or theory). On this view, objects depend on theories in a strong sense,
which includes existence. In the view of the two authors mentioned, internal
realism leads to ontological pluralism; ontological pluralism, in turn, justifies
the ontological autonomy of chemistry. In a schematic form, the argument
leading to ontological pluralism is this:
1. An ontology is always relative to a conceptual scheme.
2. There exists a plurality of conceptual schemes that apply simultaneously
to the same portion of reality.
3. Therefore, there exists a plurality of ontologies.
This argument aims to endorse the idea that there are as many ontologies
as there are theories, all equally legitimate. But if that is the case – Lombardi
and Labarca suggest – there is a physical ontology and there is a chemical
ontology, and none of these two ontologies is privileged with respect to the
other. The ontological autonomy of chemistry would thus be secured.
However, there is an ambiguity with respect to the first premise of the
argument schematized above. There are two ways in which premise 1 could
be interpreted. On one interpretation, premise 1 says that there is no theoryindependent ontology. In other words, there is no privileged (or “God’s eye”)
point of view which enables us to see ontology “as it really is”, independently
of our conceptual schemes. On a second interpretation, premise 1 says that
every conceptual scheme brings in its own ontology; as Lombardi and Labarca
put it, “different conceptual schemes define different ontologies” (2005, p. 138,
my italics).
These two interpretations are not equivalent. It is possible to accept the
first interpretation and reject the second. But for the conclusion of the argument to follow, the second interpretation is required. However, one may
legitimately doubt that if interpreted according to the second interpretation,
premise 1 is true. Contrary to what Lombardi and Labarca believe, it could
be argued that not every conceptual scheme defines its own ontology. For
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example, if two conceptual schemes (theories) are related in a certain way (so
that one reduces to the other), is it really required to postulate two ontologies,
one for each theory? If the properties and laws of a theory can be shown to
be reducible to the properties and laws of another theory, why couldn’t we
dispense with the ontology stipulated by the reduced theory in favor of the
ontology stipulated by the reducing theory? Of course, there may be good
pragmatic reasons for keeping both theories. If working within the reducing theory alone makes calculations or predictions needlessly complicated, we
could, of course, hold on to the reduced theory for its instrumental value.
But we need not be committed to its ontology as well. I would like to illustrate this with an example, but I am aware that uncontroversial examples of
inter-theoretic reduction might not exist. If one accepts (for the sake of the
argument) that Newton’s mechanics reduces (in the philosophical sense) to
Einstein’s, the following example could be given to illustrate my point. Despite being superseded by Einstein’s theory, we still use Newton’s theory, but
we do not continue to believe its ontology (absolute space and time, gravity as
a force, etc). Rather, we use Newton’s theory for its instrumental value, not as
a guide to our ontology. Why couldn’t we say the same thing about chemistry?
Even if chemistry turns out to be just applied quantum mechanics, we may
keep the conceptual scheme of chemistry for its instrumental value alone. In
order to conclude that the existence of a plurality of conceptual schemes allows
for a plurality of ontologies, one needs to argue that all conceptual schemes
are equally legitimate and logically independent from one another. But that,
obviously, need not be the case. In particular, if one conceptual scheme can
be deduced from another, the claim that the two conceptual schemes bring in
two distinct ontologies becomes problematic.
Suppose, however, that the argument schematized above is sound, and Putnam’s internal realism does lead to ontological pluralism. If so, the conceptual
schemes of physics, respectively chemistry, bring in two ontologies – that of
physics and that of chemistry. Lombardi and Labarca’s tacit assumption is
that ontological pluralism automatically secures the ontological autonomy of
chemistry. Notice however, that the fact that physics and chemistry have their
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own ontologies tells us nothing with respect to how those ontologies are related. It only tells us that the entities, properties and regularities of chemistry
exist (and so do those of physics). But this claim is compatible with what
some philosophers have called retentive reduction (e.g., Churchland 1979).
Again, examples from science may be controversial, but here’s one. Even if
we accept that thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, we may continue to think of temperature and pressure as real. Thus, we may keep the
ontology of thermodynamics but deny that this ontology is irreducible to that
of statistical mechanics. Here’s another example, perhaps less controversial:
the fact that a table reduces to a collection of atoms arranged in a certain way
does not make it less worthy of existence; it’s just that the table has a derived,
or secondary existence; reduction need not be eliminative.2
To conclude, I am not convinced that Putnam’s internal realism can, all
by itself, secure the ontological autonomy of chemistry. At most, it may be
able to secure an ontology for chemistry, but an argument is needed for the
claim that this ontology is autonomous in relation to that of physics.

1.2.5

Emergentism

Another tentative answer to our question may be this: we have chemistry
instead of just applied quantum mechanics because chemistry is ontologically
autonomous from quantum mechanics; this is because the entities, properties,
and regularities (laws) of chemistry are emergent.
Nowadays many philosophers of science agree that reductionism as a philosophical program has not succeeded. The philosophical accounts of intertheoretic reduction encountered theoretical and practical difficulties. It has
been argued that examples of successful inter-theoretic reductions in science
are few and far between. As regards chemistry, many have expressed doubts
that a complete reduction of this discipline to physics can be had. On the
other hand, nowadays almost everyone is a metaphysical naturalist (at least
2

For the distinction between retentive and eliminative reduction see Churchland (1979).
For the claim that the reduction of chemistry to atomic physics is an example of a retentive
reduction see Ney (2008).
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about the domain of chemistry). Chemists and philosophers alike contend that
our world does not contain vitalistic chemical essences, spooky chemical souls,
or chemical entelechies. They agree that if all the elementary entities that
microphysics talks about were to vanish, there would be nothing left. This is
sometimes referred to as “the generality of microphysics” – all events are, or
are exclusively composed out of parts which are, microphysical events, and so
fall under microphysical laws (Pettit 1993, p. 217). I will use the terms “generality of microphysics” and “physicalism” interchangeably: both terms refer
to the notion that every thing (or at least every thing in the purview of the
natural sciences) ultimately consists of the kinds of entities that physics (or
microphysics) talks about and that there are no vital substances, entelechies,
etc., occurring at any stage of complexity.
It is hard to miss the apparent tension between the two claims made in
the preceding paragraphs. If chemical stuff is composed of nothing else except
microphysical stuff, how can one justify the belief that there are even such
things as chemical properties, truths, or explanations as opposed to merely
complex quantum-mechanical properties, truths, or explanations? Given the
generality of physics, how can the autonomy of chemistry be preserved in a
substantial way, i.e., how can chemistry be considered autonomous in a way
which goes beyond historical or methodological autonomy? If physicalism is
true, can we even speak of the ontological autonomy of chemistry, as opposed
to a merely historical or methodological autonomy?
Some philosophers thought that the said tension is only prima facie. According to the emergentists, all objects are composed – at their most fundamental level – of microphysical objects; however, some hold that it would be
a mistake to conclude from this that all properties are physical properties;
similarly, it would be a mistake to think that if all events are governed by
physical laws, then all laws must be physical. Emergentists hold that there
are chemical entities, properties, and laws that depend on, but do not reduce
to physical entities, properties and laws.3
3

The term “law” could be used in two ways. It could be used to refer to a regularity
in nature. Or it could be used to refer to the linguistic form expressing that regularity (a
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“Emergence” is a philosophical term of art, with a lot of appeal to philosophically inclined scientists, including chemists. However, the meaning of this
term often remains underarticulated and vague. A prominent contemporary
philosopher writes:
“The term “emergence” seems to have a special appeal for many
people; it has an uplifting, expansive ring to it, unlike “reduction” which sounds constrictive and overbearing. We now see the
term being freely bandied about, especially by some scientists and
science writers, with little visible regard for whether its use is underpinned by a consistent, tolerably unified, and shared meaning”
(Kim 2006).
I don’t think that the use of the term “emergence” is or should be reserved
exclusively to philosophers. Also, I am quite skeptical that a unified meaning
can be achieved for this term, even amongst philosophers. But I do think
that studying how philosophers have thought about emergence in chemistry
can help us answer the specific question. That is, if it can be shown that
chemistry somehow emerges out of physics then – given the right account of
emergence – one could perhaps give a satisfactory answer to the question of
what justifies the autonomy of chemistry in relation to the underlying physics.
As Kim noticed, emergentist positions vary from one author to another
and therefore emergentism is hard to pin down. However, there are a number
of features that many emergentist positions share. Virtually all emergentist
positions hold some form of the view that that the world consists of a hierarchy of levels or ontological strata (the physical, the chemical, the biological,
the psychological) and each level depends on the previous level but it is irreducible to it. Properties at a certain level interact to produce properties
at a higher level (emergents). The relation between the lower level and the
higher level is usually thought to be supervenience: higher level properties are
said to supervene on the lower level properties.4 These higher level properties
sentence). I will use the term in both ways, its meaning being determined by the context.
4
A set of properties H supervenes on a set of properties L if and only if (i) any two
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(emergents) arise from those at the lower level, but they cannot be predicted
on the basis thereof. Emergents are often deemed to have novel causal powers,
i.e., they have the capability to produce effects in a way that cannot be anticipated. Sometimes emergents are said to be capable of downward causation
– the ability to influence the basal conditions from which they arise (the underlying dynamics). Also, sometimes it is held that emergents involve global
rather than merely local properties, and thus they arise only when the basal
conditions are characterized by a certain amount of complexity. Therefore in
relation to the entities from which they arise, emergents are usually characterized as novel, irreducible, unpredictable/unexplainable on the basis of the
lower level theory, and on some views, capable of downward causation.
Typically, emergence is correlated with some sort of failure of reduction.
Depending on how one construes irreducibility, one ends up with different types
of emergence. On the classical account of reduction due to Nagel (1961), one
theory is irreducible to another if the laws of the higher level theory cannot
be deduced from those of a more fundamental theory by employing bridge
laws connecting the two levels. For example, if there are chemical truths that
cannot be predicted (deduced) from quantum mechanics together with the
requisite bridge laws, one would say that chemistry is irreducible to quantum
mechanics. However, the notion of predictability is ambiguous; it may refer to
predictability in principle or to predictability in practice. If we hold a strong
notion of predictability (i.e., predictability in principle) then we end up with
strong emergence: chemistry cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics even
in principle. If we hold a weaker notion of predictability (i.e., predictability
in practice) then some weaker version of emergence obtains; in this case, we
would say that chemistry is weakly emergent – chemistry cannot be in practice
reduced to physics.
In chemistry, the following have been considered emergent or irreducible:
chemical compounds, molecules, secondary properties of compounds such as
objects x and y that have the same L properties will necessarily have the same H properties
(though not necessarily viceversa), and (ii) any two objects z and w that differ in their H
properties will also differ in their L properties (though not necessarily viceversa).
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their taste and colour, temperature, phases of matter, phase transitions, the
shape of the molecules, atomic structure and properties, periodicity, aromaticity, chemical bond, chemical structure.5

1.3

What is needed?

A satisfactory answer to our specific question would have to argue for the existence of sui generis chemical properties and laws (regularities), which could be
used in sui generis chemical explanations. By sui generis chemical properties,
regularities and explanations I mean properties, regularities and explanations
that are not identical to (possibly complicated) quantum-mechanical properties, regularities and explanations. The existence of sui generis chemical
properties and regularities would make chemistry not only historically and
methodologically autonomous from physics, but also ontologically.
The idea of the ontological autonomy of chemistry may seem incompatible
with the generality of physics. After all, if all chemical entities are composed of
nothing else except microphysical entities, doesn’t this mean that the ontology
of chemistry reduces to the ontology of physics? However, this argument
is construes ontology in a restricted way, as referring exclusively to entities.
Ontology is concerned not only with entities, but also with properties and laws
(regularities). If one distinguishes between a property and its instances as one
should, the fact that every instance of a chemical property is composed of
nothing else except instances of microphysical properties does not mean that all
chemical properties are in fact microphysical properties in disguise.6 Similarly,
it would be a mistake to think that if all events are governed by physical laws
5

For a list of chemical notions that are not amenable to a rigorous quantum mechanical
treatment (and thus to reduction) see van Brakel (2000, p. 132).
6
The distinction made in metaphysics between properties and property instances is usually illustrated with an example like the following. The color red (redness as such) is a
property (property-type) whereas the redness of my car is an instance of that property
(property-token). The color of my car is an instance of color red, but it is not identical with
it (redness as such will continue to exist even if the redness of my car disappears). For a
more comprehensive account of the distinction between properties and instances, see e.g.,
Swoyer and Orilia (2011).
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then all laws must be physical. Although the entities that chemistry talks
about are composed of nothing else except microphysical entities, this leaves
open the possibility of sui generis chemical properties and laws. But if that
is the case, there is a sense in which one can talk of the ontological autonomy
of chemistry. It must be admitted, however, that this ontological autonomy is
not radical: if the entities that microphysics talks about were to vanish, there
would be nothing left; consequently, there would be no chemical properties,
no laws relating these properties, and no explanations employing those laws.
However, the fact that the ontology of chemistry depends on the ontology of
microphysics does not make the former a subdomain of the latter.7
After a brief overview of the various ways in which an answer to the specific
question could be attempted, emergentism seems to offer the most promising
answer. If it can be shown that chemical properties and regularities are emerging in some sense out of the underlying microphysics then we have a natural
answer to the specific question, and chemistry could be thought of as an ontological stratum different from the microphysical one.
The purpose of this thesis is to articulate an emergentist account of chemistry that can justify the idea that there are sui generis chemical properties and
regularities – in other words, an emergentism that preserves the ontological
autonomy of chemistry.

1.4

Overview

Chapter 2 critiques some historical and contemporary accounts of emergence
in chemistry. I start out with British emergentism, for which the paradigmatic
example of emergence was that of chemical compounds. The first section of
chapter 2 discusses the views of J.S. Mill (1806-1873) and C.D. Broad (18871971) and it investigates whether their views of chemistry are still viable today.
In section 2.2 I present and critically assess the “fusion” account of emergence
due to Humphreys (1997b, 1997a, 2008), who views covalent bonding as a
“core example of fusion emergence” (2008, p.7). The last section of chapter
7

For an argument that physicalism does not entail reductionism see Fodor (1974).
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2 discusses briefly other emergentist views in chemistry, such as those due
to Hendry (2006) and Luisi (2002), but also other views about emergence in
science, such as those due to Bedau (2008), Wimsatt (2000, 2008), Mitchell
(2010) and Batterman (2002, 2011).
Chapter 3 develops a theory of emergence that is best equipped to provide a
satisfactory answer to the specific question. I call this theory “functional emergence”. Functional emergence is a departure from the traditional accounts of
emergence in that it is committed to the generality of microphysics and does
not recognize the existence of non-physical forces. Nonetheless, I will argue,
functional emergence is strong enough to justify the idea that there are sui
generis chemical properties, laws and explanations. The first two sections of
chapter 3 are more theoretical, as they introduce an important distinction,
that between constitutive and functional properties. Constitutive properties
are higher level properties that are in fact identical with certain lower level
properties; functional properties are higher level properties that cannot be
identified with particular lower level properties. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are the
most technical parts of this dissertation, but also some of the most important. They argue that a number of properties in chemistry, including acids,
bases, metals, oxidants, reductants and piezoelectrics are in fact functionally
emergent. These are sui generis chemical properties that appear in sui generis
chemical laws, which can be used to provide sui generis chemical explanations.
The laws in which these properties appear are “indiscriminate” or “promiscuous” in the sense that they express relations between higher level properties,
but do not discriminate between (or are insensitive to) the various ways in
which those properties are constituted at the lower level. Such properties and
regularities ground the ontological autonomy of chemistry.
Chapter 4 examines what the existence of functionally emergent chemical
properties entails with respect to the much discussed reduction of chemistry
to physics. It present three prominent accounts of inter-theoretic reduction,
namely that of Nagel (1949, 1961), that of Kemeny, Oppenheim and Putnam
(1956, 1958), and that of Kim (1999, 2005). It is argued that the existence of
terms which refer to functionally emergent properties poses problems for the
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first two accounts, while the third account does not succeed in establishing
the kind of reductionism that would endanger functional emergence and the
ontological autonomy of chemistry.
Chapter 5 addresses the objections that can be brought against the thesis
of multiple realizability, which is an important tenet of functional emergence.
This chapter responds to four criticisms that imperil the multiple realizability thesis itself or its efficacy as an anti-reductionist strategy. I critique the
arguments provided by Kim (1992, 2010), Shapiro (2005), (Smart 1963) and
others. I also give a unitary voice to a concern that many authors including
Millikan (1999), Boyd (1999) and Shapiro (2000) share, and label this “the
analyticity objection”. With the help of examples of chemical functionally
emergent properties such as acidity or piezoelectricity, I argue that some of
these criticisms do not pose a threat to functional emergence, while the others
do not succeed.
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions. It summarizes the most important
results of this thesis and argues why the functionalist view of chemistry counts
as an emergentist view. I end with some speculations regarding the disciplinary
character of chemistry and the validity of the layered view of the world.
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Chapter 2
Accounts of emergence in
chemistry
2.1

The British emergentist view of chemistry

In recent years, the work of the British emergentists received an increased
amount of attention from authors concerned with emergence and reduction in
all disciplines, but especially in the philosophy of mind. While it is true that
one of the main motivations for the development of what it has been called
“the theory of emergence” was to account for the existence or appearance
of secondary qualities such as colours and odours (which seem resistant to a
purely mechanistic explanation), for most British emergentists the paradigmatic example of emergence was that of chemical compounds. The purpose
of this section is (i) to examine and make explicit the British emergentist
view of chemistry as the primary example of emergence, and (ii) to investigate whether this view of chemistry could still be upheld today, after more
than eight decades of scientific developments in this field. The section will
focus mainly on C.D. Broad (1887-1971), as this author’s work is considered
representative for the current of thought that came to be know as British
emergentism and his discussion of chemistry is more ample than that of any
other author in the same current.
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2.1.1

Broad’s view of chemistry

In chapter II of The Mind and its Place in Nature (1925), Broad is concerned
with the question of whether the apparently different kinds of material objects
and their behaviour are irreducibly different. For example, are living things
irreducibly different from non-living things in their behaviour? Of course, as
the title of Broad’s work reveals, Broad’s main concern is the mind and how
it can be accommodated within a purely naturalistic framework. However, as
Broad himself acknowledges, one is much more likely to elucidate this problem if one considers first similar questions about simpler cases of apparently
irreducible behaviour. And one of the simplest cases we find is that of chemical compounds. Chemical behaviour appears markedly different from purely
mechanical behaviour; substances which interact chemically behave in a very
different way from those which merely hit each other, like billiard balls. What
can account for such behaviour? Broad considers two competing theories: the
theory of emergence, and the mechanism theory.1
The mechanism theory attempts to explain all phenomena (including chemical phenomena) by appeal to a very narrow set of elements. Ideally, such a
theory will postulate:
(i) a single fundamental kind of stuff, capable of
(ii) a single fundamental kind of change, governed by
(iii) a single elementary causal law which acts between pairs of particles, which
is subject to
(iv) a single principle or law of composition.
If a theory satisfies all these conditions it is called Pure Mechanism. As an example of a theory which is very close to this mechanistic ideal, Broad mentions
classical mechanics. Mechanics is very close to having a single fundamental
kind of stuff (i.e., mass), capable of a single fundamental kind of change (i.e.,
1

Broad also considers a third possibility, the theory of a special component, which he
dismisses.
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change of positions), governed by a single elementary causal law which acts
between pairs of particles (e.g., gravity) and which is subject to a single principle or law of composition (i.e., vector addition). Broad admits that a theory
can diverge from this ideal and still be mechanistic. For example, a theory
that recognizes mass and charge as fundamental can still be called mechanistic,
although will not be “pure”.
One characteristic of an ontology obeying the mechanism theory is that
the behaviour of the aggregates of particles depends only on the forces acting
between pairs of such particles – the law that governs the aggregates is quite
independent of the configurations and surroundings in which the constituent
particles happen to find themselves. On the mechanist view, the properties of
the whole are completely determined by the properties of its parts and their
relations. Therefore, the behaviour of the whole could, in principle, be deduced
from a sufficient knowledge of of how the parts behave in isolation or in other
wholes, plus their relations in the whole they form. Mechanical systems like
a set of billiard balls or artificial machines are good examples of wholes to
which the mechanistic theory applies. For example, a clock is a system whose
behaviour can be deduced from the particular arrangement of its parts (spring,
wheels, pendulum, etc.) and from the laws of mechanics which apply to all
mechanical systems in general (even to those that are not clock parts).
On the other hand, if a system is emergent, its properties cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of its constituents taken separately
or in other wholes, and of their proportions and arrangements in this whole.
According to Broad, chemistry “seems to offer the most plausible example of
emergent behaviour” (Broad 1925, p.65). If chemical compounds are truly
emergent, the only way to learn about their properties is to study samples. It
is worth emphasizing that, according to Broad, this limitation does not arise
because of the lack of sufficient computational resources or limited knowledge
of the initial conditions.
“If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical archangel, gifted with the further power of perceiving the
microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive hay-
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stacks, could no more predict the behaviour of silver or of chlorine
or the properties of silver chloride without having observed samples of those substances than we can at present.” (Broad 1925, p.
71)
In fact, according to Broad, not only that we cannot predict the properties of
chemical compounds on the basis of the properties of their constituents, but
we cannot even predict that two elements would combine chemically with each
other (i.e., chemical affinity).
What stands in the way of such predictions? If one knows the properties
of silver and those of chlorine and the laws that govern them, and has perfect knowledge of the microscopic structure of atoms and their relations, then
– given the infinite computational abilities of a mathematical archangel – it
would seem that one must be able to deduce the properties of silver chloride.
If one cannot do this, what stands in the way of such deduction? According to
Broad, the answer has to do with the fact that the law connecting the properties of the molecule of silver chloride with those of the atoms of silver and
chlorine is “so far as we know, an unique and ultimate law” (Broad 1925, p.
65). By this, Broad means that it is not a special case which arises through
substituting certain determinate values for variables in a general law which
connects the properties of any chemical compound with those of its separate
elements and with its structure. Such laws, which connect the properties of
entities at adjacent orders (in this case the law connecting the properties of
atoms to those of molecules) are called by Broad trans-ordinal laws.2 According to Broad, those trans-ordinal laws which cannot be understood as instances
of a more general law are indicative of emergence. For example, in the case of
silver chloride, the law connecting the properties of silver and chlorine atoms
with the properties of the silver chloride would be a trans-ordinal law of an
emergent type, since this law connects entities at two adjacent levels (atomic
level, respectively the level of the compound) and cannot be understood as a
special case of a more general law – according to Broad, this law is an ultimate
2

By contrast, an intra-ordinal law would be one which connects the properties of aggregates of the same order.
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law.
Broad contrasts this state of affairs with that where a mechanistic explanation is possible. In such cases (e.g., a clock), the behaviour of a whole can
be predicted using the general laws of mechanics and vector addition – principles that govern the behaviour of the springs and wheels even before they are
assembled together to form the clock. By contrast, in chemistry – according
to Broad – the properties of an as yet unexamined compound cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of its elements in isolation or from
a knowledge of the properties of their other compounds.
As Broad himself acknowledges, those favoring the mechanism theory will
feel that there is something radically unscientific and superstitious about transordinal laws. But Broad attempts to dissolve this feeling. He remarks that
chemistry had become a science “of great extent and certainty” long before
we had any mechanistic insight into the internal make-up of the elements. He
argues that for a long time, progress in chemistry was possible without using
any mechanistic assumptions. He concludes that the possibility of mechanistic
explanation is not essential to the progress of chemistry.
“If then chemistry can be a scientific subject and can make steady
progress without using the assumption that a mechanistic explanation of chemical phenomena is possible, it would presumably have
made precisely the same progress if in fact no such explanation had
been possible.” (Broad 1925, p. 74).
In addition, Broad does not see anything mysterious or unscientific about the
trans-ordinal laws. In his view, a trans-ordinal law is as good a law as any
other; once it has been discovered empirically it can be used like any other
law in science; we may use it to make predictions, to suggest experiments, or
for practical purposes. The only thing that is peculiar about such laws is that
they cannot be deduced beforehand from the laws governing entities at a lower
level.
Why does Broad think that the law connecting the properties of the molecule
of silver chloride with those of the atoms of silver and chlorine is unique and
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ultimate? In the chapter discussing mechanism and its alternatives, Broad
claims that this state of affairs can be ascribed either to (i) the existence of
innumerable “latent” properties in each element, each of which is manifested
only in certain conditions, or (ii) to the lack of any general principle of composition, such as the parallelogram law in dynamics, by which the behaviour
of any chemical compound could be deduced from its structure and from the
behaviour of each of its elements in isolation (Broad 1925, p. 66-67).
If the first alternative is correct, then emergence differs from mechanism in
that the law that governs the behaviour of a compound is sensitive to the configurations its constituents. On this view, the configuration of the constituents
forming a compound play a crucial role in determining the properties of the
compound. But is this the distinguishing characteristic of emergence? Mechanism also recognizes the fact that configurations are important. In a system
of gravitating particles, the behaviour of the whole will depend in part on the
configuration in which the particles happen to find themselves. What then is
special about the configurations of the components of an emergent system – in
this case, a chemical compound? According to McLaughlin’s interpretation of
Broad, an emergent whole possesses force-generating properties of a sort not
possessed by any of its parts (McLaughlin 2008, p. 41). The forces generated
by the configurations of particles (which are distinct from the particle pair
forces present in mechanism) are called by McLaughlin configurational forces.3
These are forces which arise in a compound only when the components are
arranged in certain select configurations, but not in others. On McLaughlin’s
interpretation, configurational forces are fundamental – they are new forces,
forces that are not the resultants of any other forces, such as forces that previously existed in the components.
According to McLaughlin’s interpretation of Broad, configurational forces
in chemistry are higher-order chemical forces characterizing the compounds, irreducible to lower level physical forces characterizing the components. Nonethe3

Although Broad does not use this term, McLaughlin interprets Broad in this way. According to McLaughlin, “it is clear that he [i.e, Broad] maintains that certain structures of
chemical compounds can influence motion in fundamental ways” (McLaughlin 2008, p. 47).
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less, configurational forces are genuine forces; like all forces, they influence “the
go of events”; using a more recent terminology, they are capable of downward
causation. In fact, they are the forces responsible for the characteristic behaviour of the chemical compounds, i.e., their ability to bond or react – what
Broad calls the “ultimate characteristic” of the chemical order. In McLaughlin’s interpretation of Broad, configurational forces are what makes possible
the existence of emergent behaviour. On this view, the emergent trans-ordinal
laws indicate the existence of chemical configurational forces.4
If the second of the two previously mentioned alternatives is correct, then
chemistry lacks a general principle of composition similar to vector addition
that exists in classical dynamics (mechanism’s postulate iv). On this view,
one cannot learn about the properties of a compound by substituting certain
values of the variables in a general law which connects the properties of that
compound with those of its constituents, for there is no such general law. This
would explain why the trans-ordinal laws that connect the properties of the
atoms with those of compounds are unique and ultimate. They are ultimate
because in determining the properties of a chemical compound there is no theoretical shortcut, one must study a sample. However, as Broad himself grants,
there is no doubt that the properties of silver chloride are completely determined by the properties of silver and the properties of chlorine, in the sense
that whenever we have a whole composed of these two elements in certain proportions and relations we have something with the characteristic properties of
silver chloride, and that nothing has these properties except a whole composed
in this way (Broad 1925, p. 64). Therefore, one may argue that in producing
AgCl, nature does follow some rule of composition. Broad’s response would be
that this rule of composition is not general – according to Broad, by studying
the rule nature follows when it produces AgCl one cannot learn anything about
the rule nature follows when it produces other compounds. In this sense, the
4

There is a complication here. Both atoms and molecules are chemical species. Therefore,
chemistry will contain at least two types of trans-ordinal laws. There will be trans-ordinal
laws connecting the properties of subatomic particles with those of the atomic elements, and
there will be trans-ordinal laws connecting the properties of atomic elements with those of
molecules they form.
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chemical trans-ordinal laws are unique.

2.1.2

Evaluating Broad’s account of emergence in chemistry

Is the doctrine of configurational forces on which Broad bases his emergentism
compatible with the scientific theories that we currently have? Are there any
configurational forces, especially in chemistry?
McLaughlin responds negatively to the second question. According to
McLaughlin, the fall of British emergentism was caused by advances in science.
“[Q]uantum mechanical explanations of chemical bonding in terms
of the electro-magnetic force, and the advances this led to in molecular biology and genetics render the doctrines of configurational
chemical and vital forces enormously implausible” (McLaughlin
2008, p. 49)
I agree with McLaughlin that quantum-mechanical explanations of chemical bonding in terms of the electromagnetic force render the doctrines of
configurational chemical and vital forces implausible. In what follows, I will
consider three key statements that Broad makes about chemistry, and then
I will examine whether these claims could still be upheld today, after more
than eight decades of scientific developments in physical chemistry. The three
claims are:
1. It is impossible to predict the properties of a chemical compound on the
basis of the properties of the components.
2. Chemical affinity cannot be predicted.
3. In chemistry we lack a general principle of composition, such as the
parallelogram law in classical dynamics.
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To these three claims, one may add a fourth. According to McLaughlin’s
interpretation, Broad’s emergentism is committed to the existence of chemical
configurational forces.
Does chemistry lack a general principle of composition, such as the parallelogram law in classical dynamics, by which the behaviour of any chemical
compound could be deduced from its structure and from the behaviour of each
of its elements in isolation? Admittedly, if we apply the laws of classical physics
to atomic or molecular systems, we get predictions that are incompatible with
the observations. This was the situation that the scientific community faced
around 1911 when trying to understand the structure of hydrogen – a situation
that most certainly Broad knew about. As it happens, if the atom obeys the
laws of classical physics, the electron orbiting the nucleus will emit radiation,
since it is an accelerating charge. This means that the electron will rapidly
loose its kinetic energy and it will spiral down into the nucleus.5 Therefore,
classical physics (in which the forces are subject to vector addition) cannot
explain the behaviour of atoms and molecules they form. Since the behaviour
of atoms and molecules is part of the subject matter of chemistry, Broad could
have been right in thinking that chemistry lacks a general principle of composition similar to the one we have in mechanics.
However, as we now know, it is not true that the entities that form the
subject matter of chemistry obey classical mechanics, in which the dynamical
law is Newton’s second law. But from this does not follow that these entities
do not obey a principle of composition similar to the law of parallelogram in
dynamics. Chemical compounds are complex quantum-mechanical systems.
In the formulation of quantum mechanics developed by Dirac and von Neumann, the possible states of a quantum-mechanical system are represented by
vectors in a Hilbert space associated with the system. A vector space is a
mathematical structure in which the entities (vectors) are subject to operations such as vector addition and multiplication. The entities that form the
subject matter of chemistry, insofar they obey quantum mechanics, are sub5

If the electron-nucleus distance was originally on the order of an angstrom, it will become
zero in t = 10−10 s.

25

ject to vector addition. To illustrate vector addition in quantum chemistry,
consider an electron of an atomic element. When one calculates the electron’s
total angular momentum, one treats the electron’s orbital angular momentum
L and its internal angular momentum S as vectors and adds them using vector addition. Of course, in this context, vectors are subject to quantization.
Nonetheless, the entities that form the subject matter of chemistry do obey
the sort of compositional principle Broad thought chemistry is missing.
But perhaps this is not what Broad meant when he claimed that in chemistry we lack a general principle of composition. What he had in mind, perhaps,
was something along the lines of his predecessor, J.S. Mill. In A System of
Logic, Mill distinguishes between two modes of causation: a mechanical mode
and a chemical mode. In the mechanical mode of causation, the effect produced by two causes acting together is the sum of the effects of each cause
acting independently. Mill calls this the principle of Composition of Causes,
which in his view, just like in Broad’s, is akin to the principle of composition
of forces in classical dynamics. On this mode of causation, the effect of the
two causes acting in conjunction can be predicted deductively, from the effects
of separate causes acting separately. The chemical mode of causation, on the
other hand, does not obey the principle of Composition of Causes.
“The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well
known, a third substance, with properties different from those of
either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken
together. Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is
observable in those of their compound, water.” (Mill 1882, p. 267)
In Mill’s view, chemical compounds have properties that are not “the sum” of
the properties of their components taken separately or simply juxtaposed, as
in a mixture. Besides the example of water, Mill gives additional examples:
the sweet taste of sugar of lead (lead diacetate, Pb(C2 H3 O2 )2 ) is not the sum
of the tastes of its component elements, acetic acid and lead or its oxide; the
color of blue vitriol (copper sulfate, CuSO4 ) is not a mixture of the colors
of sulfuric acid (transparent) and copper(II) oxide (black), from which it is
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produced. Those effects whose properties do not resemble the properties of
their causes are called by Mill heteropathic; the laws governing the production
of these effects are called heteropathic laws. For Mill, the laws of chemistry are
heteropathic, since they govern the production of substances whose properties
do not resemble those of the reagents.
If this is what Broad had in mind, then he was right: the properties of chemical compounds are not “the sum” of the properties of their components. But
why should we expect them to be? A deductive explanation of the properties
of chemical compounds in terms of the properties of their atomic constituents
could still be possible even if the manifest properties of these compounds are
not “the sum” of the manifest properties of their components. For Mill such
an explanation was out of sight, but Broad contended that this may be due
to a limitation of our present state of knowledge.
Was the impossibility of chemical prediction that Mill and Broad talked
about due to a limitation of their present state of knowledge? I join McLaughlin in thinking that the answer is affirmative. Today’s theoretical chemists have
managed to determine the properties of a number of molecules in an ab initio
manner, using quantum mechanics to approximate various quantities such as
dipole moments, bond energies, bond lengths and angles. Although the ab
initio methods work only approximately for large molecules, it is nevertheless
true that chemical affinity and the properties of molecules can be understood
as resulting from molecular structure, which is itself determined by quantum
mechanics.
This brings us to Broad’s claim that until we try and perform the reaction,
we cannot predict that two elements would combine chemically with each
other. One of Broad’s examples is that of hydrogen and oxygen:
“Oxygen has certain properties and Hydrogen has certain other
properties. They combine to form water, and the proportions in
which they do this are fixed. Nothing that we know about Oxygen
by itself or in its combinations with anything but Hydrogen would
give us the least reason to suppose that it would combine with
Hydrogen at all. Nothing that we know about Hydrogen by itself
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or in its combinations with anything but Oxygen would give us the
least reason to expect that it would combine with Oxygen at all.
And most of the chemical and physical properties of water have no
known connexion, either quantitative or qualitative, with those of
Oxygen and Hydrogen.” (Broad 1925, p. 63)
With the knowledge that physical chemistry has given us about the structure
of hydrogen and oxygen, this claim is difficult to maintain. By solving the
Schrödinger equation for the hydrogen atom, the electron configuration of hydrogen has been determined as 1s1 . That is, hydrogen has one electron on its
electron shell (the 1s orbital). Through various quantum chemistry methods
and the analysis of atomic spectra, the electron configuration of oxygen has
been determined as 1s2 2s2 2p4 . Oxygen has been determined to have two electrons on the 2s orbital and four on the 2p orbital; this brings the total number
of electrons on the outermost shell to six. It has also been determined that
atoms tend to combine in such a way that they each have eight electrons in
their last shell (the maximum that quantum mechanics allows). This fact is
also known as the octet rule. An electron configuration of ns2 np6 is very stable
energetically (here n represents the principal quantum number which gives us
the last shell); this electron configuration characterizes all noble elements with
the exception of He, which are known for their very low chemical reactivity.
Having six electrons on the last shell, oxygen can have a double covalent bond
with one atom of another element that has two electrons on the last shell (e.g.,
iron(II) oxide, FeO) or a simple covalent bond with two atoms of another element which has one electron on the last shell (e.g., hydrogen oxide, H2 O).
Therefore, contrary to what Broad claimed, one must expected that oxygen
will bind with hydrogen, forming a relatively stable compound. Similarly, one
must expect that Ag will form compounds with Cl, for Ag has one electron on
the last shell while chlorine, a halogen, has one missing electron.6
What about Broad’s claim that the chemical properties of a compound
6

Unlike hydrogen oxide, silver chloride is an ionic compound, like most metal-nonmetal
compounds. This is explained by the fact that chlorine is has a higher electronegativity
than silver.
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cannot be determined on the basis of the properties of the components? For
the sake of simplicity, let’s stick to the examples that Broad himself uses,
namely water and silver chloride. One of the chemical properties of water is
that it is a good solvent, and neither oxygen nor hydrogen are. This property
derives from the polar nature of the water molecule. The H2 O molecule is a
v-shaped molecule with oxygen at the vertex and the two hydrogens forming
a bond with a 105° angle between them. The relatively high electronegativity
of the oxygen pulls the hydrogen electrons away from the hydrogen nuclei,
leaving them with a partial positive charge; at the same time, the oxygen becomes more negative. The unequal sharing of electrons and the asymmetric
molecular shape result in the H2 O molecule having an electric dipole. The
electric dipole is responsible for the effect that water has on ionic compounds
such as NaCl. The polarity of the ionic compounds (which due to the nature of the ionic bond) in conjunction with the polarity of water result in an
electrostatic attraction between those parts of different compounds that have
opposite charges: negatively charged oxygen atoms attract positively charged
sodium atoms, while positively charged hydrogens attract negatively charged
chlorine – the ionic bond of NaCl is thus broken. To this effect also contribute the short-lived but numerous hydrogen bonds that form between the
H2 O molecules. The strong cohesion between water molecules, which is due
to these hydrogen bonds, explains why water is a liquid at room temperature,
while other substances with similar or even higher molecular weight are gases.
Other properties of water are also explained by the underlying quantum mechanics (e.g., water has a high surface tension, 71.97 dyne/cm (at 25°C, 100
kPa), the highest of the non-metallic liquids).
A similar argument can be made for the properties of silver chloride. Broad
claims the properties of this substance cannot be predicted in advance; the only
way to learn about the properties of silver chloride is by observing a sample.
A property for which silver chloride is known is its photo-sensitivity: in the
presence of light, the substance darkens. This is why it has been used in
photography, where is an important ingredient of the emulsion that is coated
on photographic paper. Neither silver nor chlorine has this property. Can
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this property of silver chloride be deduced from quantum mechanics? If we
know the electron structure of silver and that of chlorine and enough quantum mechanics we can in fact deduce this behaviour. Silver chloride is an
ionic compound, consisting of silver cations bound to chlorine anions. When
light is shone on the sample, the electrons in the chlorine atoms absorb electromagnetic radiation emitted by the light source, becoming excited. If an
electron is excited, it leaves the valence band (one of the energy levels allowed
by quantum mechanics in which the electron is still bound to its atom and it
participates in the lattice bonding of the AgCl crystal structure) and it enters
the conduction band (the electron leaves its atom and travels freely through
the crystal lattice). The excited electron may give off its energy as heat and
relax back to its original state; or it can bind to a silver cation to form an electrically neutral silver atom. If this happens, the ionic compound dissociates
into a silver powder (black) and chlorine, and this dissociation is responsible
for the darkening of the sample.
But do these quantum-mechanical explanations render Broad’s view untenable? Broad’s point was that chemical properties cannot be predicted on the
basis of atomic structure. Most quantum-mechanical explanations of chemical
properties are obtained only a posteriori. Quantum chemists often know what
the target macro-property is, and this makes their job a lot easier. Usually,
pure ab initio calculations are difficult to carry out due to the complex mathematics and limited computational resources. However, this would not be a
problem for a mathematical archangel, who would not be the subject of such
limitations.
As mentioned, McLaughlin thinks that the advancements in the understanding of the atomic and molecular structure that took place during the
20th century make Broad’s claims regarding emergence in chemistry implausible. However, when it comes to answering if the doctrine of configurational
forces on which Broad bases his emergentism is compatible with the scientific
theories that we currently have McLaughlin claims:
“So far as I can tell, British emergentism does not rest on any
“philosophical mistakes”. It is one of my main contentions that
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advances in science, and not philosophical criticism, led to the fall
of British Emergentism.” (McLaughlin 2008, p. 50)
While McLaughlin is right that advances in science led to the fall of British
emergentism, it would be an exaggeration to claim that this doctrine is free
of philosophical problems. Insofar as it subscribes to configurational forces,
Broad’s emergentism supports the idea that there are sui generis chemical
forces, which are distinct from those within the purely physical domain. Thus,
this type of emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical world, for if
there are sui generis chemical forces able to influence “the go of events”, the
causal closure of physics (i.e., the idea that every physical effect has a physical
cause) is not respected. Chemical configurational forces are both irreducible
and efficacious in the physical world; therefore some physical events will have
higher level (i.e., chemical) causes. Thus, there will be a class of physical
events whose causes will not be physical. As a result, physics is not causally
closed: there are causal factors which are not described by physics, or for
whose description physics defers to another science (in this case, chemistry).
The denial of the causal closure of physics is far from being philosophically innocuous. The reason is that the causal closure of physics came to be
viewed as one of the tenets of modern science – a tenet which is grounded
in conservation laws. The worry, therefore, is that the denial of the causal
closure of physics to which the doctrine of fundamental configurational forces
is committed is in fact in tension with modern science.
McLaughlin does not have this worry. He thinks that configurational forces
can be easily accommodated in the framework of classical mechanics and even
of relativity. He takes the laws of mechanics one by one and argues that all
these laws (the law of inertia, Newton’s second law, the conservation of momentum) are indifferent to the nature of the force they talk about (whether
it is particle-pair force or configurational). He then moves to examining the
compatibility of configurational forces with the conservation principles of classical mechanics. He argues that the mass of a system of particles exerting a
configurational force could be the sum of the masses of the constituents in
the configuration. McLaughlin concludes that there is no conflict between
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configurational forces and the principle of the conservation of mass.
What about the conservation of energy? Is the doctrine of fundamental
configurational forces compatible with this principle? If configurational forces
exist, they are not idle or epiphenomenal forces – they do mechanical work.
But work requires energy. Where does this energy come from? According
to McLaughlin, it is possible for it to be the case that particles contain a
certain kind of potential energy that can be released only when they figure
in appropriate configurations. So for McLaughlin, there need be no conflict
between configurational forces and the principle of the conservation of energy.
Configurational forces may very well respect the conservation of energy, just
like the other forces accepted in physics.
This sort of argument is also presented by Papineau:
“After all, the conservation of energy in itself does not tell which
basic forces operate in the physical universe. Are gravity and impact the only basic forces? What about electromagnetism? Nuclear forces? And so on. Clearly the conservation of energy as such
leaves it open exactly which basic forces exist.” (Papineau 2002, p.
249).
McLaughlin and Papineau are right that the conservation of energy is indifferent to the kind of forces it talks about. If configurational forces are just
another kind of force among others (gravitational, electromagnetic, etc.), there
is no reason to suppose that their mere existence would violate the conservation of energy. However, configurational forces are not like the gravitational or
the electromagnetic force – they occur only at certain moments in time. They
come into existence as a consequence of particles assuming certain configurations, and they go out of existence when the configurations disappear. So
these forces are “special forces” in the sense that they occur only after certain
conditions are met, unlike the gravitational or electromagnetic forces, which
are not subject to this constraint to the same extent. Nonetheless, configurational forces are supposed to be fundamental, i.e., not derivative or resultant
from other kinds of forces.
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I worry that the fundamental character of configurational forces cannot
be easily reconciled with the principle of the conservation of energy if their
“special” nature is to be preserved. I believe the defenders of configurational
forces are facing a dilemma: either these forces are not truly fundamental,
or their existence violates the conservation of energy. The argument may
look as follows. Suppose that we have an energetically isolated system of
particles S that assumes the right configuration at time tc and as a result of
this a configurational force F emerges in S at tc . If the energy characterizing
the configurational force can be traced back to some potential energy stored
by the particles and released when the right configuration obtains, then the
configurational force is not truly fundamental: it is derivative or resultant –
it comes from the potential energy of the particles in the configuration. But
this goes against the definition of configurational forces, which are supposed
to be fundamental.
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Figure 2.1.1: Configurational forces and the conservation of energy.
If the configurational force is fundamental, the energy of system S
increases when the configuration obtains.

However, suppose these forces are fundamental. Since they are not epiphenomenal, they are able to do work, which requires energy. If this energy is not
already in the system as potential energy and released when the configuration
obtains (the force is assumed to be fundamental!), then the conservation of
energy is violated, for the system was assumed to be energetically isolated,
yet its total energy increases as a result of its components assuming a certain
configuration. Thence the dilemma: either the configurational forces respect
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the conservation of energy, or they are not truly fundamental.

2.1.3

Conclusion

It has been argued that the advancements in the understanding of the atomic
and molecular structure that took place during the 20th century make Broad’s
claims regarding emergence in chemistry implausible. Broad was aware of this
possibility:
“Now of course it may be true as a matter of fact that the atoms
of the various elements are wholes composed of various numbers of
similar particles with various arrangements and movements. And it
may be true as a matter of fact that the laws of chemical combination, the properties of compounds and so on, are mere consequences
of the laws of electro-magnetics and of the particular number, arrangement and movements of the particles which compose each
kind of atom” (Broad 1925, p. 73).
Given that Broad was aware of this possibility, one may legitimately ask why
he maintained that chemistry is an example of emergence. The reasons are
philosophical, but also historical.
Broad developed his theory of emergence primarily to account for the existence or appearance of secondary qualities such as colours and odours, whose
integration into a naturalistic framework is not straightforward. But presumably, Broad did not want to see the mind as very different from other natural
phenomena. His theory of the mind as an emergent phenomenon would appear
more plausible if it could be shown that emergence occurs in “lower” ontological strata, such as the vital or the chemical. If emergent behaviour first occurs
at the level of chemical compounds, then it is more plausible and perhaps even
expected that emergent behaviour should appear at higher levels as well.
Another reason why Broad thought that chemistry seems to offer the most
plausible example of emergence (as he conceived it) is more historical. Broad
presented his views about emergence in chemistry as part of the Tarner Lectures in the philosophy of science he delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge
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in 1923. Two years later, he published The Mind and its Place in Nature,
a monograph based on these lectures. Although the chemical bond and the
properties of compounds were understood in terms of electronic structure since
at least the early 1900’s by Gilbert N. Lewis and others, this sort of understanding came of age only after 1926, the year when Schrödinger discovered
of the equation that governs the dynamics of quantum systems. An abundance of applications to chemistry – many of which consisted in the derivation
of chemical facts from the underlying physics – followed immediately thereafter.7 Couldn’t Broad have foreseen such successes? Any attempt to answer
this question would be highly speculative, but the fact that Broad published
his book one year before Schrödinger discovered the wave equation is most
certainly an aspect that played an important role.
The British emergentist view of chemistry can hardly be upheld today. It
receives no support from contemporary chemistry, and it seems to be at odds
with the conservation of energy. This, however, need not mean that chemistry is not emergent. Emergence is often associated with the occurrence of
novel properties, the existence of distinct ontological strata, with irreducibility and disciplinary autonomy. Chemistry may exhibit all these characteristics
of emergence even though it does not have the features that Broad associated
with emergence (i.e., configurational forces, or the lack of a principle of composition). This leaves open the possibility of coming up with a view of chemistry
on which chemical properties and laws are still emergent, however not in the
traditional sense. On this view, emergence in chemistry need not necessarily
7
In 1927, the philosopher-turned-physicist Fritz London and the physicist Walter Heitler
used the new quantum mechanics to formulate the Valence Bond theory, which enabled
them to calculate the bonding properties of the hydrogen molecule. In 1929, Sir John
Lennard-Jones introduced another method of calculating the molecular structure that used
quantum mechanics: the linear combination of atomic orbitals molecular orbital method
(LCAO). Lennard-Jones worked on the derivation of the electronic structures of molecules
of fluorine and oxygen from first principles, i.e., from quantum mechanics. Other quantum
chemistry methods such as the Hartree-Fock or the functional density method have been
subsequently developed and used to calculate the structure of molecules. With the advent
of modern digital computers, these methods could handle satisfactorily an increasingly large
number of electrons and nuclei. In some cases, such as the case of the case of disilyne, Si2 H2 ,
the computational methods have predicted the correct structure of the molecule before the
experiments confirmed it.
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be a rival of what Broad called “mechanism”; emergence in chemistry may,
for example, be thought of along the lines of non-reductive physicalism in the
philosophy of mind – that is, as compatible with physicalism but incompatible
with reductionism.

2.2

The prospects for fusion emergence in chemistry

In a number of articles, Paul Humphreys (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2008) has offered
an account of emergence which aims to provide the grounds for an ontology of
the special sciences. Humphreys’ account (called fusion emergence) presents a
series of challenges to at least three widely accepted assumptions about ontology: (i) that the right way to represent the relation between lower level and
higher level properties is supervenience, (ii) that our world’s ontology is wholly
compositional, and (iii) that the physical domain is causally closed. If sound,
Humphrey’s account offers an interesting answer to our specific question.
Humphreys has argued not only that fusion emergence can be consistently
described (1997b), but also that our own world exhibits cases of this kind
of emergence (2008). According to Humphreys, covalent bonding is a “core
example of fusion emergence” (2008, p. 7). The purpose of this section is to
raise some concerns about Humphreys’ account in general and about his core
example of fusion emergence in particular. It will be suggested that the extent
to which covalent bonding undermines the second assumption mentioned above
has been overstated.

2.2.1

Humphreys’ fusion emergence

Humphreys’ account of emergence was motivated by the desire to avoid the
exclusion argument or a generalized version thereof, whose conclusion is that
higher level emergent properties are excluded from affecting lower level properties, since all the causal work is done by the latter (see Kim 1992, 1999,
2006). The exclusion argument has unwelcome consequences for the ontology

36

of the special sciences. If one thinks of the special science properties (e.g.,
chemical or biological) as occupying higher levels than do physical properties,
then the exclusion argument entails that no event involving a special science
property could ever causally influence a physical event. The idea of special
science causation is thus threatened. Also, the exclusion argument challenges
the idea that special science properties deserve a place in our ontology: if
special science properties are causally idle, what is the point of having them
in our ontology? The exclusion argument has unwelcome consequences for
physics, too. If one thinks of physics itself as stratified (e.g., with high energy
physics, solid state physics and thermodynamics occupying different strata),
the exclusion argument entails that only the most basic physical properties
can be causally efficacious, and – as a result – all other causal claims within
contemporary physics are false.
While the exclusion argument denies that the higher level properties that
special sciences are concerned with are capable of downward causation, emergence seems to require it explicitly. It has been argued that the only way
to cause an emergent property to be instantiated is by causing its emergence
base property to be instantiated (Kim 1992, p. 136). This is known as the
downward causation argument, and it shares with the exclusion argument the
assumption that the right way to represent the relation between lower level
and higher level properties is supervenience.
In his work, Paul Humphreys challenges both the exclusion argument and
the downward causation argument by explicitly denying their common assumption, namely that supervenience is the right way to represent the relation between lower level and higher level properties (1997a). He also argues
that thinking of higher level emergent properties in terms of supervenience is
mistaken. Instead, he links the possibility of emergence with the existence of
a fusion operation that operates on i-level properties and outputs i+1-level
properties, which have novel causal powers.8
8

For the sake of brevity, sometimes I will use “property” instead of “property instance”.
It should be noted however that for Humphreys the arguments of the fusion operation are
property instances.
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The process of fusion is formally represented as follows. Let Pim (xir )t1
represent an i-level entity, xr , instantiating an i-level property, Pm , at time
t1 . Pin (xis )t1 will denote another i-level entity, xs , instantiating another i-level
property, Pn , at time t1 . Humphreys introduces the fusion operation symbolized by [. ∗ .], which takes as arguments the two property instances Pim (xir )t1
and Pin (xis )t1 and fuses them: [Pim (xir )t1 ∗Pin (xis )t1 ]. The fusion operation is an
i-level operation, i.e., an operation of the same level as its arguments. The
result of the fusion operation is the fused property [Pim ∗ Pin ][(xir )+(xis )](t2 ) at
i+1
the i+1-level, which can also be written as [Pi+1
l ][xl ](t2 ). The fused property
is a unified whole in the sense that its causal effects cannot be represented in
terms of the separate causal effects of the original property instances. Also,
within the fused property instance [Pim (xir )t1 ∗Pin (xis )t1 ], the original property
instances Pim (xir )t1 and Pin (xis )t1 no longer exist as separate entities and they
do not have all of their i-level causal powers available for use at the i+1-level
(Humphreys 1997b, p. 10).
Humphreys argues that this particularity of fusion emergence is what enables this brand of emergentism to avoid the threats of the exclusion and
downward causation arguments. At the time when the fused property instance
[Pim (xir )t1 ∗Pin (xis )t1 ] comes into existence, the original property instances Pim (xir )t1
and Pin (xis )t1 go out of existence. Therefore, it is a fortiori the case that
they cannot compete as causes with the emergent property instance. On
Humphreys account, emergents don’t coexist with their bases, and this feature
prevents the exclusion argument from getting off the ground.
Humphreys’ fusion emergence also deals with the downward causation argument. This argument is also committed to the idea that emergent properties
supervene on lower level properties. The argument assumes that the only way
to bring about an emergent property instance at time t is by bringing about its
subvenience base at time t. But if fusion emergents are not synchronous with
their bases, this assumption is unwarranted. There is no reason to suppose
that an i+1-level property instance could not directly produce another i+1level property instance e.g., by directly transforming into it or by transforming
another, already existing, i+1-level property instance – in both cases, other
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property instances may contribute (1997b, p. 13; 2008, p. 8).
By avoiding the threats to the ontology of the special sciences posed by
the exclusion and downward causation arguments, Humphreys’ emergentist
account attempts to rescue the autonomy of the special sciences and to depict an ontologically antireductionist image of the world in which the subject
matters of the various special sciences correspond to irreducible ontological
strata.9 For Humphreys, there is a hierarchy of levels of properties L0 ,L1 , ...
Ln ... of which at least one distinct level is associated with the subject matter of
each special science, and Lj cannot be reduced to Li for any i < j (Humphreys
1997a, p. 5).

2.2.2

Previous criticisms of fusion emergence

Humphreys remarks that philosophers have long thought of the ontology of the
special sciences in terms of supervenience. On this view, the higher level properties are “composed of” or “supervenient upon” lower level properties.10 But
Humphreys finds supervenience unsatisfactory. He complains that supervenience does not provide any understanding of ontological relationships holding
between levels. If these levels are emergent, they contain emergent properties.
According to Humphreys, an important characteristic of emergent properties
is that they result from the interaction between their constituents.11 However,
the level of detail that emergent properties demand makes the use of supervenience relations seem simplistic. This is one of the reasons why Humphreys
argues that emergence should not be understood in terms of supervenience.
Add to this the threats posed by the exclusion and downward causation arguments, and supervenience seems completely inappropriate for providing the
grounds for an ontology of the special sciences.
9

Humphreys admits however that the boundary between the physical level and other
levels is not sharp (Humphreys 1997a, p.S345).
10
The notion of supervenience that Humphreys uses is Kim’s strong supervenience: “A
family of properties M strongly supervenes on a family N of properties iff, necessarily, for
each x and each property F in M, if F(x) then there is a property G in N such that G(x)
and necessarily if any y has G it has F”(Kim 1993, p.65).
11
Humphreys sees this interaction as nomologically necessary for the existence of emergent
properties (1997a, p.S342).
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As mentioned in the previous section, on Humphreys’ account, emergents
are not co-instantiated with their bases. Wong (2006) has called this the basal
loss feature of fusion emergentism, and he has claimed that it is both problematic and unmotivated (2006, p. 346). According to Wong, the disappearance
of the lower level properties of an entity is problematic for two reasons. First,
because it threatens the structural properties crucial to the proper functioning of that entity. The basal properties that fuse to become emergents may
also constitute nonemergent, structural properties which may be indispensable to the proper functioning of the system. However, if basal properties
are destroyed by the fusion process, then so would the structural properties.
Second, the disappearance of the lower level properties generates what Wong
calls “the correlation problem”. It is empirically established that many special
science properties have lower level correlates with which they are copresent
(e.g., mental properties are synchronously correlated with neurophysiological
properties). However, if we are to treat the special science properties as fusion
emergents, then we deny the copresence of their lower level correlates, which
Wong sees as empirically implausible.
Wong considers the basal loss feature of fusion emergentism as unmotivated
for the reason that on Humphreys’ account, basal and emergent properties
don’t have causal profiles that overlap significantly and thus cannot compete
as overdeterminers of their effects. According to Wong, emergents supplement
the underlying dynamics rather than merely overdetermine physical effects
(2006, p. 361).
In his response to Wong’s criticisms, Humphreys (2008) argues that most
systems possess multiple properties, some of which are essential to carrying
out the system’s function, whereas others are not. In general, the fusion process will affect only the latter. If a system’s state is given by <P,Q,R,...Z>
(x), the fusion between P(x) and Q(x), will leave R...Z unchanged and able to
sustain the proper functioning of the system. Also, given that most properties
are quantitative, part of P and part of Q will fuse, leaving the remainder to
maintain the state. Wong’s challenge to Humphreys is to show that this is
will always be the case (Wong 2006, p. 357). However, Wong’s demand is

40

unreasonable. If Humphreys can show that at least some of the special science
properties are examples of fusion emergence, then this is enough to challenge
the three assumptions mentioned at the beginning. But are Humphreys’ examples able to do this? Before addressing this question, a couple of quick
general points about Humphreys’ account of emergence are in order.

2.2.3

The division of labor between properties and the
notion of a physical operation

Although Humphreys does not say it, his distinction between properties which
are able to undergo fusion and those which are essential in the functioning of
the system does in fact rely on two other dichotomies: first, between properties
that are able to undergo fusion (PAUF) and properties that are not (PNAUF);
and second, between properties which are essential in the functioning of the
system (PEFS) and those that are not (PNEFS). Thus, Humphreys’ distinction results from crossing two criteria: first, whether the properties are able
to undergo fusion; second, whether the properties are essential in the functioning of the system. Humphreys assumes that the application of these two
criteria delivers co-extensive subsets of properties, so that the properties which
are able to undergo fusion will also be the ones that are not essential in the
functioning of the system.
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PAUF

PNAUF

PNEFS

PEFS

Figure 2.2.1: Two overlapping dichotomies between properties.
The dichotomy between the properties that are able to undergo fusion
(PAUF) and those that are not (PNAUF) overlaps with the dichotomy
between the properties that are not essential in the functioning of the
system (PNEFS) and those that are (PEFS).

Humphreys can, of course, maintain his distinction between properties
without threatening the coherency of his account. That is, he can maintain
that in any given entity there will be a “division of labor” between properties: some will undergo fusion, while others will preserve the functioning of
the system. In this case, the properties to which the emergent character of
an entity is due will not also be structural properties with a role in the in
the functioning of that entity. Conversely, the structural properties that are
crucial to the proper functioning of an entity won’t participate in the fusion
processes that that entity may undergo. However, these two last claims are far
from trivial. Unless we have an independent justification of why the two dichotomies overlap, one may worry that Humphreys’ division of labor between
properties constitutes an ad hoc response to the problem of basal loss.
The other point has to do with the nature of the fusion operation. On
Humphreys’ account, the fusion operation is not necessarily causal. However,
fusion is supposed to operate on real properties in the world, not on their
representations. Humphreys claims that the fusion operation is “a real physical
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operation” as opposed to a merely logical one like conjunction or disjunction
(1997b, p. 10).
At this point, one may pause and ask what a physical operation is. We
know what a logical operation like conjunction or disjunction is because there
are logical/mathematical theories in which such operations are defined (e.g.,
sentential logic, predicate logic, Boolean logic, etc.). In the absence of these
theories, our understanding of the logical operations will be greatly impoverished. What is the corresponding theory for the fusion operation? Humphreys
claims that fusion is a physical operation. However, what it means for something to be a physical operation is not entirely clear. For example, in physics
textbooks one does not find such an operation being defined. Humphreys may
be taken as being uncommitted to the exact nature of the fusion operation
pending further empirical work (Wong 2006, p.352). It may turn out that
fusion is implemented by single physical process (already discovered or yet to
be discovered), or by a host of physical processes. In any case, an understanding of fusion as a physical operation depends on how well one understands its
physical implementation. In order to achieve this, one needs to engage with
empirical issues. It is to these empirical issues that I will now turn.

2.2.4

Humphreys’ examples

Whether the theory of fusion emergence can be coherently formulated is one
thing; whether it applies to anything in the world is quite another. The former
is a theoretical aspect that can be addressed largely on a priori grounds, while
the latter is a an empirical issue. To argue that fusion emergence is not a
metaphysician’s fiction but a real phenomenon, one needs more than appeals
to imagined scenarios; one needs concrete examples taken from the sciences.
Humphreys presents such examples. According to Humphreys, “the clearest
cases of fusion emergence are the entangled states of quantum systems” (2008,
p. 4).12
12

Humphreys’ suggestion that the entangled state is an example of fusion emergence
has been developed in more detail by Kronz and Tiehen (2002), who also discussed its
ramifications and limitations.
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According to Humphreys, the existence of such cases of emergence entails
that our world’s ontology is not wholly compositional. By a compositional
ontology Humphreys means an ontology in which “all non-fundamental entities
are aggregated or structured collections of other entities that can be generated
by the use of explicitly stated rules of combination, where the constituent
entities retain their identities within the structure” (2008, p. 2).
Humphreys thinks that the entangled state of a composite quantum system
does not conform to the requirements of a compositional ontology because it is
non-separable – the state of the system cannot be written as a tensor product
of the states of its parts. Although there may be worries that a theory whose
physical interpretation is still heavily debated might not be our best guide
to ontology, let’s grant that the entangled state in quantum mechanics is a
bona fide example of fusion emergence. The question then becomes whether
there are other examples of fusion emergence in our world, preferably in the
special sciences.13 Humphreys’ answer is affirmative. The example of fusion
emergence that is discussed in most detail by Humphreys is that of the covalent
chemical bond. As mentioned, according to Humphreys, covalent bonding is
a “core example of fusion emergence” (2008, p. 7).
Why does Humphreys think that the covalent bond exemplifies fusion?
Humphreys notes that a covalent bond occurs when a pair of electrons is shared
by two atoms; he also notes that the density of the electrons which participate
in the covalent bond is distributed over the entire molecule rather than the
individual atoms. Humphreys also claims that while some properties remain
unchanged after the fusion (e.g., the charge and mass of the nucleons, the total
charge of the molecule), others are affected by it; for example, there is a slight
lowering of the energy of the combined molecular arrangement compared to
the energies of the atoms before fusion. According to Humphreys, this energy
that emerges upon fusion is responsible for the characteristic properties of the
molecule.
Humphreys contrasts the covalent bond with the ionic bond. He suggests
13

The exclusion argument to which fusion emergentism is an objection threatens the
special sciences to a greater extent than physics.
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that ionic compounds are the result of electrostatic forces between positively
and negatively charged ions and can be understood within the framework of a
compositional ontology. On the other hand, molecules (resulting from covalent
bonding) exemplify fusion and therefore are non-compositional. Humphreys
does not elaborate much on why ionic bonding is compositional and covalent
bonding isn’t. He only claims that there is a contrast between the two types of
bonding and that the fact that “the molecule is not simply a spatial arrangement of the two atoms (...) is one of the things that distinguishes fusion from
composition” (2008, p. 7).

2.2.5

Questioning the ionic-covalent dichotomy

Insofar as Humphreys takes the two types of bonding as having different ontological requirements (and thus supporting incompatible ontologies), he is
committed to a contrast between them that is not simply a matter of degree. However, the sharp contrast between ionic and covalent bonding that
Humphreys’ example assumes does not receive as much support from physical
chemistry as one may think.
Ionic and covalent bonding are viewed as two extreme models of the chemical bond (Atkins and Jones 2002, p. 92). With the exception of the bonds
of homonuclear diatomic molecules, all chemical bonds have some ionic character as well. If the electronegativity difference ∆χ increases, so does the
ionic character of the bond.14 Generally, if ∆χ > 1.6, the bond is considered
ionic. If ∆χ < 0.5, the bond is considered covalent non-polar. And if ∆χ is
between 0.5 and 1.6, the bond is considered covalent polar. However, there is
no principled way to choose these values and they may vary slightly from one
chemistry textbook to another. There is no sharp distinction between an ionic
and a polar covalent bond; rather, the difference between them is a matter
of degree. If the difference between the two types of bonding is only gradual,
14

On the Pauling scale, the difference in electronegativity
between atoms A and B is
p
−1/2
a dimensionless quantity: χA − χB = (eV)
Ed (AB) − [Ed (AA) + Ed (BB)]/2 , where
Ed (XY) represents the dissociation energy between atoms X and Y in electronvolts. Pauling
defined the amount of ionic character of a chemical bond as 1 − e−1/4(χA− χB ) (Pauling 1960,
p.98)
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then how can they be accommodated within different ontological frameworks?
Where should the boundary between compositional and non-compositional be
placed?
One may argue that as long as there exist clear cases of covalent and ionic
bonding, this should be enough to justify the requirement of different ontological frameworks. However, while pure covalent bonding exists (between the
atoms of homonuclear diatomic molecules such as Cl2 , H2 , O2 ), pure ionic
bonding cannot exist, since it would require that the electronegativity difference ∆χ between the atoms be infinite or at least exceedingly large (Carter
1979, p. 124). Therefore, all bonds have some covalent character. Does noncompositionality characterize only those pure cases of covalent bonding, or
should all types of bonding be accountable within a single (non-compositional)
ontology? If neither, how should the discrete border between two distinct ontological frameworks be superimposed onto the covalent-ionic continuum? These
questions are not in themselves sufficient to show that Humphreys’ account
fails, but they are certainly indicative of a lack of harmony between the sharp
character of the boundary between a compositional and a non-compositional
ontology and the non-sharp character of the boundary between ionic and covalent bonding.
There is another problem with viewing chemical compounds through the
ionic-covalent dichotomy. These two types of chemical bonding are models,
i.e., they are idealizations which have their virtues but distort reality in some
respect. For example, they represent the pair of electrons participating in
a covalent bond as being shared by just one pair of atoms, even when the
molecule is polyatomic. Chemical bonds between atoms can be described
more accurately using the concept of resonance. Resonance refers to the representation of the electronic structure of a molecular entity in terms of distinct
contributing structures (also called resonance structures). Electrons involved
in resonance structures are said to be delocalized: for example, in the case
of a polyatomic molecule the sharing of an electron pair is distributed over
several pairs of atoms and cannot be identified with just one pair of atoms. A
resonance hybrid is a blend of the contributing structures.
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All compounds, regardless of whether they are considered ionic or covalent, can be viewed as resonance hybrids of purely covalent and purely ionic
resonance structures. For example, the structure of a homonuclear diatomic
molecule, in which two atoms of the same element are covalently bonded to
each other, can be described as a resonance hybrid of two ionic structures
(Atkins and Jones 2002, p. 93).
A−A ←→ Aδ− Aδ+ ←→ Aδ+ Aδ−
In the case of homonuclear diatomic molecules, the ionic structures make
only a small contribution to the resonance hybrid. Also, the two ionic structures have the same energy and make equal contributions to the hybrid, so
the average charge on each atom is zero. In a heteronuclear molecule, the
resonance hybrid has unequal contributions from the two ionic structures –
the structure with the negative charge on the atom that has a greater electron
affinity will make a bigger contribution to the resonance hybrid.
The representation of chemical compounds in terms of resonance structures is more accurate than the ionic-covalent representation but it is strictly
speaking incompatible with it. The resonance model challenges the view of
chemical compounds as either ionic or covalent because resonance hybrids are
a blend of resonance structures rather than the flickering of a compound between different structures, “just as a mule is a blend of a horse and a donkey,
not a creature that flickers between the two” (Atkins and Jones 2002, p. 80).

2.2.6

The level-relativeness of fusion

According to Humphreys, the covalent bonding exemplifies a kind of ontological emergence which shows that the ontology of our world is not exclusively
compositional. Why does Humphreys think that molecules cannot be understood in the framework of a compositional ontology? Molecules consist
of atoms, so at a first glance, the compositionality condition would seem to
be satisfied. However, at a closer look, one realizes that molecules are not
simply the result of the combination or spatial juxtaposition of atoms. A
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molecule is the sharing of electrons between two or more atoms. Because of
this, Humphreys is justified in claiming that the molecule can be described
as the fusion of two or more atoms, not as a combination or aggregation of
atoms.
However, if one thinks of molecules not as collections of atoms but as
collections of nuclei and electrons, what looks like fusion between two atoms
can be described as composition of nuclei and electrons. I will attempt to
show that physical chemistry permits a compositional understanding of atoms
and the molecules, in terms of separate but interacting electrons and nuclei.
That is, I will attempt to show that atoms and molecules can be generated
by the use of explicitly stated rules of combination of separate but interacting
electrons and nuclei, which is exactly what fusion emergence denies.
The Aufbau principle consists in a number of explicitly stated rules that
allow us to understand the atom (any atom) as a physical system that is build
by successively adding electrons around the nucleus.
1. The principle of the minimum energy. The electrons occupy atomic
orbitals in such a way that the total energy of the atom is a minimum;
they fill orbitals starting at the lowest possible energy states before filling
higher states.
2. The Pauli exclusion principle. Every electron in an atom is described
by its own distinct set of four quantum numbers, not shared with any
other electron. This entails that a given orbital is to be occupied by no
more than two electrons, case in which their spins, denoted by the ms
quantum number, are paired.
3. The Madelung rule. Orbitals with a lower n+l value are filled before
those with higher n+l values.
4. Hund’s rule of maximum multiplicity. Electron pairing will not
take place in orbitals of the same sub-shell until orbitals are singly filled
by electrons with parallel spin.
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It should be recognized that the Madelung rule and Hund’s rule of maximum
multiplicity are not exceptionless. However, they are rules for which the generality of physics entails that there is, nevertheless, a physical reason grounded
in physical law (as there is one for the cases when the rules fail), even if discovering this reason is often difficult. What these four rules show is that the atom
is a complex physical system in which the nucleus and the electrons are subject
to a number of physical constraints and interact with each other according to
physical laws. It is these physical laws and constraints that are the more basic
rules of composition in the multi-electron atom. The atom appears to be more
than just a collection of individual particles because of the complexity of the
interactions between these particles.
In contrast with the entangled state, which is non-decomposable into separate states of each of the two electrons and thus cannot be written as a tensor
product of the states of the individual electrons, the wavefunction of a multielectron atom can be thought of as resulting from the separate contributions of
each electron wavefunctions, and it can be written as a product of individual
atomic orbitals: ψ(r1 , r2 , .... rn ) = φ1 ( r1 )φ2 ( r2 )....φn ( rn ). This strategy of
learning about the wavefunction of a multi-electron atom on the basis of the
individual electrons is known as the orbital approximation and is a remarkably
useful tool in the attempts at solving the Schrödinger equation for atoms that
have more than one electron. When applied to multi-electronic atoms, the
(atomic) orbital approximation assumes that each electron behaves independently of the others, and thus the electronic Hamiltonian can be separated
into as many components as there are electrons: Ĥe = Ĥ1 + Ĥ2 + .... + Ĥn .
The treatment of the multi-electron atom in physical chemistry is, I think,
an illustration of compositionality. Admittedly, the orbital approximation is
an approximation – the inter-electronic repulsion forces which are due to the
Coulomb potential are deliberately ignored, to make the Schrödinger equation
more tractable. However, the existence of such forces does not show that
the atom cannot be understood compositionally; on the contrary, the interelectronic repulsion forces are the consequence of the physical laws which are
the more basic rules of composition in the multi-electron atom.
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Compositionality principles seem to be abundant in the physical chemistry
of molecules, too. In contrast to older theories such as the valence shell electron
pair repulsion theory (VSEPR), the molecular orbital theory describes the
electrons in a molecule as delocalized; they are not confined to pairs of atoms,
but are spread over the whole molecule. The central claim of the molecular
orbital theory is that molecular orbitals are obtained from summing up atomic
orbitals. More rigorously, each one-electron molecular orbital φi is expressed
as a linear combination of atomic orbitals (LCAO): φi = c1i σ1 + c2i σ2 + c3i σ3 +
... + cni σn , where the coefficients represent the weights of the contributions of
each atomic orbital to the molecular orbital and are found using the HartreeFock method. The wavefunction for the molecule is then written as a product
of one-electron wavefunctions. This is the molecular orbital approximation:
the wavefunction of a multi-electron molecule is approximated as the product
of individual molecular orbitals: Ψ(r1 , r2 , .... rn ) = Φ1 ( r1 )Φ2 ( r2 )....Φn ( rn ).
The electron configuration of molecules is obtained from the same set of rules
that yielded the electron configuration of multi-electron atoms.
In some sense, Humphreys is justified in thinking of the molecule noncompositionally, for a molecule is not simply the result of the spatial arrangement of atoms. If one descends one ontological level (e.g., from the level of the
molecule to the level of atoms), the molecule cannot be described compositionally, in terms of separate but interacting atoms. However, if one descends two
ontological levels (e.g., from the level of the molecule to the level of nuclei and
electrons), the molecule can be described in terms of separate but interacting
components. What looks like fusion at the i-level (molecular level) can be
represented as composition at the i-2-level (level of electrons and nuclei). For
example, in the case of a simple molecule such as the dihydrogen molecule,
what looks like fusion between two hydrogen atoms is in fact composition
between two nuclei and two electrons.
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2.2.7

Entanglement to the rescue?

An argument that challenges this conclusion may in fact be available to the
defender of non-compositionality. The argument is based on the remark that
the electrons which participate in the covalent bond have opposite spins (are
paired), and thus they are entangled (i.e., they form a singlet state, or a state
in which their total spin is zero). If the entangled state is a bona fide case of
fusion and hence it does not conform to the requirements of a compositional
ontology, then the molecule must also be an example of fusion. On this view,
the fact that the electrons participating in the covalent bond cease to possess
separate states is sufficient grounds for concluding that the molecule is a nonseparable whole which defies a compositional ontology. The defender of noncompositionality could argue that the covalent bond (and hence the molecule)
owes its existence to the entanglement of the electrons constituting the bond.
On this view, once two electrons belonging to different atoms have become
entangled, a covalent bond occurs between the atoms and a new entity emerges:
the molecule.
The problem with the argument above is that it does not give an accurate
characterization of the origin and nature of the chemical bond. Chemical bonds
are due to the interplay of four sets of forces: the attraction of each electron to
the nucleus of its own atom, the attraction of each electron to the nucleus of the
other atom, the electron-electron repulsion, and the nucleus-nucleus repulsion.
The fact that the electrons participating in a covalent bond are paired is a
consequence of their obeying the Pauli exclusion principle. However, the Pauli
exclusion principle is not a force, but a constraint that the electrons must
satisfy if a covalent bond is to be formed. Consider two hydrogen atoms whose
electrons have parallel spins. If the atoms are brought together, the charge
density from each electron is accumulated in the antibonding region (i.e., at
the extremities of the system), rather than in the bonding region between
the nuclei. Therefore, they will not form a dihydrogen molecule. The role
of the Pauli exclusion principle is to veto those systems that cannot form a
molecule by imposing a constraint on the spin of the electrons participating
in the covalent bond. The Pauli exclusion principle tells us that only those
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hydrogen atoms whose electrons have opposite spins are eligible for forming a
bond. The spin entanglement that can be found in a molecule does not play
the role of a force holding the molecule together.15
In fact, there are molecules in which not all of the electrons are entangled,
such as molecules with unpaired electrons or an open shell configuration. Although usually the unpaired electrons are found in the antibonding orbitals
and they are expected to lower the bond order and thus decrease the bond
energy, there are cases such as the oxygen molecule, O2 , in which the unpaired
electrons actually increase the strength of the bond.

Figure 2.2.2: Triplet oxygen vs. singlet oxygen.
Triplet oxygen is more stable than singlet oxygen, despite the fact
that in triplet oxygen there is “less” electron entanglement.
15

The so-called “exchange force” or “exchange interaction” which decreases the expectation value of the distance between two electrons (or fermions, more generally) with identical
quantum numbers when their wave functions overlap is not a true force and should not be
confused with the exchange forces produced by the exchange of force carriers, such as the
electromagnetic force produced between two electrons by the exchange of a photon, or the
strong force between two quarks produced by the exchange of a gluon.
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The ground state of the oxygen molecule is also known as the triplet oxygen
because the total spin of the molecule is 1: the electrons occupy two different
2pπ ∗ molecular orbitals singly and, according to Hund’s rule, their spins are
parallel (this can also be deduced empirically, from oxygen’s paramagnetism).
The triplet oxygen is known to be more stable than the singlet oxygen – a
diamagnetic form in which the electrons are paired in the same 2pπ ∗ orbital
(Wiberg et al. 2001, p. 476).16 Another example is that of the molecular
hydrogen ion, H+
2 , in which there is no entanglement since there is only one
electron. The bond holding together the dihydrogen cation is described as
a “one-electron bond”, and has a formal bond order of 12 (Pauling and Wilson 1963, p. 362). For this simple system the Schrödinger equation can be
solved accurately and the calculations show clearly that the molecular entity
possesses a bound state, i.e., it possesses a ground state whose energy is less
than that of a hydrogen atom and a free electron. In the case of dilithium,
the binding energy is greater for the one-electron Li+
2 than for the two-electron
+
Li2 , although in the Li2 there is no entanglement involved in bonding, while
in the Li2 there is (James 1935).
These examples show that the connection between the chemical bond and
entanglement is not as strong as the argument that is available to Humphreys
may assume it to be. They show that i) the chemical bonding of some molecular entities is possible even in the absence of entanglement, as in the case
of the one-electron bonds, and ii) the chemical bond of some molecules may
actually be stronger if not all electrons are entangled.

2.2.8

Conclusion

Humphreys’ fusion emergence is an elegant solution to the exclusion problem,
but it is not without its difficulties. There are a couple of general concerns.
First, there is the worry that Humphreys’ division of labour between properties
may be an ad hoc response to the problem of basal loss if we don’t have
independent justification for why the dichotomy between the properties that
16

The specific form referenced here is O2 a1 4g .
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are able to undergo fusion and those that are not should overlap with the
dichotomy between the properties that are not essential in the functioning of
the system and those that are. Second, the notion of a physical operation plays
a crucial role in Humphreys’ emergentist account, but it is not clear what this
operation means, and how it is implemented at the physical level.
There are also more specific concerns which regard Humphreys’ core example of fusion emergence. In developing this example, Humphreys assumes
a deep contrast between ionic and covalent bonding that is not warranted by
physical chemistry. It is not clear how the the fuzzy boundary between ionic
and covalent bonding maps onto the discrete boundary between a compositional and a non-compositional ontology.
Finally, Humphreys’ claim that chemistry gives us reasons to reject a compositional ontology is problematic. While it is true that the molecule can be
described as the fusion of atoms, if one thinks of the molecule not as a collection of atoms but as a collection of electrons and nuclei, what looks like
fusion between two atoms can be described as composition of electrons and
nuclei. In fact, chemistry is full of compositional principles: in the molecular orbital theory, each one-electron molecular orbital is expressed as a linear
combination of atomic orbitals; the orbital approximation gives us a way of
learning about the wavefunction of a multi-electron atom or molecule on the
basis of the wavefunctions of the individual electrons; and the Aufbau principle gives us explicit rules of composition for obtaining the electronic structure
of atoms and molecules. Given the effectiveness of these rules and principles
and the fact that they are compositional par excellence, it is premature to
conclude that the entities forming the subject matter of chemistry cannot be
accommodated within the framework of a compositional ontology.

2.3

Other contemporary accounts

A recent approach to emergence in chemistry is due to Hendry (2006). Hendry’s
account is based on the classical notion of emergence advocated by Broad.
Hendry does not accept McLaughlin’s conclusion that there is no scintilla
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of evidence that there are configurational forces or downward causation in
chemistry; he adopts McLaughlin’s distinction between resultant and configurational but he formulates it in terms of Hamiltonians, rather than forces.
Using the quantum chemistry of the molecule, Hendry aims to show that there
is downward causation in chemistry by showing that there are “configurational
Hamiltonians” governing the behaviour of molecules.
Hendry asserts that if the behaviour of some systems is governed by configurational (non-resultant) Hamiltonians, then the behaviour of those composite systems is not determined by the more general laws governing their
constituents. He argues that to the extent that the behaviour of any subsystem is affected by the supersystems in which it participates, the emergent
behaviour of complex systems must be viewed as determining, but not being
fully determined by, the behaviour of their constituent parts. This, Hendry
contends, is the case in the chemistry of the molecule, where the motions of
the atoms are determined by the overall structure of the molecule.
Hendry uses the concrete example of a CO2 molecule. The motion of the
parts of this molecule can be seen as quantum-mechanical harmonic oscillators
and rigid rotators. However, this is possible only after we assume a certain
structure for the whole molecule. According to Hendry, we use quantum mechanics to explain the motions of parts of the molecule within the context of
a given structure for the molecule as a whole (in this case, a linear structure).
The problem is that rather than deriving this structure using resultant Hamiltonians, we put it “by hand” – we assume “configurational Hamiltonians”.
The fact that the motion of the parts of molecule is determined by the overall
structure is, according to Hendry, an example of downward causation.
Is the chemical emergence that Hendry’s arguments support of a strong
kind? If the molecular Hamiltonians are truly configurational and thus fundamental (i.e., not resultant), then the kind of emergence that Hendry’s arguments support is strong. If, however, they are resultant, then Hendry’s
arguments support only weak emergence. The advocate of weak emergence
may agree that the molecule as a whole constrains (determines) the motion
of its parts. But she may argue that its ability to do so comes from the in-
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trinsic and relational properties of the parts themselves (from the Coulomb
attractive and repulsive forces between the parts and various other factors
such as gravity, the Pauli principle and relativistic effects). On this view, the
use of configurational Hamiltonians is justified for pragmatic reasons (resultant Hamiltonians are just too hard to compute) or epistemic reasons (having
to do with their explanatory role), but from an ontological perspective these
Hamiltonians are ultimately resultant, albeit often underivable in practice.
Nonetheless, Hendry’s own view seems to be that the molecular Hamiltonians
are not resultant, so in his view the account of emergence that he defends
seems to be strong.
Hendry claims that his revision of traditional emergentism is at odds with
the causal completeness (or causal closure) of physics – the thesis that “all
physical events are determined (or have their chances determined) entirely
by prior physical events according to physical laws”(Papineau 1990, p. 67).
If chemistry truly denies the causal completeness of physics then it would
seem that this constitutes evidence for a strong notion of emergence – presumably, the existence of non-physical but causally efficient properties (such
as sui generis chemical properties) guarantees that what’s true about them
cannot be derived from the truths of microphysics. Since the causal closure
of physics is grounded in the conservation of energy, it is not entirely clear
how a strong version of emergence that denies it may respect this venerable
principle of science. Indeed, the argument I brought forward in 2.1.2 against
Broad’s notion of configurational forces is applicable to Hendry’s concept of
configurational Hamiltonians as well.
Another emergentist account intended to apply to specifically to chemistry
has been offered by Luisi (2002). By the term “emergence” Luisi understands
the onset of novel properties that arise when a certain level of structural complexity is formed from components of lower complexity. Luisi emphasizes that
molecular sciences, and chemistry in particular, are actually the disciplines in
which the notion of emergence has the most obvious applicability. Luisi offers
the following examples of emergent properties in chemistry: the aromaticity of
a benzene molecule, which is not present in the atoms that form the molecule;

56

the properties of water and of all other molecules, which are not present in the
atomic components; and the oxygen-binding properties of complex chemical
structures like hemoglobin or myoglobin which are not present in the single
aminoacids.
Luisi considers the following two questions. Can the properties of molecules
be explained a posteriori from the properties of the components? Can they
be foreseen a priori? Luisi argues that there are no reasons to think that
the liquid properties of water, the aromaticity of benzene, or the folding of
myoglobin, cannot be in principle explained or even foreseen on the basis of
the properties of the components. Thus, Luisi is entirely committed to token
reductionism (explained below). He even goes as far as claiming that the
hypothesis that the emergent properties of molecules cannot be explained as a
matter of principle on the basis of the components is tantamount to assuming
a force of some non-defined nature (Luisi 2002, p. 193). But he points out
that in practice, emergent properties are almost impossible to predict. This is
especially true for large molecules like myoglobin, in the case of which the 20
different amino acids and a chain length of 153 amino acid residues, gives rise
to 20153 possible theoretical chains, myoglobin being one of those.
According to Luisi, chemistry offers examples of downward causation, understood as the influence of the relatedness of the parts on the behaviour
of the parts themselves. One example that Luisi offers is that of benzene:
when a benzene molecule is created, the orbitals of carbon atoms and those
of hydrogen are changed; the molecule as a whole affects the properties of
its constituents. Of course, it is true that the molecule of benzene could not
have emerged if its components did not have the right properties (Luisi does
not deny upward causation), but it is also true that once the molecule is
formed it constraints the motion of its parts. For Luisi, downward causation
is the consequence of upward causation, and once the two exist, they take
place simultaneously in a sort of “cyclic” causality. But the kind of downward
causation that Luisi endorses differs significantly from the kind of downward
causation that the British emergentists talked about; it does not assume any
special “configurational” forces at work.
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Luisi’s account of emergence resembles very much the next account of emergence, due to Mark Bedau (2008), especially when one compares the two authors’ views about predictability and downward causation.
A number of contemporary authors have recently proposed concepts of
emergence that are applicable to phenomena studied by science in general.
Although the examples that these authors refer to come from specific domains
(the theory of cellular automata, physics, etc.) these concepts of emergence are
applicable to a host of phenomena, including those in the purview of chemistry.
Mark Bedau (2008) thinks that there is not much room for strong emergence in contemporary science, and even if such strongly emergent phenomena
existed, they could at best play a primitive role and thus they will be scientifically irrelevant. Bedau defends a version of emergence which he even refers
to as “weak emergence”. Weak emergence is compatible with the generality of
microphysics:
“Macro entities and their states are wholly constituted by the states
and locations of their constituent micro entities, so the causal dynamics involving macro objects is wholly determined by the underlying micro dynamics.” (Bedau 2008, p. 161).
But Bedau also recognizes that the global properties of a macro system may
influence the behaviour at the micro level. This is a sort of downward causation; however, this kind of downward causation is not the same as the one
that is associated with strong emergence. The properties of the macro system
(including the causal properties) are a consequence of the properties of the micro systems that compose it, but the derivation is usually hard to obtain. The
hallmark of Bedau’s weak emergence is that to obtain such a derivation there
is no theoretical shortcut: one must resort to simulation. Bedau claims that
causal processes in nature are caused by the iteration and aggregation of micro
causal interactions. The only way to predict the macro properties of weakly
emergent systems is to follow the same steps of iteration and aggregation that
nature follows, with the help of powerful computers.
Bedau’s examples of weak emergence come primarily from the theory of cellular automata. For example, being a glider gun is a weakly emergent property
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in the Game of Life – a glider gun is a macro level property, which is realized
by a variety of micro level configurations of cells. Thus, Bedau’s emergence
is compatible with a weak notion of reductionism – token reductionism, which
claims that all property instances are lower level property instances; but insofar as it is committed to the idea that the same macro property can be
instantiated by a variety of different micro properties (e.g., the glider gun in
cellular automata), Bedau’s emergence is incompatible with type reductionism
– the idea that all properties are lower level properties. According to Bedau,
explanations that contain emergents (macro explanations) are autonomous in
relation to micro explanations – they are overarching explanations that unify
an otherwise heterogeneous collection of micro instances.
Concepts of emergence that emphasize context sensitivity, nonlinearity,
feedback loops, and the importance of organization between the parts of compositionally complex systems have been presented by William Wimsatt (2000,
2008) and Sandra Mitchell (2010). These accounts of emergence have not been
designed to apply to chemistry in particular and they are not at odds with
reductionism. This is why those inclined to see reductionism (or at least a
strong variant thereof) and emergence as mutually exclusive would not readily embrace these accounts as emergentist. Indeed, what these accounts call
“emergence” would in some cases count as “resultance” in the eyes of those
who hold more conservative views about what emergence is.17 However, if
one insists on the traditional notion of emergence it may turn out that no
phenomena investigated by science meet those strict tenets of emergence, and
thus nothing available for scientific study would count as emergent (e.g., see
Mitchell 2010). Chemistry is a domain in which a certain type of reductionistic
approach has been proven to be tremendously fruitful. But it is also a domain
which has been considered as “the embodiment of emergence” (Luisi 2002).
Thus, one need not rule out the possibility that the kind of accounts proposed
by Mitchell and Wimsatt are applicable to chemistry as well.
Another concept of emergence has been offered by Robert Batterman (2002,
17

For a discussion of the distinction between emergence and resultance in the context of
British emergentism, see McLaughlin 2008.
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2011). Although Batterman’s examples of emergence are primarily from physics,
his view of emergence could conceivably apply to chemistry as well, and for
this reason it is worth mentioning. Batterman distinguishes between two senses
of reduction. One may talk of the reduction of one theory to another in the
philosopher’s sense (e.g., Nagelian reduction, where the laws of a coarse grained
theory, are derived from the laws of another theory, which is fine grained); or
one may talk of reduction in the physicist’s sense (the fine grained theory
reduces to the coarse grained theory in the limit of some parameter having
a certain value). For example, relativistic mechanics reduces to classical me 2
chanics in the limit in which vc → 0. Now, the limiting relations between
theories may be regular (when the “limiting behaviour” as the parameter tends
to a certain value resembles the “behaviour in the limit” where the parameter
has that value), or they may be singular (when the behaviour in the limit differs markedly from the limiting behaviour). Many pairs of theories are related
by singular limiting behaviour: quantum and classical mechanics, the wave
and ray optics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.
For Batterman, the singular nature of the limiting relations between pairs
of theories is indicative of emergence: the behaviour of the system as a certain
parameter approaches a certain value is different from the behaviour of the
system when that value is reached. When the limiting relations are singular
we can expect novel phenomena in the asymptotic regime between the two
theories. Often, as in the case of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics,
the coarser (higher level) theory can be reduced in the philosopher’s sense to
the fine grained (lower level) theory only if one makes the assumption that a
certain parameter (in this case, the number of particles N) approaches infinity.
But real systems are always finite, and a strict derivation obtains only in
the thermodynamic limit. As a result, one may speak of the phenomena of
thermodynamics as emerging from statistical mechanics. Qualitative changes
in the states of matter known as phase transitions (e.g., freezing and boiling
water, the transition from the ferromagnetic phase to the paramagnetic phase)
are also considered emergent since it proves very difficult (if not impossible)
to reduce them to the underlying microphysics if we do not appeal to infinite
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idealizations.
Batterman’s approach pays close attention to mathematical procedures
such as renormalization – a mathematical technique for characterizing how
the structure of interactions varies with the scale considered. Renormalization
reveals how theories at different levels are related, but such relation is not
reduction: it turns out that the phenomena studied by the higher level theory
are decoupled from those at the lower level.
For Batterman, emergence is also associated with universality or multiple realizability (systems very different at the micro level exhibiting identical
macro level behaviour). Multiple realizability shows that lower level explanations cannot adequately account for the convergence of the behaviour of
varied systems, and higher level level explanations that ignore the micro-level
details are required. In contrast with the classical notions of emergence, Batterman’s notion of emergence does not subscribe to the downward causation
thesis or to the idea that mereological part/whole relations play a crucial role
in emergence.
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Chapter 3
Functional emergence
In this chapter I begin to develop a theory of emergence that is, in my view,
best equipped to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what justifies
the ontological autonomy of chemistry. For reasons that will become apparent,
I will call it “functional emergence”. I will begin with a rough and ready
characterization of functional emergence and progressively clarify the details
of this brand of emergence, including through a number of examples.
The main thesis of functional emergence is the idea that many properties
are defined not by a shared microphysical ingredient, but only functionally,
by a common behaviour. Take, for example, the property of being an acid
(this is one of the examples which will be treated in detail in this chapter).
The property of being an acid is defined only functionally, by pointing to a
common behaviour of these substances in chemical reactions (the ability to
donate a proton) rather than to a shared microphysical ingredient (a H atom,
for example).
Functional emergence is committed to the generality of microphysics: e.g,
every acidic molecule is a complex microphysical system of interacting electrons, protons and neutrons, all obeying the laws of physics – so unlike more
traditional notions of emergence, functional emergence does not recognize the
existence of non-physical forces. However, functional emergence agrees that
it would be mistake to conclude from this that chemical properties are mi-
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crophysical properties in disguise.1 Similarly, functional emergence rejects the
idea that if all events are governed by physical laws, then all laws are physical.
According to functional emergence, there are genuine chemical properties and
laws, which on most accounts of reduction are irreducible to the properties
and laws of microphysics (chapter 4 will discuss this in detail). The reason
for this is multiple realizability: one and the same chemical property (e.g.,
acidity) is realized by a variety of microphysical properties (various systems
of electrons, protons and neutrons), and thus it cannot be identified with any
particular microphysical property. As a result, the laws in which functional
chemical properties occur will not be derivable from the laws of microphysics
simply because the latter lack the requisite terms. Using the term “emergence” to characterize this kind of functionalism about chemistry is not unjustified: chemical properties are higher level properties, and the general truths
about them cannot be derived from the general truths of physics (although
this derivation is sometimes available for property instances). However, unlike other varieties of emergence, functional emergence does not go as far as
to assert the existence of downward causation or deny the causal closure of
physics.2
The idea that a thing is defined by what it does, and not by what it consists
of, was first advocated by Alan Turing, in the foundations of computer science
and artificial intelligence (Turing 1950). He thought about it via an analogy
with the mathematical concept of a function (Turing 1950, p. 439). Turing’s
idea was quickly adopted in the philosophy of mind, where it served as a basis
for an alternative theory of mind, different from both the identity theory and
behaviourism (Putnam 1975b;a, Fodor 1974; 1997). However, functionalism
as a theory of the mind has been questioned (starting with Block 1980) and
functionalist anti-reductionist strategies in the philosophy of mind encountered
a number of complications and obstacles. Among these are the problem of the
phenomenal character of experience or qualia, the questionable scientific status
1

A chemical property is a physical property in disguise if the chemical property is identical
with a complex physical property but this identity relation is not obvious.
2
Downward causation is understood here as the power of a whole to affect its parts that
does not originate in the parts themselves.
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of folk psychology, and recent empirical findings coming from neuroscience that
contradict the multiple realizability thesis in psychology (Bickle 1998, Bechtel
and Mundale 1999). The theses of functionalism and multiple realizability
have also inspired anti-reductionist arguments in the philosophy of biology
(Kitcher 1984; 1999, Kincaid 1990).
This chapter will develop a detailed and rigorous account of functional
properties in chemistry – an account that elucidates the nature of functional
properties by explicating the contrast between functional and non-functional
(constitutive) properties. In this account, the criteria for multiple realizability will be made explicit. The fact that chemical properties can be intersubjectively scrutinized, that they are amenable to measurement, experiment
and to a quantitative understanding to a greater extent than those in other special sciences, justifies a more optimistic attitude (see Scerri and McIntyre1997,
p. 227; Humphreys 1997b).
Chemistry is the discipline that is in some sense closest to physics, and
therefore it is the first domain outside physics itself where we should be able
to observe functional properties and irreducibility/emergence, if these truly
exist. Despite this, the philosophers interested in the autonomy of chemistry
have not given consideration to functionalism and multiple realizability. For
example, the volume which was published as a result of the 3rd Erlenmeyer
Colloquy for the Philosophy of Chemistry, titled “The Autonomy of Chemistry” (Janich and Psarros 1998) does not even mention functional chemical
properties, despite the broad consensus and shared anti-reductionist attitudes
among the participants. Other arguments for the autonomy of this discipline
(Bunge 1982, van Brakel 2000, Lombardi and Labarca 2005, Scerri and McIntyre 1997) also omit multiple realizability or functionalism. In fact, the idea
of multiple realizability that often goes hand in hand with functionalism has
been regarded with distrust in the philosophy of chemistry, one major author
referring to it as “wishful thinking” (Scerri 2000, p. 406).
These attitudes about functionalism and multiple realizability in chemistry
are, in my view, mistaken. In fact – as I will argue – many chemical properties
are defined functionally, in terms of their efficient roles, and not in terms
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of their physical constitution. The form of emergence that I defend recruits
functionalism’s anti-reductionist capacities and is rich enough to justify the
ontological autonomy of chemistry.
Unlike psychology, where the multiple realization thesis is a hypothesis
(the claim being that properties like pain are multiply realizable), chemistry
presents us with properties that are multiply realized.3 If it can be shown
that there are chemical properties that can be defined adequately only functionally, then we have a strong and clear case against property reductionism
in chemistry. If there are functional properties in chemistry, they cannot be
said to reduce to any constitutive properties, and therefore must be considered
as they are, namely sui generis, higher-order chemical properties in their own
right.
However, a success against reductionism need not mean a success against
physicalism. Although chemical functional properties may not be themselves
reducible, any instantiation of such a property is identical with an instantiation of some physical property. This way, physicalism (token physicalism) is
preserved, while reductionism (or type physicalism) is resisted.

3.1
3.1.1

Constitutive vs. functional properties
The distinction between constitutive and functional properties

Some properties are defined by “what they are”, i.e., by pointing to an intrinsic
feature (i.e., a constituent) present in all instances of that property and which
explains their distinguishing characteristics. I call these properties and the
definitions that such properties receive constitutive. A constitutive definition
3

In fact, it has been argued that a multiple realizability of psychological states is not well
supported by empirical findings. Bickle (1998, ch. 4) emphasizes that most experimental
results in contemporary neuroscience indicate continuity of underlying neural mechanisms,
both within and across species. Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reveal common areas of high metabolic activity during
psychological task performance, both across and within individual humans.
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is a definition that points to a lower level constituent (a part) that is common to
all the entities to which the definiendum applies, and explains their behaviour.
Showing that a property can be given a constitutive definition is showing that
the following steps can be followed.
1)

Obtain a description of each type of entity instantiating the property in question in terms of its lower level constituents.

2)

Look at the descriptions obtained at step 1 and identify those
constituents that a) are common to all entities instantiating the
property in question and b) are not shared with any other entities.

3)

Find a principled way of explaining how these shared constituents
determine the features that characterize the property in question.

4)

Only after steps 1-3 are completed can one formulate the constitutive definition and assert the identity of the property in question
with the property of being a system possessing the constitutive
features found at step 2.

The features that define the property in question mentioned at step 3 are
known by consulting the common definition for the property in question. Step
3 is required to ensure that the microphysical features identified at step 2 are
not accidental features that just happen to be possessed by all the physical
systems in question and only by them. If step 3 is completed then the microphysical features identified at step 2 can be called microconstitutive: they
are microphysical features that are constitutive of all the systems instantiating
the property in question.
To illustrate how a property can be given a constitutive definition, consider the property of being a mammal. The commonly existing definition of
a mammal such as the one provided by the Oxford English Dictionary states
that a mammal is “a warm-blooded vertebrate animal of a class that is distinguished by the possession of hair or fur, females that secrete milk for the
nourishment of the young, and (typically) the birth of live young.” Now let
us examine whether one can give a constitutive definition for the property of
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being a mammal. Being a mammal is a constitutive property if and only if
the following steps can be completed.
1)

Obtain a description of each type of mammal in terms of its lower
level constituents.

Various animals belong to the class of mammals (mammalia). The science of
biology can give us a description (an analysis) of each element in this class
in terms of its anatomico-physiological features. There is one anatomicophysiological description for dogs, another for humans, another for bats, another for whales.
2)

The second step in providing a constitutive definition for the property of being a mammal is to look at the descriptions obtained at
step 1 and identify those anatomico-physiological features that a)
are shared by all mammals and b) distinguish them from other
organisms.

The property that meets both criteria is the property of having mammary
glands. Any organism that has mammary glands is a mammal, and any mammal is an organism that has mammary glands.4
3)

Find a principled way of explaining how having mammary glands
determines the features that define or characterize the property of
being a mammal.

We need to be sure that the anatomico-physiological features identified at step
2 (mammary glands) are not accidental features that just happen to be possessed by all mammals and only by them. To do this, it is required to show
that having mammary glands is related to the features that define or characterize (according to the commonly existing definition) the property of being a
mammal. According to the commonly existing definition (be it scientific, from
a biology textbook, or lexical, from the dictionary) mammals are distinguished
4
Given that in males mammary glands are typically absent, the term “organism” in this
sentence should be interpreted as including the male of the pair as well.
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from other classes by the fact that the females nourish their young with milk.
Milk is a product of the activity of mammary glands. Normally, the mammary
glands are fully functional only in females.
4)

Only after steps 1-3 are completed can one formulate the constitutive definition and assert that a mammal is an organism that has
mammary glands.

Any organism that has mammary glands is a mammal, and any mammal is an
organism that has mammary glands. Therefore, the possession of mammary
glands is both necessary and sufficient for instantiating the property of being
a mammal.5 Indeed, one can say that the property of being a mammal just is
(or reduces to) the property of being an organism that has mammary glands.
One may raise the following question. Commonly existing definitions (be
they lexical or scientific) aim to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the property defined. But constitutive definitions also claim to isolate the
necessary and sufficient conditions. Does this mean that the necessary and sufficient conditions stipulated by the two types of definition are the same? If so,
what distinguishes constitutive definitions from commonly existing definitions,
be they lexical or scientific?
In response, it should first be recognized that many commonly existing
definitions are in fact characterizations or descriptions of the property defined.
This is true especially of lexical definitions. In the dictionary definition of
mammals mentioned above, some characteristics mentioned in the definition
are not necessary. For example not all mammals have their skin covered with
hair or fur, monotremes lay eggs, etc. Other characteristics which uniquely
5

One may worry that the controversy in the philosophy of biology regarding species as
natural kinds prevents us from defining mammals constitutively, as those organisms that
have mammary glands. In particular, the worry may be that if biological species are defined
by a common history (and not by some features present in all members) then the same
thing could be said about biological classes as well (mammalia included). While there
may be ways to defuse this objection (for example, by arguing that the worry does not
necessarily extend to biological classes, which are far more general than biological species,
being separated from them by three taxonomic ranks), I will instead restrict the scope of
my discussion of mammals to currently existing ones. It is then uncontroversially true that,
among currently existing animals, all mammals and only them have mammary glands.
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pick out mammals are not mentioned: two bones in the middle ear called
incus and malleus occur only in mammals. In contrast, constitutive definitions
always isolate the necessary and sufficient elements.
Second, even if both the constitutive definitions and the commonly existing
ones provide the necessary and sufficient conditions to uniquely pick out the
property denoted by the definiendum, it does not follow that the two definitions
are identical. This is because they may provide different sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Take the following two definitions of a square.
Definition 1: The square is the geometrical figure with four equal
sides and a right angle.
Definition 2: The square is the geometrical figure with an area
equal to the length of any of its sides multiplied by itself.
Both definitions list properties that are necessary and sufficient to define the
square. But these properties mention different things (Definition 1 mentions
the right angle, whereas Definition 2 mentions area). However, the two definitions are in a sense equivalent: they pick out the same object, the square.
So the definientia of the two definitions are intensionally distinct but extensionally equivalent. The same may happen with constitutive definitions and
commonly existing ones.
Third, even if a commonly existing definition provides the necessary and
sufficient conditions that uniquely pick out the property denoted by the definiendum, it does not follow that this definition is constitutive: the necessary and
sufficient conditions may refer to abstractions or relations, to functions to be
fulfilled, or conditions to be met (as in the case of operational definitions), not
to microconstitutive features.
Finally, in some cases the commonly existing definition may be in fact
constitutive; if this is the case, then we already have a constitutive definition
and there is no need to follow the steps above.
Not all properties can be given constitutive definitions. Some properties
are defined not by what they are, but by what they do, i.e., they are defined
functionally. Functional properties proper are those that can be given only
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functional definitions. Functional definitions are those definitions that pick
out the property denoted by the definiendum via a specification of the efficient role played by that property in the entity instantiating it. The idea is
that what makes a functional property the property it is, is the causal role
associated with it, and not some constituent shared by all instances of that
property. In this respect, functional properties differ fundamentally from constitutive properties, and of course, so do their respective definitions. For every
functional property there can be more than one kind of particulars that can
carry out the causal role defining that property. Such particulars are the realizers (or implementers, or instantiations) of the considered functional property.
A classic example of a functional property is the property of being a mousetrap. There are many types of mousetraps: springloaded bar mousetraps,
“mouth” mousetraps, electric mousetraps, bucket mousetraps, glue mousetraps, etc. There is no microconstitutive property shared by all these devices
(so there will be difficulties with step 2). But they are all mousetraps inasmuch
as they successfully accomplish the role of trapping mice. The functionalist
story has it that anything (any device) that successfully accomplishes this role
is a mousetrap – the property of being a mousetrap is said to be multiply
realizable.
Functional properties can be seen as second-order constitutive properties,
as many philosophers adopting a functionalist view of mental properties prefer
to see them. For example, the property of being a mousetrap is a second-order
property, namely the property of having some constituent or another that
results in mice being trapped. Thus, functional properties are higher-order
properties, not reducible to (identifiable with) a particular implementation or
realization; the “essence” of being a mousetrap consists in the possession of
the ability to realize the relevant causal role, and not in the possession of a
constitutive feature shared by all individual realizers.
By contrast, a constitutive property can be reduced to a certain constituent
of the things instantiating it, because that constituent is shared by all the
instances of the considered property, and possessing that constituent is both
necessary and sufficient for instantiating the property in question. Being a
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mammal reduces to being an organism that has mammary glands, but being a
mousetrap does not reduce to being a device that has a spring-loaded bar, for
example. To highlight the distinction between properties that are defined by
“what they are” and those that are defined by “what they can do”, consider
this: being a mammal reduces to being an organism that is mammary-glanded,
whereas being a mousetrap is any device that can trap mice.
A couple of things need to be clarified with regard to the type of definition
that I propose. First, there is an ambiguity with the word “constitutive”.
The word may be used to describe the property as such (e.g., as in “Being a
mammal is a constitutive property”) or the characteristic in virtue of which the
property obtains (e.g., as in “Having mammary glands is constitutive of being
a mammal”).6 This ambiguity has the potential of obscuring the arguments
I will be putting forward and for this reason it must be dealt with. For
the sake of clarity, I will continue to refer to the properties that are defined
with reference to a common ingredient as constitutive properties, but I will
use the term microconstitutive to refer to those shared features in virtue of
which the property obtains. Thus, being a mammal is a constitutive property
that obtains in virtue of the microconstitutive feature of having mammary
glands. This choice of terminology is largely conventional as in many cases
(including the case of mammals) the shared feature (viz. mammary glands) is
not necessarily microphysical.
Second, there is the question of the exact nature of the microconstitutive
features that figure in a constitutive definition. What sort of features may be
properly considered microconstitutive and what sort of features are excluded?
If we pick sufficiently abstract microconstitutive features, couldn’t we provide
constitutive definitions even for functional properties? In this case, wouldn’t
the distinction between constitutive and functional collapse? These are all
genuine concerns. This is why the features identified at step 2 must meet some
6

The distinction between “the property as such” and “the caracteristic in virtue of which
the property obtains” matches the distinction between a property and its essential constituents. For example, in the case of mammals, the property of being a mammal is what I
call “the property as such”, whereas having mammary glands is the characteristic in virtue
of which a creature is a mammal.
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constraints: they have to be intrinsic and concrete. They cannot be relational
or abstract.7 The constitutive features (or the candidates thereof) must be
constituents, i.e., things (not relations or abstract features). Discerning when
these constraints are met is not easy. However, judging whether a certain
feature is an appropriate candidate for being a microconstitutive property can
be judged more effectively in the context of concrete situations. The details
of the concrete situations that I will be considering will, I hope, make it easier
to ascertain whether a certain shared feature is truly microconstitutive.

3.1.2

Functional properties and multiple realization

Equipped with these concepts, we can attempt the following definition of multiple realization. A property T is multiply realized when it has two or more
distinct realizations, where distinct realization can be spelled out as follows.
Two lower level properties N and M are distinct realizations of a higher level
property T if and only if i) the instantiation of either N or M in an individual
S is sufficient for the instantiation of T in S (REALIZATION), and ii) there is
no microconstitutive property P such that the instantiation of P is sufficient
for the instantiation of either N or M (DISTINCTNESS). In other words, a
property is multiply realized when it is not constitutive. The existence of a
common microconstitutive feature P shared by the lower level realizing properties is determined according to the best mature scientific theories that are
applicable to that level.
Since this definition appeals to a scientific theory for ascertaining the distinctness of the realizer properties, a number of examples of multiple realizability that have been traditionally offered could be reevaluated. For example, the
claim that psychological properties like pains or beliefs are multiply realized
is plausible only to the extent to which there is a mature human and animal
neuroscience. The same with the property of being a mouse trap. The prop7

This must be the case if the property that we are defining is concrete; this requirement
does not apply to the case in which the property that we are defining is itself abstract
or relational. This proviso is required to allow the possibility of providing constitutive
definitions for abstract properties such as mathematical properties.
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erty of being a mouse trap has didactical value when it comes to illustrating
the thesis of multiple realizability to someone who has never heard of it. But
if one adopts the definition of multiple realizability presented above, it could
become problematic. Given the definition above, the claim that the property
of being a mouse trap is multiply realized receives as much support as the
notion that there is a scientific theory that deals with the construction of mice
catching devices. While springs and glues may be (and indeed are) of scientific
interest (for sciences such as mechanics and chemistry, respectively) one may
question that the devices that employ them to catch mice hold significant scientific interest. Rigorous talk of multiple realization is best conducted within
the framework of an empirical science, and the more established this empirical
science is, the more legitimate the talk of multiple realizability becomes.

3.1.3

Constitutive vs. dispositional, constitutive vs. relational

How do functional properties compare with dispositional properties? It may
be tempting to think of functional properties as dispositions (in the sense
that both are defined by their behaviour). However, this is misleading for the
following reason. Many of those who discuss dispositions defend the idea that
dispositional properties supervene on intrinsic properties. If one accepts that
dispositional properties supervene on intrinsic properties, then this could be
incompatible with what I mean by a functional property. Functional properties
are multiply realizable, whereas dispositions need not be. For example, the
property of being a noble gas is could be considered dispositional (noble gases
are disposed to being chemically inert), but it is not functional. Rather, as I
will show in the next section, the property of being a noble gas is a constitutive
property.
Also, the distinction between constitutive and functional properties does
not overlap with the distinction betweeen relational and intrinsic. While some
functional properties are relational, not all relational properties are functional.
For example, the property of being an object less massive than a given object
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X is a relational property, but it need not be functional. It could very well
be constitutive: it could turn out that all objects less massive than X are
constitutively identical.

3.2

Constitutive properties in chemistry

In chemistry, constitutive properties are those that are given constitutive definitions. Showing that a certain type of chemical property can be given a
constitutive definition is showing that the following steps can be followed.
1)

Obtain a purely microphysical description of each type of physical
system instantiating the chemical property in question.

2)

Look at the descriptions obtained at step 1 and identify those microphysical features that a) are common to all physical systems instantiating the chemical property in question and b) are not shared
with any other physical systems.

3)

Find a principled way of explaining how these shared microphysical features determine the features that define or characterize the
chemical property in question.

4)

Only after steps 1-3 are completed can one formulate the constitutive definition and assert the identity of the chemical property
in question with the property of being a system possessing the microphysical features found at step 2. These features can be now
called microconstitutive: they are microphysical features that are
constitutive of all the entities to which the definiendum applies.

Step 3 is required to ensure that the microphysical features identified at step 2
are not accidental features that just happen to be possessed by all the physical
systems in question and only by them. If step 3 is completed then the microphysical features identified at step 2 can be called microconstitutive: they
are microphysical features that are constitutive of all the systems instantiating
the chemical property in question.
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Important chemical properties like being a noble gas, a halogen, an alcohol, an oxide, as well as other chemical properties are defined via constitutive
definitions, therefore all such chemical properties can be said to reduce to microphysical properties in this precise sense: they are identical with the systems
in which a certain microphysical property plays a defining role.
Consider the property of being a noble gas. It can be shown that the
property of being a noble gas is nothing more than the possession of a microconstitutive (quantum-mechanical) property – having a “full” set of electrons
on the outer electron shell. Noble gases (helium, neon, argon, krypton, xenon,
radon, and the synthesized element ununoctium) are a group of chemical elements that have similar chemical properties: under standard conditions, they
are all monoatomic gases with very low chemical reactivity. They occupy group
18 (8A) of the periodic table. In order to show that the chemical property of
being a noble gas is identical to a physical property, the steps above can be
described more precisely and it can be shown how their completion leads to a
constitutive definition for the property of being a noble gas atom.
1)

For an isolated atom of each particular noble gas, one needs to obtain a purely microphysical (i.e., quantum-mechanical) description
of the nucleus-electrons system representing that atom.

For simple atoms like hydrogen, this quantum-mechanical description can be
obtained by solving the Schrödinger equation for the binding energy E and
then for the wavefunction ψ. We start out with the (time independent nonrelativistic) Schrödinger equation for the hydrogen atom:

Ĥψ = Eψ
We find that
E = − n12 8εme
2 h2
0

where m is the electron mass, e is the electron charge, ε0 is the permittivity
of the vacuum, h is Plank’s constant, and n is the first quantum number –
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the principal quantum number. By solving Schrödinger’s equation for the
binding energy we find the value of n. The same procedure can be applied
for finding the binding energy for all hydrogenic atoms (e.g., He+ , Li++ ). The
principal quantum number n is the first of the four numbers describing the
quantum-mechanical makeup of an atom, and it gives us the binding energy
of the electron to the nucleus (it tells us in which “shell” the electron is).
An n value of 1 is associated with the ground state of the hydrogen atom.
Solving the Schrödinger equation for the wavefunction ψ, we find three more
quantum numbers: the angular momentum quantum number, l, that gives us
the “shape” of the wavefunction, the magnetic quantum number, ml , which
gives us the energy levels available within a subshell, and the spin quantum
number, ms , which describes the unique quantum state of an electron. Using
these four quantum numbers, one can write down the quantum-mechanical
description of any nucleus-electrons system – the electronic configuration.
The Schrödinger equation gives us the electronic configuration of all atoms,
but as already mentioned, when the number of electrons increases the equations become increasingly difficult to solve exactly and approximate methods
are being used. The atoms of noble gases are not simple hydrogenic systems,
and except for the simplest noble gas atom, helium, there is no analytical
way of solving the Schrödinger equation. Nonetheless, the ground state energy levels of the electrons of the helium atom can be known very accurately
using approximate methods like Hartree-Fock and Thomas-Fermi theory (also
known as density functional theory). But for our current purposes, how we
obtain the quantum-mechanical description of a noble gas atom, is less important. It is perfectly acceptable if the electron configurations are determined
experimentally, through the analysis of the atomic spectra. This can be done
accurately for the atoms of noble gases, and one way or another we end up
with the following quantum-mechanical descriptions:
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He
1s2
Ne
1s2 2s2 2p6
Ar
1s2 2s2 2p6 3s2 3p6
Kr
1s2 2s2 2p6 3s2 3p6 4s2 3d10 4p6
Xe
1s2 2s2 2p6 3s2 3p6 4s2 3d10 4p6 5s2 4d10 5p6
Rn
1s2 2s2 2p6 3s2 3p6 4s2 3d10 4p6 5s2 4d10 5p6 6s2 4f14 5d10 6p6
Uuo 1s2 2s2 2p6 3s2 3p6 4s2 3d10 4p6 5s2 4d10 5p6 6s2 4f14 5d10 6p6 5f14 6d10 7s2 7p6
2)

The second step in providing a constitutive definition for the property of being a noble gas is to look at the description obtained at
step 1 and identify those quantum-mechanical features that a) are
common to all noble gas atoms and b) are not shared with any
other atom of a different element.

By examining the electron configurations above and comparing them with
those of the other elements in the table, it becomes clear that what fits both
conditions is the fact that the atoms of noble gases have their outermost shell
(given by the maximum value of the principal quantum number n) filled with
electrons (in boldface above).8 Therefore having a full outer shell is a constituent of all noble gases and only of them.
3)

The next step is to find a principled way of explaining how this
shared quantum-mechanical feature (having the outermost electron
shell filled) determines the features that characterize noble gases
(viz., their low reactivity).

As it can be observed from the electronic configurations above, it turns out that
the atoms of all noble gases with the exception of He, which has two electrons,
have exactly two subshells on the last shell: s and p (second quantum number
l is 0, respectively 1). These subshells being both filled, bring up the number
of electrons on the last shell to 8, which makes the noble gas atoms conform to
the octet rule. This rule asserts that atoms tend to be most stable when the
8

This is because an s orbital can hold maximum 2 electrons, while a p orbital can hold
a maximum of 6 electrons.
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outermost electron shells of their constituent atoms contain eight electrons.
The octet rule (and the analogous rule for the He atom, the duet rule) provide
a principled explanation for the very low reactivity of the noble gases: noble
gas atoms do not require any more electrons to complete their outer shell.
4)

After the steps above have been completed, one can finally assert
the identity of the property of being a noble gas atom with the
quantum-mechanical property of being an atom with a complete
outer shell. One is thus able to formulate the constitutive definition
of the noble gas that is found in chemistry textbooks.

One may have a lingering suspicion that the property of having a full outermost electron shell is itself a functional property. This is because the notion
of an outermost electron shell sounds functional, due to the adjective “outermost”. However, the property of being a full outermost electron shell is in
fact a microconstituent of noble gases: a full electron shell is something pretty
concrete, that is shared by all noble gases and only by them, that explains
their behaviour, and that can be physically removed from the system. Second,
even if the property of being a full outermost shell were a functional property,
it would not follow that the property of having a full outermost shell (i.e.,
the property of being an atom with a full outer shell) is itself a functional
property. Consider the property of being a glue, and suppose this property
is functional – different glues having different microconstituents (say, made
of different chemicals) have the same macro-level property, i.e., they are all
sticky. The property of being a glue mouse trap may still be a constitutive
property (the shared constituent that plays a crucial role in the functioning of
the property being glue), despite the fact that this constituent is itself a functional property. The same with mammals: the mammary glands of species
X (say, bats) may be truly different in their realization from the mammary
glands of species Y (say, whales); thus, being a mammary gland may be a
functional property. But this does not entail that the property of being a
mammal is itself a functional property: at the anatomical level of analysis, all
mammals really do have a constituent in common, namely mammary glands.
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At lower levels of analysis, the shared constituent may turn out to depend on
heterogeneous mechanisms: the constituents may not consist of the same subconstituents. But this does not mean that the property originally analyzed is
functional. Thinking otherwise may result in a fallacy similar to the fallacy of
composition: a forest may be big even if all of its trees are small. I will return
to this sort of objection in the first section of chapter 5.
Similar constitutive definitions can be found for the other name-bearing
individual groups in the table. Halogens are elements whose atoms have exactly seven electrons on the outermost shell; alkaline earth metals are elements
whose atoms have two more electrons on their outermost shell relative to the
previous noble gas, etc. The atoms of the elements in these groups show patterns in their electron configuration, and these patterns are responsible for
their similar chemical behaviour.
For numerous other chemical properties (especially compounds), providing constitutive definitions is even easier. For such chemicals, one need not
look at the quantum-mechanical description of the system, since it is sufficient to examine the molecular structure and identify the individual atoms or
functional groups in its constitution. For example, alcohols are those compounds containing the group hydroxyl, OH, which is bound to a saturated
carbon atom; sulphones are those compounds containing the functional group
sulphonyl, RSO2 R’; carbonates are those compounds containing carbonate ester, ROCOOR’, etc.9 The existence of a functional group in the constitution
of the molecule will typically ensure similar chemical properties for all compounds having that group. In general, the same functional group will undergo
similar chemical reactions regardless of the molecule to which it belongs.
9
The term “functional group” has no semantic connection with “functional property” as
described here. In organic chemistry, functional groups are specific groups of atoms within
molecules that are responsible for the characteristic chemical reactions of those molecules.
In fact, the terminology can be misleading: the presence of a functional group in the constitution of a chemical property instance (a molecule) makes the chemical property in question
non-functional in our sense, i.e., it makes it constitutive.
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Alcohol

Formula

1-Propanol

C3 H8 O

Isopropyl alcohol

C3 H8 O

Cyclohexanol

C6 H12 O

Ethanol

C2 H6 O

Structure

Stick-and-ball model

Table 3.1: Microphysical description of alcohols.
All alcohols and only alcohols have a hydroxyl group bound to a
saturated carbon atom.

3.3
3.3.1

Functional properties in chemistry
Acids and bases

Now consider definitions of chemical properties such as the property of being
an acid. According to the Brønsted-Lowry definition, which is the most used,
an acid is any compound that can donate a proton to other compound in
chemical reactions. Consequently, the Brønsted-Lowry base is defined as a
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proton receiver.
We first notice that this definition does not resemble a constitutive definition. Unlike noble gases or alcohols, acids and bases are defined not by
pointing to a certain microconstitutive feature, but by pointing to what they
do in reactions; they are defined by their chemical behaviour relative to the
participants in the reaction: acids donate protons, bases accept them. Therefore, the definitions for acids or bases that can be found in chemistry textbooks
are functional definitions par excellence. But perhaps they need not be; perhaps the property of being an acid (or a base) is defined functionally merely
for convenience. Let us see whether acidity and basicity can be given constitutive definitions by following recipe that gave us the constitutive definition
for noble gases.
The first step is to obtain a microphysical description of an isolated acidic
compound in terms of its constituents, and do so for all acidic compounds.
Why does the acid have to be isolated? To be sure that the properties we
identify do not depend on the relations of the chemical species in question
with whatever is external to it. So the task looks simple: first, make a list
of all acids; second, give their microphysical descriptions. In our case, this
description may be their structural chemical formula (the Lewis dot-diagram),
which gives us the kind, number and charge of the atoms in composition and
which also tells us how they are arranged.
Given the requirement that the compound to be described has to be considered in isolation to guarantee that we are investigating constitutive properties,
making a list of all acids is not as simple as it sounds. This is because acids are
characterized by what they do in chemical reactions, i.e., by their behaviour in
relation to the substances to which they react, or in relation to the results of
their reaction. For example, Arrhenius acids are defined as those substances
which, in aqueous solutions, increase the concentration of hydrogen ions (H+ ),
bases being those substances that increase the concentration of hydroxide ions
(OH− ). Of course, the Arrhenius definition limits acids and bases to substances in aqueous solutions. The Brønsted-Lowry definition does not have
this limitation (it includes water-insoluble substances), but ultimately it does

82

not solve our problem. The Brønsted-Lowry acids and bases are defined with
reference the products of their reaction: the acid (on the right hand side of
the equation) and the corresponding base (on the left side) are referred to as
the conjugate acid-base pair. The solvent-system definition of acids does not
solve our problem either. According to this definition, an acid is a substance
that, when dissolved in an auto-dissociating solvent, increases the concentration of the solvonium cations, and a base is a substance that increases the
concentration of the solvate anions. Just like the Brønsted-Lowry definition,
this definition extends acid-base reactions to non-aqueous systems, but it does
not yield categorical (non-relational) properties: a compound acting as an
acid in one solvent may act as a base in another. In fact, the Brønsted-Lowry
definition does not yield categorical properties either; amphoteric substances
can behave both as an acid and as a base, depending on the substance they
react with. The most used example of an amphoteric substance is water,
but even substances that are commonly considered strong acids, like sulfuric
acid, H2 SO4 , become bases in reaction with super-acids (also known as “magic
acids”).
But let’s grant for the sake of the argument that we have a comprehensive
and precise list of all acids, and we also possess the microphysical description
of each compound on the list. The next step would be to look at these descriptions and identify those intrinsic microphysical features that a) are common
to all acids and b) are not shared with any other chemical species. If we
take the Brønsted-Lowry definition of acids, the only intrinsic microphysical
feature that these compounds have in common is the presence of a hydrogen
atom – after all, the ability of donating a hydrogen nucleus presupposes the
possession of the nucleus in question. Many 19th century English chemists
including Sir Humphry Davy thought this, and for Brønsted-Lowry acids this
is correct. But the presence of one (or more) hydrogen atoms in a chemical
compound does not guarantee that that compound is a Brønsted-Lowry acid
– non-acidic compounds, such as sodium hydride (NaH, a strong base), also
have a hydrogen atom. So having a hydrogen atom is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for being a Brønsted-Lowry acid. Similarly, one may think
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that Brønsted-Lowry bases have in common the possession of a hydroxyl functional group (OH), consisting of an oxygen and a hydrogen atom connected
by a covalent bond. But, while many strong bases have this functional group
(e.g., sodium hydroxide, NaOH, potassium hydroxide, KOH, barium hydroxide, Ba(OH)2 , other bases don’t have it (e.g. weak bases like ammonia, NH3 ,
methyl-amine, CH3 NH2 , pyridine, C5 H5 N). All that Brønsted-Lowry acids
have in common is not a thing, but a behaviour:
A1)

Acids donate protons in chemical reactions.

A2)

Acids in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen.

A3)

Acids in reaction with metal carbonates produce water, CO2 and
a salt.

A4)

Acids in reaction with metal hydroxides and metal oxides produce
water and a salt.

This behaviour is shared among all Brønsted-Lowry acids despite the fact
that each acid consists of different systems of electrons and nuclei. Similar
arguments can be made for substances that qualify as acids according to the
other definitions of acidity. Lewis acids, which are defined as any substance
that can accept a pair of electrons from another compound which donates
it (called a Lewis base), are even more heterogeneous than the BrønstedLowry acids. For example, boron trifluoride, BF3 , tin tetrachloride, SnCl4 ,
and even the proton, H+ , are all Lewis acids, although they don’t appear to
have anything microconstitutive in common. The same thing can be said,
mutatis mutandis, about bases.

3.3.2

Oxidants and reductants

Another examples of functional properties are the property of being an oxidant and that of being a reductant. Oxidants (also named oxidizing agents,
or oxidizers) are substances that accept electrons from another substance in
chemical reactions (redox reactions), while reductants (also called reducing
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agents, or reducers) are substances that donate electrons. The substance that
loses electrons (the reductant) is said to be oxidized by the oxidizing agent.
The substance that gains electrons (the oxidant) is said to be reduced by the
reducing agent. As a result of the oxidation process, the oxidation state of the
reducing agent (i.e., the hypothetical charge that an atom would have if all
bonds to atoms of different elements were completely ionic) increases, and the
oxidation state of the oxidizing agent decreases.
Take, for example, the combustion of hydrogen in oxygen.
2 H2 + O2 −→ 2 H2 O + Heat
To make the oxidation numbers explicit, the equation is rewritten as
2 H20 + O20 −→ 2 H2+1 O −2 + Heat
This is a redox reaction. Hydrogen, which on the left side of the equation has
the oxidation state of 0 loses electrons to oxygen and acquires the oxidation
state of +1.
2 H20 −→ 2 H2+1 + 4 e −
Hydrogen has been oxidized by oxygen, which in this particular reaction acted
as an oxidant.
Oxygen, on the other hand, has gained electrons. It moves from the oxidation state of 0 to an oxidation state of -2.
O20 + 4 e − −→ 2 O −2
Oxygen has been reduced by hydrogen, which in this particular reaction acted
as a reductant.
Originally the term oxidation was used to refer to a reaction in which a
chemical substance combined with oxygen; oxidation meant the formation of
oxides. However, the term came to refer to a general process that happens
when a chemical species combines with a range of substances of which oxygen
is one example. It is true that when a chemical species combines with oxygen,
it tends to loose electrons to the oxygen. But this process of electron loss
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may also happen in the absence of oxygen; many different substances have the
ability to remove electrons from other chemical species.
For example, in the reaction above the role of oxygen as an oxidizing agent
may be played by another substance, e.g., chlorine. It is true that hydrogen
burns in oxygen, but it also burns in chlorine:
2 H2 + Cl2 −→ 2 HCl + Heat
which is also a redox reaction:
2 H20 + Cl20 −→ 2 H +1 Cl −1 + Heat
In this case hydrogen has been oxidized not by oxygen, but by chlorine, which
acted as an oxidizing agent. Chlorine has been reduced by hydrogen, which
acted as a reducing agent. Therefore the term oxidation no longer means the
formation of oxides, but the loss of electrons. Similarly, the term reduction
originally meant a reduction in the amount of oxygen in a substance (e.g., the
removal of oxygen from cupric oxide when cupric oxide and hydrogen react
to form copper and water). The term reduction also came to refer to the
general process of gaining electrons in a chemical reaction, whether or not
oxygen itself was the substance which gained them. As mentioned, different
substances play the role of oxygen in redox reactions, i.e., there are other
oxidizing agents besides oxygen:
• Halogens such as F, Cl, I, Br
• Acids such as nitric acid, HNO3 , sulfuric acid, H2 SO4 , peroxymonosulfuric acid, H2 SO5 , peroxydisulfuric acid, H2 S2 O8
• Salts like permanganate, MnO4
• Oxides like nitrous oxide,N2 O or silver oxide Ag2 O
Despite having heterogeneous microconstitutive features, oxidants behave similarly in chemical reactions:
O1)

Oxidants accept electrons from the chemical species to which they
react.
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O2)

Oxidants react with metals, producing oxide(s) and/or salt(s) of
the original metal; this process is known as corrosion.

O3)

Oxidants degrade the substances that come in contact with (this is
especially of concern in biology, since they damage large molecules
like DNA and promote ageing).

O4)

Oxidants make possible the combustion of chemical substances.
They react with hydrogen or hydrocarbons to give off carbon dioxide or water and heat; once a metal is ignited, oxidants promote
its combustion, the result being a metal salt.

3.3.3

Piezoeletrics

When subjected to mechanical stress, some materials generate an electric potential on their surface (polarization) or undergo a change in polarization direction. This is called the direct piezoelectric effect. Conversely, if an electric
field is applied on their surface, they experience a deformation (strain). This
is called the converse piezoelectric effect.10 One notices right away that piezoelectricity is defined functionally, by pointing to a common behaviour of certain
materials when they are subjected to certain conditions: a material is said to
be piezoelectric if it “experiences mechanical deformations when placed in an
electric field and becomes electrically polarized under mechanical loads” (Yang
2005, p.10).
The piezoelectric effect is defined by the following equations:

10

P = dT

(3.3.1)

S = dE

(3.3.2)

Most of the time, the term “piezoelectricity” is used to refer to the direct effect.

87

The first equation says that that the polarization of a material (P) depends
on the stress applied (T) and on some piezoelectric coefficient (d). The second
equation says that the strain (S) experienced by the material depends on the
piezoelectric coefficient and on the intensity of the electric field applied (E).
Polarization is the charge per unit area developed on the surface: P = Q/A.
Stress is the force per unit area acting within a material: T = F/A. Stress can
be thought of as the internal resistive response of a material to an externally
applied pressure. Strain is the change in shape of an object in response to
stress. Strain is defined as the change in length relative to the original length
of an object: S = 4L/L.
It is important to point out that the definition above is phenomenological
(it describes the observed relations between magnitudes like the intensity of
the electric field, stress, strain and polarization) and it is completely agnostic regarding the mechanism that may be responsible for such relations; in
principle, the same relations could be rendered true by different microphysical
mechanisms. In this sense then, piezoelectricity can be characterized as a quite
general electromechanical phenomenon.
Piezoelectricity is exhibited by a number of materials with diverse physicochemical constitutions, such as natural and synthetic crystals, and materials
of biological or synthetic origin. I will investigate how piezoelectricity arises
in crystals and in materials of biological origin such as bone and argue that
piezoelectricity cannot be reduced to a particular micro-constitutive property
shared by all these materials. If this is the case, then piezoelectricity should be
regarded as a functional, higher level property of material systems, irreducible
to other (lower level) properties.
Discovered by the Curie brothers in 1880, the theory of piezoelectricity
underwent a development reverse to that of most fields of physics. While the
phenomena in most fields of physics were explained successfully by corpuscular
assumptions, piezoelectricity did not reveal any direct relation to microphysical
processes (Katzir 2003). In fact, the attempts to explain piezoelectricity in
microphysical (molecular) terms were largely unsuccessful because they did
not save the phenomena. In 1890 the early molecular model of piezoelectricity
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was superseded by a phenomenological theory. According to Woldemar Voigt,
who developed it, in such a theory “a small number of principles, i.e., rules
derived from experience and ascribed hypothetical general validity, support an
edifice of mathematical conclusions that yields the laws of the phenomena in
the field concerned”.11 Eventually, the microphysical approaches caught up
in terms of empirical adequacy with the phenomenological one, and today we
have a good understanding of the microphysical processes that give rise to this
phenomenon in various materials. However, as I will be showing later on, these
microphysical explanations of piezoelectricity differ from material to material.
3.3.3.1

Piezoelectricity in crystals

I will start by examining how the piezoelectric effect arises in quartz. Quartz
exhibits significant piezoelectric properties. If a force of 2 kN (500 lbf) is
applied to a 1 cm3 piece of quartz, a voltage of 12500 V will be produced.
How can this be explained?
Quartz is a mineral composed of silicon and oxygen and it belongs to the
trigonal crystal system, trigonal-trapezohedral class. In a quartz crystal, for
every silicon atom, there are two oxygen atoms, so quartz’s overall chemical
formula is SiO2 . Every oxygen atom is connected to two silicon atoms, and
every silicon atom is surrounded by (and connected to) four oxygen atoms.
The oxygen atoms form tetrahedra which include a silicon atom at their center.
These are the referred to as the SiO4 tetrahedra. A network of tetrahedra (a
motif) forms the crystal unit cell – a unit whose repetitive translation in three
dimensions generates the crystal.
11

Woldemar Voigt, “Phänomenologische und atomistische Betrachtungsweise,” in Katzir
(2003, p. 70).
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Figure 3.3.1: Quartz unit cell.
Rendered at webmineral.com.

Figure 3.3.2: Different views of a quartz unit cell.
View of a quartz unit cell with emphasis on tetrahedra (left) or
with an emphasis on chemical structure (right). Rendered with
Jmol.
Unlike other piezoelectric materials (e.g., Rochelle salt), quartz is not ferroelectric, i.e., it does not have a spontaneous electric polarization. Oxygen
is more electronegative than silicon but the fact that the oxygen atoms are
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equally distant from one another and from the central silicon atom does not
allow the formation of a net dipole moment in the individual tetrahedra. From
an electrical point of view, each SiO4 group may be seen as a sphere that has
a negatively charged shell (due to the four electronegative oxygens) and a positively charged core (the silicon atom that has lost some of its negative charge
to the four oxygens and it has become a cation).

Force

O2

Si 4+
O2

O2
O2

Figure 3.3.3: A deformed SiO44 – tetrahedron.
The central Si 4+ ion is moved from the center closer to the base.
If, however, mechanical stress is applied, the tetrahedra become deformed.12
The central silicon atoms are pushed away from the centre and closer to one
of the four sides of the SiO4 tetrahedron, creating a net dipole moment in
each tetrahedron. This takes place in all the tetrahedra of the crystal unit
cell. In quartz the dipole moment of one tetrahedron is not cancelled out by
the dipoles of the other tetrahedra in the unit cell, and a net induced dipole
moment arises in each unit cell. By summing up the dipole moments per unit
cell, one may calculate a net polarization for the macroscopic crystal sample.
12

At this point the SiO4 tetrahedra become SiO4 polyhedra, as the edges become unequal
under stress. However, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, I will continue to refer to the
deformed SiO4 tetrahedra as SiO4 tetrahedra.
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In quartz, therefore – as well as in all other piezoelectric crystals – piezoelectricity is realized by a displacement current which arises in the crystal as a
consequence of the displacement of atoms (ions) under the application of an
external mechanical stress (Tichy et al. 2010, p. 1). Displacement current
does not involve a flow of charged particles (a current flow), but the formation
of electric dipoles which create an effect similar to the flow of charges.
Another example of piezoelectric crystal is sphalerite (Zn,Fe)S. Sphalerite
contains neither silicon nor oxygen. Also, sphalerite differs from quartz in that
it crystallizes in the isometric system, hextetrahedral class. Unlike quartz, the
unit cell of sphalerite is a cube. Nonetheless, when subjected to mechanical
stress, sphalerite exhibits electric polarization.

Figure 3.3.4: Sphalerite unit cell.
3D model rendered at webmineral.com.

Yet another example of piezoelectric crystal is hilgardite, Ca2 B5 O9 Cl(H2 O).
Hilgardite crystallizes in the triclinic system, pedial class. Unlike quartz or
sphalerite its atoms do not form tetrahedra, but more complex polyhedra.
Despite all these differences, hilgardite is piezoelectric.
Out of the 32 crystal classes, 20 exhibit piezoelectricity. Now one may
ask the following question: why, despite all these differences in structure and

92

constitution, these crystals exhibit similar electrical behaviour (electrical displacement) under stress? It is obvious that the type of the elements in the
constitution and structural aspects such as the shape of the crystal unit or
the shape of polyhedra that atoms form are not relevant. What is relevant
is certain symmetry aspects that obtain in all piezoelectric crystals: they are
all noncentrosymmetric. Noncentrosymmetry is the absence of an inversion
center in the crystal. More precisely, the condition that for every point (x, y,
z) in the in the space group of the crystal there is an indistinguishable point
(-x,-y,-z) to which the original point can be mapped, fails to be satisfied. If the
crystal is centrosymmetric, the charges developed as a result of strain cancel
each other and the result is a zero net dipole moment. So noncentrosymmetry
is a sine qua non condition for being a piezoelectric crystal.
Then haven’t we succeeded in reducing the piezoelectricity of crystals to
the property of being noncentrosymmetric? Can’t we formulate a constitutive
definition of piezoelectricity, at least for crystals? I think that an affirmative
answer is problematic. First, although centrosymmetry is a sufficient condition for the absence of piezoelectricity, noncentrosymmetry is not a sufficient
condition for piezoelectricity. Crystal class 432 (isometric hexoctahedral) is
noncentrosymmetric, but it is not piezoelectric. The reason is that the class
still has a sort of symmetry (axial symmetry) that forbids a net polarization:
the charges developed along certain axes in the crystal cancel each other. Second, noncentrosymmetry, like symmetry, refers to the relations between the
constituents of a crystal, not to the constituents themselves; it is a structural
property that occurs at the scale of the crystal unit cell, not at the scale of
the atomic microconstituents of the crystal (nodes). For this reason, there are
many ways in which a crystal can fail to be centrosymmetric. The structure
of quartz is very different from the structure of sphalerite, for example, but
both are noncentrosymmetric; both quartz and sphalerite fail to satisfy the
condition above, but each does it in its own way. Noncentrosymmetry is not
a microconstitutive property; it is a structural/relational property which is
multiply realized.
This mechanism that gives rise to polarization in crystals (i.e., electric
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displacement) is what some authors call “classical” piezoelectricity. The hallmark of classical piezoelectricity is the occurrence of a displacement current as
a consequence of applying mechanical stress. The definition of piezoelectricity
formulated by authors like Yang certainly covers “classical” piezoelectricity,
but need not be restricted to it. Moreover, for our purposes, it is important not to confuse piezoelectricity as a phenomenological occurrence with the
mechanisms that give rise to it, displacement current being the most widely
known mechanism and the first to be investigated in solids.
3.3.3.2

Streaming current as a source of piezoelectricity

When a solid (e.g., a piece of metal) is placed into a liquid (e.g. an electrolyte),
the surface of the solid becomes charged.13 This charged layer electrostatically
attracts oppositely charged ions (counterions) from the liquid, and a second
layer forms – the diffuse layer, which is like a cloud of ions and counterions. The concentration of counterions in the diffuse layer decays with distance
from the surface: the part of the diffuse layer that is adjacent to the surface
charge contains predominantly counterions; as one moves away from the surface charge and towards the bulk of the liquid, regions with mixed charges will
be encountered. The two parts of the diffuse layer are separated by the “slip
plane” – a plane separating the relatively stationary counterions adjacent to
the surface charge from the mixed mobile charges in the rest of the diffuse
layer. The potential difference between the bulk of the liquid and that which
exists at the hydrodynamic slip plane is termed the zeta potential.
If pressure is applied to the liquid, the motion of the ion-containing liquid
along the slip plane produces an electric potential, which is called the streaming
potential. Conversely, when an electric potential is applied across a porous
material or a capillary tube, the liquid filling that material or tube is set in
motion (the process is called electroosmotic flow).
13

The mechanism responsible for this is either ion dissociation, complexation or adsorbtion.
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Figure 3.3.5: The electric double layer.
From Hastings and Mahmud (1988).

The potential associated with the the electric double layer has been found
responsible for the piezoelectric response of some polymeric materials, gels
and liquids (Lewis 1994, Fukada 2000, Lewis et al. 1992). In experiments with
liquids like glycol, glycerin, or gels such as agarose (a polysaccharide polymer),
both the direct and the converse piezoelectric effect have been detected.
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Figure 3.3.6: An experimental setup to show interfacial piezoelectricity due to the streaming current in gel or liquid.
From Lewis et al. (1992), Fukada (2000).
When the liquid or gel is subjected to an applied voltage using circular
metal electrodes, the mobile ions in the diffuse layer of the liquid are set in
motion along the field lines connecting the inner and outer electrodes.

Figure 3.3.7: The electric field pattern between the electrodes generated in the gel or liquid.
From Lewis et al. (1992).
As a result of this motion, a shear wave is generated in the liquid or gel.
The mechanical disturbance is propagated throughout the rest of the medium.
The displacement of the medium is measured with the use of an interferometer
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beam and a mirror that floats on the medium’s surface. If an alternating
voltage from a variable-frequency generator is applied to the electrodes, a
cyclic movement of the liquid or gel is registered.
Conversely, mechanical disturbances (vibrations) in the medium result in
the occurrence of an electrical potential between the electrodes that can be
measured. When vibrations are applied to the gel, the ions in the diffuse
layer move relative to the slip plane of the double layer, thereby inducing a
current in the electrode circuit. As expected, transverse shear vibrations will
be particularly effective in inducing currents. All this shows that the charged
double layer can be the source of piezoelectricity (Fukada 2000, p. 1280).
The solid-liquid interface presented above is an integral aspect of the microscopic structure of many natural or artificial composite materials that are
classified as solids. Sun et al. (2004) have investigated the piezoelectric properties of hardened cement paste. The mechanism that they found responsible
+
for the piezoelectricity of cement is the streaming current of ions (Ca+
2 , Na ,
K+ , OH− , SiO42 – , etc.) present in the water flowing through the capillary
pores of the specimens.14 When compressive stress is applied to the specimen,
water is forced through microchannels of the material. The ions in the mobile part of the electrical double layer flow along micropores, which causes the
streaming current which results in the polarization of the specimen. Sun et
al. concluded that “the mechanism of piezoelectric effect in hardened cement
paste is different from that in other piezoelectric materials such as piezoelectric
ceramics” (Sun et al. 2004, p. 719).
The examples examined so far show something interesting about the nature
of piezoelectricity. They show that one and the same macroscopic phenomenon
is carried out by different microscopic mechanisms in different materials. In
solid-liquid interfaces and in composite materials in which such interfaces are
an integral part, the electric dipole arises as a result of a streaming current of
ions. In crystals, on the other hand, the electric dipole arises as a result of a
displacement current which is in turn caused by atomic displacement. Unlike
14

Water is an integral part of hardened cement. The specimens analyzed by Sun et al.
were hardened cement cubes kept in air for a year before testing.
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streaming (conduction) currents, displacement currents do not involve the flow
of ions. However, the net result of the existence of displacement currents is
identical to the effect which arises from the existence of streaming currents:
they both generate electric dipoles in the material when it is subjected to
mechanical stress. In materials whose microstructure contains solid-liquid interfaces the piezoelectric effect depends crucially on the existence of an electric
double layer. However, the electrical double layer does not play a role in the
piezoelectric effect in crystals simply because in crystals it does not occur.
The piezoelectric mechanism in materials like cement is genuinely different
from the piezoelectric mechanism in crystals or ceramics.
3.3.3.3

Piezoelectricity in bone

Bone too exhibits electrical surface polarization if placed under mechanical
stress. Bone is a biphasic material whose structural complexity extends down
to the molecular level. One phase is organic, consisting of collagen fibrils –
long-chain fibrous proteins produced by the bone cells (osteocytes) and deposited in a highly organized pattern that determines the gross structure
of each bone. The other phase is inorganic, consisting of hydroxylapatite
Ca10 (PO4 )6 (OH)2 – a microcrystaline mineral that is deposited naturally on
the collagen fibers. The piezoelectric effect in bone cannot be attributed to
the hydroxylapatite, which is centrosymmetric (Marino et al. 1971). Instead,
the piezoelectricity of bone has been linked to collagen (Fukada and Yasuda
1957).
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Figure 3.3.8: A cubic sample cut from a long bone.
The pressure, T, in the yz plane produced the polarization along
the x-axis . FromFukada (1995).
The collagen molecule is made up of three polypeptide strands (alpha
chains), each having the conformation of a left-handed helix. The three helixes form a right-handed triple helix which is held together by hydrogen bonds.
These triple helixes make up the collagen molecule. Collagen molecules are
arranged in a five-stranded pattern to form a microfibril. An ordered array
of these microfibrils makes a collagen fibre. In bone the fibres are mineralised
with hydroxylapatite which is cemented to the collagenous surface.
The origin of the piezoelectric effect of collagen is similar to that of other
polypeptide molecules. Inside the molecule, the dipoles of the CO and NH
groups point roughly in the same direction. If the helix is sheared, the direction of each dipole makes a slight rotation, and the polarization direction
changes.This results in electric polarization in the direction perpendicular to
the shearing plane (Fukada 1968, p. 229).
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Figure 3.3.9: The alpha-helix of polypeptides.
From Fukada (1995). The piezoelectric effect results from dipole
rotations.
The piezoelectric properties of wet bone differ from those of dry bone. In
wet (or in vivo) bone the presence of water increases the symmetry of the
collagen molecules and thus decreases the piezoelectric response of collagen.
Nonetheless, the piezoelectric properties of bone collagen persist even in fresh,
physiologically wet, bone. This is because the hydroxylapatite crystals prevent access of water to parts of the collagen fibers. Thus the collagen in
bone is considered to retain a lower symmetry and to continue to show some
piezoelectricity even when the bone is fully hydrated (Anderson and Eriksson
1970). However, the magnitude of the signals observed in bent wet bone have
been found to be several orders of magnitude larger than one would expect
from the piezoelectric properties of collagen fibers (Johnson et al. 1980). The
mechanism responsible for this difference has been found to be streaming potential (Anderson and Eriksson 1970, Gross and Williams 1982, Otter et al.
1985). The occurrence of streaming potentials in bone is made possible by the
electrical double layers which occur in the channels and micropores of bone.
When pressure is applied, the electrolytic fluid that is naturally present in the
bone is forced through the capillaries of the bone, giving rise to a streaming
current which leads to the separation of charge. Studies have found that the
magnitude of the stress-generated potentials in bone depends on the type of
fluid in the capillaries, thereby confirming the presence of streaming potentials
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(Pienkowski and Pollack 1983).
If a living bone (e.g., femur) is bent in cantilever mode, the transverse
capillaries are inhomogeneously strained. On the convex surface of the bone
that results from bending they are subjected to tensile stress, while on the
concave surface, they are compressed. As a result, the transversely running
channels will increase in diameter (they will open) on the convex side and will
decrease in diameter (they will close) on the concave side. This will force the
extracellular fluid contained within the capillaries toward the convex surface.
Because the extracellular fluid in bone carries a positive charge, the convex
surface will become positively charged with respect to the concave surface
(Eriksson 1974).
Force

-

+
+
+
+

Figure 3.3.10: Bent femur bone.
Bent bone develops positive charges on the convex side and negative charges on the concave side.

Despite the fact that the main mechanism of piezoelectricity in wet bone is
very different from that of crystals, the electrical response to mechanical stress
is similar from a phenomenological point of view. The similarity becomes
striking when one considers that, in addition to the direct effect, wet bone
exhibits the converse effect: electric potential applied on surface of fresh femur
bone make it deform, just as crystals do (Aschero et al. 1996).
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3.3.3.4

A philosophical disagreement among scientists

In a study of viable human cortical bone maintained in vitro, Black (1974)
referred to the electric potential of mechanically deformed bone not using the
term “piezoelectricity” but that of “strain-related potential”. In the discussion
period following a presentation of this study, Dr. Black was questioned by Dr.
Williams about the use of this terminology. I find the discussion illuminating with respect to the concept of piezoelectricity and I reproduce it below
(excerpted from Black and Korostoff 1974, p. 199-120).
DR. W. S. WILLIAMS: You state that the strain, rather than the
stress, is correlated with the voltage. Is it really necessary to apply
a new term when the mechanism of production, in fact, seems to
be piezoelectric?
DR. BLACK: Yes, this is one of my pet peeves. I have spent a
few years reading in this field and am now convinced that we have
become very sloppy in the jargon. I would suggest that we retain
the term piezoelectric for Voight’s (sic) original classical definition.
That is, if one can find a crystalline repeating phase in which potential is generated as a result of strain due to separation of the apparent charge centers, I’m perfectly happy to call that phase piezoelectric. For other phenomena, my temptation is to invent new words.
I believe that confusion has resulted because Dr. Fukada originally
described the effect phenomenologically, with the general idea that
one applied strain and saw resultant polarization. I don’t think he
intended to imply a detailed knowledge of the mechanism at that
time. In fact, I don’t believe that the mechanism he reported for
this behaviour in synthetic membranes, for example, was theorized
by Voight when he originally wrote his treatise in piezoelectricity.
I think we do both the biologists and the physicists disservice by
using the word carelessly, so I would much rather use the term
“strain-related” in cases where we do not understand exactly what
is occurring.
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DR. WILLIAMS: The word, however, derives from pressure, which
suggests a wide variety of possible responses. Indeed, Voight’s calculations apply strictly to mineral crystals. Conversely, we have
heard much evidence that other materials do exhibit this same general effect. Probably, with a very slight modification, this concept
could be encompassed within the term piezoelectricity, which specifies and carries more information than strain-related potential. It
does suggest a mechanism, namely, the separation of charge in
some sense.
DR. B. ROSENBERG: May I suggest that the history of science indicates that difficulties of nomenclature should always be relegated
to a committee to resolve rather than be discussed.
Rather than being something like an administrative issue, capable of being resolved by a committee (possibly by mere convention), the “difficulty of nomenclature” would benefit from philosophical attention. In truth, the disagreement
between Dr. Black and Dr. Williams is a little deeper than merely terminological – it is conceptual. Dr. Black’s reluctance of using the term “piezoelectricity” for the polarization of mechanically deformed bone stems from adopting
a constitutive view of piezoelectricity. For Dr. Black, piezoelectricity refers
to a mechanism (conduction current resulting from the separation of charge
centers), and not to a phenomenological occurrence; for him, piezoelectricity
means “classical” piezoelectricity, namely piezoelectricity as it occurs in crystals. For this reason, the polarization produced by any other means would
not count as piezoelectric. Dr. Black would rule out that the electromechanical behaviour of polymers (as investigated by Fukada) and that of materials
rich in solid-liquid interfaces (such as bone) is in fact piezoelectric, even if the
mathematical aspects of this behaviour obeys the same equation that governs
the electromechanical behaviour of crystals. Dr. Williams, on the other hand,
entertains a functional concept of piezoelectricity. For him, piezoelectricity is
primarily a phenomenological occurrence (a phenomenon, a behaviour), not a
mechanism; for him, piezoelectricity is defined functionally, as the separation
of charge under applied mechanical pressure. Dr. Williams would have no
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problems classifying the electromechanical behaviour of materials other than
crystals as piezoelectric.
Unless we want to conflate a phenomenological occurrence with the mechanism producing it, the point made by Dr. Williams stands. Consider the
electromechanical properties of wet bone. They are due to the superposition
of two distinct mechanisms: dipole rotation in the collagen molecules and the
streaming potential in bone micropores. It is remarkable that despite the
different nature of the two mechanisms and the differences in magnitude between them, the phenomenological characteristics of these two mechanisms are
essentially identical, making it difficult to discern between them – both mechanisms relate the predicted voltage to the same component of the stress tensor,
and both produce currents that are proportional to the strain rate (Gross and
Williams 1982, p. 277).
3.3.3.5

“Promiscuous” laws

It has been long known that bone is an adaptable tissue, able to being remodeled by mechanical forces. If loading on a particular bone is increased,
in time the bone will adapt as to resist the increased loading. Conversely,
if the loading on a particular bone is decreased, the bone becomes weaker.15
This empirical regularity was first theorized in the 19th century by the German anatomist and surgeon Julius Wolff, and it came to be known as Wolff’s
law. According to Wolff’s law, bone is deposited and reinforced at areas of
greatest stress. Wolff’s law is an empirically observed regularity which seems
intuitive from a clinical point of view. From an engineering point of view,
however, it implies that bone has some sort of transduction mechanism that
connects the mechanical stress experienced by the bone with the osteogenic
activity. Piezoelectricity is a mechanism that is fit for this task. The magnitude of polarization depends on the amount of stress experienced by the bone;
in turn, many cellular activities depend by the electrical environment at the
15

The increase in bone strength occurs in the racket-holding arm of tennis players and
the decrease of bone strength occurs in astronauts who have spend considerable amounts of
time in space.
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cell’s membrane.16
Studies have confirmed the formation of new bone close to areas where a
steady electrical negative charge is maintained (Rubinacci and Tessari. 1983,
Friedenburg et al. 1971). As mentioned, the streaming potential in living bone
bent in cantilever mode results in a negative charge on the concave side of the
bone and a positive charge on the convex side. A similar polarization of bone
may be caused by the mechanical deformation of collagen. Studies have shown
that the compressed internal surface of the demineralized bone (collagen) attract calcium ions which leads to subsequent nucleation and crystallization
of hydroxylapatite; no bone growth was observed on the tensed, positively
charged side of collagen (Noris-Suarez et al. 2007).
The consensus among scientists seems to be that the mechanism of bone
growth and remodeling depends on both the electromechanical properties of
collagen and the streaming potential of bone (Ahn and Grodzinsky 2009).
Thus, bone growth does not discriminate between the negative charges due
to the mechanical deformation of the collagen fibers and the ones due to
the streaming potential. For this reason, Wolff’s law may be characterized
as “indiscriminate” or “promiscuous”. Promiscuous laws are regularities that
correlate two properties, at least one of which is (or is the result of) a heterogeneously realized functional property. Wolff’s law correlates bone osteogenic
activity with the presence of negative charges induced by mechanical stress,
but it is insensitive to how these stress-induced charges are brought about; it
links bone growth to electric charges, but it is indifferent to the mechanism
that gives rise to the latter (i.e., whether it is dipole rotation or streaming
potential).
Promiscuous laws enjoy a degree of independence from the basal conditions
that the laws of microphysics typically do not. They are higher level laws
which help secure the ontological autonomy of the discipline formulating them.
Wolff’s law, for example, is a phenomenological regularity that does not rely
on a single microscopic regularity – it is not a micro-level law in disguise, but
a genuine physiological law.
16

Cells have a net surface charge which is due to the protein contents of their membrane.
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The equations of piezoelectricity are also promiscuous in the sense explained above. They claim that mechanical stress is correlated with polarization in various materials, but they may be agnostic with respect to the
mechanisms that produce polarization in these materials. Voigt’s general theory of piezoelectricity, which is the basis of the theory we have today, is a
phenomenological approach that was elaborated independently of the molecular approach (Katzir 2003; 2006).
3.3.3.6

Conclusion

Because of the diverse nature of the mechanisms responsible for the piezoelectric behaviour of various materials (e.g., ionic displacement in crystals, dipole
rotation in polymers, streaming current in interface materials like cement or
bone) it becomes obvious that piezoelectricity is a multiply realized functional
property. In other words, being a piezoelectric is defined by the behaviour of
the material in certain conditions, not by a microconstitutive feature that is
possessed by all piezoelectrics and only by them. For this reason, piezoelectricity is a higher level property which cannot be identified with a particular
microphysical property. This lends support to the idea that the field of science
that studies piezoelectricity (solid state chemistry, which has a strong overlap with solid state physics) enjoys a degree of ontological autonomy relative
to the underlying microphysics. This conclusion is further supported by the
existence of “promiscuous” laws – regularities correlating two properties, at
least one of which being (or being the result of) a functional property which
is multiply realized.

3.3.4

Other functional properties in chemistry

Arguably, the properties discussed so far are not the only chemical properties
that are functional. The property of being a metal is also functional. Just like
in the case of the noble gas atoms, metal atoms can be given precise quantummechanical descriptions. More than 70% of existing chemical elements are
metals (91 elements out of 117). Twelve out of eighteen groups in the peri-
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odic table are occupied exclusively by metals – alkali elements, alkaline earth
elements, lanthanides, actinides, and the transition elements, are all metals.
Some elements in group 13 to group 16 are metals too. As one can expect, the
quantum-mechanical description for all these atoms will look messy. Physical
chemistry has not revealed any microphysical constituent that is shared by
all metal atoms and only by them. Despite the fact that their microphysical
descriptions are wildly heterogeneous, metals have interesting chemical properties in common: their atoms readily lose electrons to form positive ions; they
form metallic bonds with other metal atoms and ionic bonds with nonmetal
atoms. Since the property of being a metal is defined with reference to what
the entities instantiating the property can do, this property is functional.

3.3.5

Are constitutive definitions impossible?

One may resist the idea that the properties mentioned above (acids, bases,
oxidants, reductants, metals, piezoelectrics etc.) are non-constitutive. One
argument may be the following. These properties are defined functionally, but
merely for convenience. They do have a microconstitutive feature in common,
just one that is not of the sort you might have expected. Consider the prototypical case of acids. Admittedly, concrete constituents like a hydrogen nucleus
cannot be identified with the common microconstitutive feature of acids. But
perhaps more general constituents should be considered. Why not take the
physical features shared by different acids that make them suitable for proton
donation (such as the proton dissociation energy) as the relevant constituents?
Why these physical features can’t be microconstitutive, but just more general?
Couldn’t we identify acids with those hydrogen-containing molecules whose
proton dissociation energy has a certain value (or maybe fits within a value
interval)? Couldn’t we define acids as those substances that have a labile
proton? This seems like a plausible possibility. However, there are a couple of
problems with it. First it should be pointed out that even if one could define
acids as those H-containing molecules whose proton dissociation energy has a
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certain value, it is not clear that this definition would be constitutive in the
same way as the definitions of mammals, alcohols, or noble gases are. Having
a bond dissociation energy of a certain value is not a constituent of acids in the
same way as having mammary glands is a constituent of mammals, or having
a carbon-bound hydroxyl group is a constituent of alcohols. In all these cases
the constituent is a concrete property (an ingredient, a part, something that
could be physically removed from the system) whereas having a certain value
of the proton dissociation energy is a more abstract physical characteristic –
it is not a thing, but a magnitude.
However, there is a much more serious concern about this proposal. Whether
a chemical species gives off a proton to another chemical species in a chemical
reaction (i.e., whether it behaves as an acid or not) does not depend exclusively
on the proton dissociation energy; it depends on the nature of the chemical
species to which the acid reacts. In principle, any hydrogen-containing compound could become an acid if the reagent is protophilic enough. Also, the
strength of an acid (the extent to which that molecule dissociates) is not dictated by the proton dissociation energy of that species, but by the stability
of the reaction products it forms. So the problem is that while the proton
dissociation energy for a molecule is a fixed quantity, the strength of the acid
consisting of that molecule is not a fixed quantity, but is relative to the chemical species to which that molecule reacts; the strength of the acid is relative
to the stability of the reaction products. So the property of being an acid is
a relational property. This is often overlooked because of the habit of judging
the acidity of a compound by comparison to that of water, or thinking about
the behaviour of the compound in an aqueous solution.
HA + H2 O −→ A − + H3 O +
Acid + Base −→ Conjugate−base−of−acid + Conjugate−acid−of−base
But consider the case of CH3 COOH. If the solvent is water, CH3 COOH is
an acid, although a weak one: its conjugate base, CH3 COO − , is not a stable
compound and it reacts with the conjugate acid, the hydronium ion.
−
−
*
CH3 COOH + H2 O −
)
−
− CH3 COO + H3 O +
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In reaction with metals CH3 COOH is also an acid, the result of the reaction
being a salt (acetate) and hydrogen gas (standard acid-metal reaction).
2 CH3 COOH + Mg −→ (CH3 COO)2 Mg + H2
So we tend to think of CH3 COOH as an acid, and we even call it acetic
acid, because when we think of it we tend to think of its behaviour in aqueous
solutions or relative to metals. However, if the solvent is not water, but H2 SO4 ,
CH3 COOH is a base.
+
−
−
*
CH3 COOH + H2 SO4 −
)
−
− CH3 COOH2 + HSO4

The chemical species that can either donate or receive a proton are called amphiprotic (or amphoteric). Amphoterism challenges the idea that there could
be a microconstitutive physical feature shared by all acids and only by them.
If the acidic character of a compound varies depending on the reagent (sometimes dramatically, as amphoterism shows) then candidates like the proton
dissociation energy (which do not vary depending on the reagent) cannot be
the microconstitutive features of acids.
Amphoterism is not a rare phenomenon. Substances commonly considered
bases that act as acids (or viceversa) should not be viewed as exceptions, or as
odd, isolate cases. Amphiprotic substances include: self-ionizable compounds,
such as water or ammonia; substances which have amine and carboxylic acid
groups such as amino acids and proteins; the hydroxides of most metals. In
fact, most chemical species having a hydrogen atom could become acids given
the right reagent. Also, chemicals that are habitually referred to as as acids
become bases given the right reagents (stronger acids).
HNO3 + H2 SO4 −→ H2 NO3+ + HSO4−
Therefore, instead of mistakenly treating amphoterism as exceptional in order
to rescue the idea that acidity is constitutive, it is preferable if we give up on
thinking about acidity as an absolute (or categorical) property. It is best to
talk about acids in the context of a chemical reaction. Talking about acidity
in the absence of the context of a chemical reaction (dissociation reactions
included) becomes strictly speaking illegitimate.
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Another argument against the idea that the properties mentioned in the
previous sections are non-constitutive could be formulated as follows (again,
let us consider the case of acids, although exactly the same things can be said
about any other functionally-defined chemical property). It is hard to prove
that a concrete microphysical property that is present in all acids and only in
them which is responsible for the similar behaviour of these substances does
not exist. You cannot prove a negative, as they say. Therefore, one cannot
conclusively assert that acids are not in fact constitutive.
Of course, it is hard to prove that all these functionally-defined chemical properties are not in fact constitutive. However, there are no compelling
reasons to believe that acidity is due to some microphysical property that is
present in all acidic molecules and only in them, determines their behaviour,
yet so far has not been discovered; or it has been discovered, but it never
made it into the definition of acids. On the other hand, there are excellent
reasons to believe that there is no such microphysical property. Contemporary
chemistry is a mature science. While it is true that some chemical phenomena
are not well understood, acidity is not one of them. Contemporary chemistry
does have a good understanding of acids and how they work. An acid is a
compound in which a hydrogen nucleus dissociates and then combines with a
chemical species. This behaviour is explained successfully by an exclusive appeal to general thermodynamic principles having to do with the minimization
of energy in the context of the chemical reaction. There are no good reasons
to suspect that this behaviour is the result of some microconstitutive physical
property which has not yet been discovered.
A related argument that could be made for the idea that acidity is functional is based on naturalism. If one accepts that science is the best way to
learn about the material world, then one should also accept that the kinds
of things that exist in the material world are best defined by science. As
mentioned, the definitions of acids accepted by the scientific comunity are
functional par excellence. Given that chemistry is a mature science, it is difficult to explain why a constitutive definition for acids has not emerged so far,
if such a definition is possible.
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These arguments suggest that the definitions of acids (and those of bases,
oxides, reductants, etc.) offered by contemporary chemical science should be
taken at their face value: these definitions are functional because the properties
that they define are themselves functional.
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Chapter 4
Functional emergence and
reductionisms
What does the existence of functionally emergent chemical properties entail
with respect to the much discussed reduction of chemistry to physics? In this
chapter I present the most prominent accounts of inter-theoretic reduction
and argue that the existence of terms which refer to functionally emergent
properties poses problems for two of these accounts, while the third account
does not succeed in establishing the kind of reductionism that would endanger
functional emergence.
The motives for developing a philosophical account of inter-theoretic reduction have their roots in the ideal of the unity of science held by logical positivism. According to the logical positivists, reduction would foster this ideal
by providing a single universal language that would allow the expression of all
empirical statements and the formulation of intersubjectively understandable
explanations and predictions, and a single method for the investigation of all
states of affairs (Carnap 1934). Inter-theoretic reduction was seen as desirable because it could help in the elaboration of a complete picture of reality
that is ontologically parcimonious and free of gaps, redundancies or hidden
contradictions (Neurath 1983).
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4.1

Nagelian reduction

One of the most prominent accounts of inter-theoretic reduction has been
formulated by Ernest Nagel (1949, 1961). By the term “reduction”, Nagel
understands “the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably
formulated for some other domain” (1961, p. 338). The model of explanation
that Nagel assumes in his reductionist account is essentially the deductivenomological model of explanation. According to this model, an explanation
is a deductive inference in which at least one of the premises states a law of
nature, while the others state the initial conditions that obtain in the given
situation. Nagel shares with the logical positivists the view that reduction is a
means of achieving the ideal of the unity of science – “a comprehensive theory
which will integrate all domains of natural science in terms of a common set
of principles” (1961, p. 336).
Nagel distinguishes between two kinds of reduction. If all terms in the
vocabulary of the theory to be reduced are also present in the vocabulary of
the reducing theory, and these terms have similar meanings in both theories,
the reduction is homogeneous. If the theory to be reduced includes terms
that do not occur in the vocabulary of the reducing theory, the reduction is
heterogeneous. It is a logical fact that in order to derive a conclusion from a set
of premises, the conclusion must not include terms that are not mentioned in
the premises. Therefore, heterogeneous reductions are more challenging than
homogeneous reductions since between the reduced theory and the reducing
one there is a terminological gap that must be bridged before reduction can
happen. Nagel is well aware of this fact. He writes:
“If the laws of the secondary science contain terms that do not
occur in the theoretical assumptions of the primary discipline ...,
the logical derivation of the former from the latter is prima facie
impossible” (Nagel 1961, p. 352).1
1

By “secondary science” Nagel means the reduced science or theory, while by “primary
science” Nagel means the reducing science or theory.
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For the reduction to be even possible, the vocabularies of the reduced theory
must be appropriately connected with the vocabulary of the reducing theory. Nagel sees this requirement as a formal condition that is necessary for
reduction. He calls it the connectability condition.
• Connectability: “Assumptions of some kind must be introduced which
postulate suitable relations between whatever is signified by ’A’ [term of
the reduced theory that does not occur in the reducing theory] and traits
represented by theoretical terms already present in the primary science”
(1961, p. 353-354).
This necessary condition is supplemented by another, which Nagel calls the
derivability condition:
• Derivability: “With the help of these additional assumption, all the laws
of the secondary science, including those containing the term ’A’, must
be logically derivable from the theoretical premises and their associated
coordinating definitions in the primary discipline”
How does Nagel’s account apply to the reduction of chemistry to physics? If
T2 is a theory of chemistry and T1 is a theory of physics, then on Nagel’s
schema T2 reduces to T1 if and only if the following conditions are met:
1. For every theoretical term C that is present in T2 but not in T1 , there
is a theoretical term P in T1 such that for all entities x, x is C if (and
possibly only if) x is P.
2. All the laws of T2 must be derivable from T1 together with the bridge
laws.
The first condition states the requirement of connectability via what’s been
called “bridge laws” connecting the vocabulary of chemistry with that of
physics. I will leave aside problems with the second condition above (they
have been discussed by Luisi 2002 for example). Instead, I will focus on the
first condition.
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Given that the vocabulary of chemistry contains terms that are not present
in the vocabulary of physics (e.g., terms like “acid”, “base”, “reductant”, “oxidant”, etc.), it appears that the reduction of chemistry to physics would be of
the heterogeneous kind. Therefore, bridge laws must be found for these terms.
Consider, for example, the following chemical law, which contains terms that
are not present in the vocabulary of physics:
A)

Acids in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen
gas.2

This chemical law is instantiated, for example, when H2 SO4 reacts with metals,
or when HCl reacts with metals. These two cases are particular instantiations
of the chemical law A, but they must not be confused with the law A itself,
which is more general. The possibility of deriving chemical law A from the
laws of physics depends on the existence of a bridge law connecting the term
“acid” with a term present in the vocabulary of physics. But in order to derive
the chemical law A (not just one of its instantiations), the bridge law must
be stronger than a one-way conditional. If the bridge law expresses a one way
conditional, such as “For all x, if x is H2 SO4 then x is an acid”, one could
derive at most a particular case of law A: “Some acids in reaction with metals
produce a metal salt and hydrogen gas”.3 But the sentence expressing chemical
law A is a universal statement – it talks about all acids. And universal statements cannot be derived (i.e., logically deduced) from particular statements.
Therefore, in order to derive the universal statement expressing chemical law
A, the bridge law must be stronger than a one-way conditional; it must be a
biconditional.4
The reductionist could reply by saying that a universal statement could be
derived from a set of particular statements if that set is exhaustive. That is,
one could derive the claim “Acids in reaction with metals produce a metal salt
2

The conception of acids and bases assumed is that of the Brønsted-Lowry theory.
In the hypothetical bridge law mentioned here a H2 SO4 molecule is construed as a
physical system which consists of electrons and nuclei.
4
Some authors like Richardson (1979) have argued that the suitable relations demanded
by Nagel’s connectability condition need not be biconditional (p. 548). For a response, see
Marras (2005, p. 356).
3

116

and hydrogen gas” from of an exhaustive conjunction of particular statements,
such as “H2 SO4 in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen gas”
and “HCl in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen gas” and
“H3 PO4 in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen gas”, and
so on until the the class of physical systems composed of electrons and nuclei
that constitute the extension of the term “acid” is exhausted. Of course, in
order for the derivation to be possible, one must also add the premise that the
extension of the chemical term “acid” is exhausted by H2 SO4 , HCl, H3 PO4 ,
and so on. This premise would amount to the following tentative bridge law:
“For all x, x is an acid if and only if x is H2 SO4 or HCl or H3 PO4 or ...”.
There are a few problems with this strategy. One problem is that the members of the biconditional above denote properties that differ in some significant
way, and this difference may be important enough as to preclude relating the
properties via a biconditional. Being an acid is a relational property: a system
of electrons and nuclei behaves as an acid or as a base (i.e., donates protons
or accept them) depending on the nature of the other participants in the reaction.5 On the other hand, being a molecule of H2 SO4 or HCl or H3 PO4 or ...,
is not a relational property. Rather, if this disjunctive property is a property
at all, it is an intrinsic property – something is on the list (or not) regardless
of that thing’s relationships with other things. If one sees a problem with
equating an intrinsic property with a relational property one should also see a
problem with the tentative bridge law above. The reductionist may attempt
to circumvent this problem by ammending the tentative bridge law as follows:
“For all x, there is an y, such that x is an acid in reaction to y if and only
if x is H2 SO4 or HCl or H3 PO4 or ...”. However, chemistry is in the business
of synthesizing new substances, and the list of physical systems composed of
electrons and nuclei to which the term “acid” applies may never be completed.
As a result, the bridge law may never be completed and the gap between the
chemical and the physical vocabulary may never be closed.
But perhaps a better strategy is available. Can’t our Nagelian bridge law
be something like “For all x, x is an acid if and only if x is a proton donor”?
5

Section 3.3.5 offered a detailed discussion of amphoterism.
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According to the Brønsted-Lowry definition, acids are those substances that
donate protons in chemical reactions. Therefore, this candidate bridge law expresses a true statement. But is this statement fit for functioning as a bridge
law in the Nagelian reduction of chemical law A? Is the term “proton donor”
truly a term of physics? It should be noted that term “proton donor” is not
a theoretical term that habitually occurs in the vocabulary of physics (unlike
the term “mean molecular energy” in the case of the prototypical reduction of
temperature offered by Nagel). The problem is not with the term “proton”,
which is – of course – part of the standard vocabulary of physics, but with
the term “donor”. The term “proton donor” is a functional term, i.e., it describes acids by pointing to their causal role in chemical reactions. Like other
functional terms, this term denotes a higher level property, capable of being
carried out (or realized) by a variety of lower level physical systems – in our
case systems of electrons and nuclei such as H2 SO4 , HCl or H3 PO4 . Each of
these lower level physical systems of electrons and nuclei belongs to a certain
set of entities that are grouped together according to a natural/objective criterion (relevant physical similarities) rather than an artificial/subjective one. In
other words, each of these systems instantiates what philosophers have called
a “natural kind” (more precisely, a physical natural kind, or physical kind
for short).6 For example, all H2 SO4 molecules belong to the same physical
kind, which is distinct from the physical kind to which H3 PO4 molecules belong. However, the set of molecules that can donate protons does not form a
physical kind – the members of this set are just too dissimilar from the point
6
The philosophical literature on natural kinds is vast and many authors have expressed
skepticism towards the idea that the kinds talked about in science are natural kinds in the
philosophers’ sense. The topic of natural kinds remains full of controversies also because
there are competing philosophical accounts of what the term “natural kind” should mean.
In my discussion of natural kinds I assume a metaphysically modest notion of natural kinds.
By the term “natural kind” I mean the kinds that the sciences talk about, whatever those
might be. For my purposes, “natural kind” need not mean more than just “scientific kind”.
The two terms are obviously not coextensive: the term “20th century Canadian immigrants”
expresses a natural kind on my view (a sociological kind), but it certainly does not express
a natural kind in the traditional philosophical sense. In fact, in the rest of this section I will
phrase my arguments in terms of “physical kinds” or “chemical kinds”, as opposed to the
more controversial “natural kinds”.
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of view of their physical characterization. So the problem with our tentative
bridge law appears to be the following. Either “proton donor” is a term of
physics, or it is not. If it is not truly a term of physics, our tentative bridge
law is not really connecting the vocabulary of physics with that of chemistry,
so it is not truly a bridge law. On the other hand, if “proton donor” is a term
of physics, its extension is too disunified and context dependent (see section
3.3.5) to form a physical kind. But bridge laws are supposed to be laws, and
laws are supposed to connect kinds to kinds (see, e.g., Fodor 1974). Thus, if
“proton donor” does not refer to a physical kind, then the tentative bridge law
above is not a law.7 Therefore, our tentative bridge law is either not a bridge
between the two vocabularies, or it is not a law. Either way, there is a problem
for the Nagelian reduction of chemistry to physics.
One may object to the argument above by questioning the idea that the
connectivity condition must be substantiated by bridge laws chemical physical
kinds to physical kinds. Why can’t we have bridge principles instead, which
do not necessarily connect kinds to kinds? (Kim 1992, p. 10).8 However, this
strategy prompts the following questions: what would be the nature of these
bridge principles, and why should they be allowed among the premises of the
derivation? The motivation for bridge laws connecting (through identification)
natural kinds to natural kinds seems pretty obvious – reductions must reduce,
i.e., they must ensure ontological parsimony. In order to achieve this, the
connectivity condition must require identities.9 But in this context, identities
are identities of kinds. If acids are a chemical kind and Nagelian reduction
7

This is also a problem for the tentative bridge law that was considered previously.
Kim finds the following answer plausible: “if M is identified with non-kind Q (or M is
reduced via a biconditional bridge principle "M↔Q", where Q is a non-kind), M could no
longer figure in special science laws; e.g., the law, "M→R", would in effect reduce to "Q→R",
and therefore loses its status as a law on account of containing Q, a non-kind” (Kim 1992,
p. 10).
9
Mere correlations won’t do, as Sklar (1967, p. 119) has argued. Sklar offered the example
of the Wiedemann-Franz law, which expresses a correlation between the thermal conductive
properties of a material and its electrical conductivity properties. Despite this, no one has
ever maintained that this law establish the reduction of the theory of heat conduction to
the theory of the conduction of electricity. The reason is that the Wiedemann-Franz law
expresses a correlation between two properties, not an identity. Thus, the Wiedemann-Franz
law is not truly a bridge law in the sense that Nagelian reduction demands.
8
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obtains, there must be a physical kind to which the property of being an acid
could be identified. Bridge laws express such identities, and thus they are, in
principle, able to bridge the gap between the two domains. It is not clear on
what basis could bridge principles accomplish this task.
The idea that the laws of nature state relations between natural kinds gives
rise to another concern. A reduction of chemistry to physics would amount
to the derivation of chemical laws from physical laws. If the physical entities
that form the extension of the chemical term “acid” do not form a physical
natural kind, the concern is that there would be no physical laws from which
the chemical law A could be derived. This idea can be illustrated with an
example. Consider again chemical law A.
A)

Acid + Metal −→ Metal−Salt + H2 ↑

The number of reactions rendering A true is vast. Consider the following two
examples.
A1)

H2 SO4 + Fe −→ FeSO4 + H2 ↑

A2)

2 HCl + Zn −→ ZnCl2 + H2 ↑

As one can see, every property mentioned in statement A with the exception of
hydrogen can be realized by various nuclei-electrons physical systems (representing a particular acid, metal, and metal salt, respectively). Of course, any
particular chemical reaction (like A1, A2) is nothing but a physical process
involving nuclei and electrons, as well as some other physical parameters (temperature, pressure, etc.). Quantum physics could offer an explanation in terms
of atomic and molecular wavefunctions for each of the reactions exemplifying
our chemical statement. Thus, each of the particular reactions exemplifying A
can be regarded as a physical truth having nomic character – A1 and A2 are
only two examples. Now we can paraphrase Fodor (1974, p. 405) and say that
while it is a law that sulfuric acid in reaction with iron produces iron sulfate
and hydrogen, and it is a law that hydrogen chloride in reaction with zinc
produces zinc dichloride and hydrogen, it is not a law that either sulfuric acid
or hydrogen chloride in reaction with either iron or zinc produces either iron
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sulfate or zinc dichloride and hydrogen. In other words, heterogeneous kinds
(or disjunctive properties) are unfit for laws. Nonetheless, the more general
claim, asserting that acids in reactions with metals produce a metal salt and
hydrogen is a law. Statements like A constitute knowledge. This knowledge
is not physical knowledge; it is sui generis chemical knowledge, which is as
such unavailable to the physicist, whose vocabulary does not include terms
like “acid”.
Similar difficulties in finding bridge laws occur for other specific chemical terms, such as base, metal, reductant, oxidant. Take the chemical term
“metal”, for example. “Metal” is a specific chemical term, which is defined
with reference to the periodic table of elements, a chemical theoretical device
par excellence (metals are those elements that occupy a certain part of the
periodic table). What would a bridge law for this term look like? The possibility of coming up with a bridge law for the term “metal” depends on the
possibility of finding a microphysical constitutive definition for the property of
being a metal. But, as argued in section 3.3.4, the property of being a metal
is functional. Physical chemistry has not revealed any particular microphysical constituent that is shared by all atoms of metallic elements and only by
them. Nonetheless, metallic elements have interesting chemical properties in
common: metal atoms readily lose electrons to form positive ions; they form
metallic bonds with other metal atoms and ionic bonds with nonmetal atoms.
In the case of metals it is hard to see how even a tentative bridge law would
look like.
What does the existence of chemical terms for which bridge laws are not
available entail with respect to the notion that chemistry is Nagel-reducible
to physics? If bridge laws are not available for functional terms this means
that for the laws in which these terms occur the connectability condition is not
met; consequently, the derivability condition is not met. As a result, the laws
in which these terms occur are not reducible to the laws of physics, although
they depend on them; they must be considered sui generis chemical laws (see
Table 4.1).
There is an objection to the antireductionist stance above that I would like
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to consider. The objection is this: one may accept that properties like being an
acid, a metal, a piezoelectric, etc. can’t be given constitutive definitions and
still reject that the truths in which these properties figure cannot be construed
as truths of microphysics.
So far, my argument against Nagelian reduction has been that statements
like those expressed by law A can’t be reduced to some unique microphysical
process because the properties mentioned by them cannot be given constitutive definitions. But perhaps the strategy of finding bridge laws connecting
chemical terms with physical terms is not the best move that the reductionist can make if he wants to reduce law A. Perhaps the reductionist would be
more successful if he attempted to reduce law A in toto, as a whole, without
the mediation of bridge laws connecting the chemical terms occuring in this
law with their physical referents. Indeed, why can’t the reductionist say that
even if the chemical properties appearing in law A cannot be identified with
physical properties, chemical law A does nevertheless refer to a certain physical process, A*. So even if the chemical properties appearing in A are not
physical properties in disguise, perhaps chemical law A is in fact a physical
law in disguise (i.e, A*).
What might A* be? A* might be something like “the giving up of protons
by certain physical systems in the presence of certain other physical systems”.
But how do we specify “certain physical systems” and “certain other physical
systems” without using the terms “acid” and “metal”? As argued in 3.3.1, and
3.3.4, the terms “acid” and “metal” do not have unique physical references.
If we can’t specify “certain physical systems” as to refer exclusively to acids
and “certain other physical systems” as to pick out metals, then A* is not the
equivalent of A.
One may object by saying that construing A* as “the giving up of protons
by certain physical systems in the presence of certain other physical systems”
does not abandon thinking about A* as we thought about A, i.e., as a process
involving different properties. Rather, to find A* we need to construe it as a
single, unitary process, and give up the idea that it is about the interaction
of properties. On this view, what needs to be done is to find a physical
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replacement for A as a whole. Thus, on this view, we need to switch to
the chemical reaction as basic (rather than chemical properties) and try to
find the physical process A* that chemical law A expresses. This version of
reductionism departs from Nagel’s in that the bridge laws are assumed to
connect whole statements and not terms (alternatively, one could think of this
version of reductionism as connecting types of chemical reactions with types
of physical processes).
Suppose we regard chemical law A as basic. If so, what physical process
A* could we identify it with? The following answer is appealing: “the giving
up of protons”. Now we can construe chemical law A (acids in reaction with
metals produce metal salts and hydrogen) as the physical process A* – the
giving up of protons. But there is a problem with this strategy. If we construe
chemical law A as “the giving up of protons” simpliciter, we lose the distinction
between the various types of chemical reactions in which acids participate. For
example, acid-metal reactions are different from acid-base reactions – the first
produce hydrogen gas, the second water. However, they both involve the
giving up of protons; from a microphysical stance, they are both instances of
A*. Therefore, thinking of A* as the giving up of protons does not allow us
to differentiate between the various types of chemical reactions.
What if we ammend A* by further specifying it? What if we construe A*
as “the giving up of protons that form hydrogen gas”? But this answer won’t
work either: this answer does not allow us to differentiate acid-metal reactions
from dissociation reactions such as the following:
CH4 −→ C + H2 ↑
Both acid-metal reactions and dissociation reactions like the one above involve
“the giving up of protons that form hydrogen gas”. To be able to distinguish
acid-metal reactions from dissociation reactions like the one above, one has
to abandon the microphysical stance and revert to the chemical vocabulary
of acids and metals. To paraphrase Dennett, we need to adopt a “chemical
stance” (as opposed to a microphysical one) and see the “real patterns” of
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chemical behaviour.10
To conclude, switching to the chemical reaction as basic does not appear to
be an effective strategy to establish the reduction of chemistry to microphysics
along Nagelian lines, i.e., using some sort of bridges between the two domains.
10

The phrase “chemical stance” is a paraphrase of Dennett’s “intentional stance” (see
Dennett 1987) while the phrase “real patterns” is the title of one of his papers (Dennett
2008).
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Acids

Bases

Oxidants

Reductants

Metals

A) Acids in reaction with metals to produce a metal salt and
hydrogen gas.
B) Acids in reaction with metal carbonates to produce water,
CO2 and a salt.
C) Acids in reaction with metal hydroxides and metal oxides to
produce water and a salt.
B1) Bases accept hydrogen ions from the chemical species to
which they react.
B2) Bases donate electron pairs in chemical reactions. (This is
the Lewis definition of bases.)
B3) Bases react with triglycerides to produce soaps (reaction
known as saponification).
B4) Bases react with acids to produce salts and water.
B5) Bases can act as insoluble heterogeneous catalysts for
chemical reactions.
O1) Oxidants accept electrons from the chemical species to
which they react.
O2) Oxidants react with metals, producing oxide(s) and/or
salt(s) of the original metal; this process is known as corrosion.
O3) Oxidants degrade the substances that come in contact
with (this is especially of concern in biology, since they damage
large molecules like DNA and promote ageing).
O4) Oxidants make possible the combustion of chemical
substances. They react with hydrogen or hydrocarbons to give
off carbon dioxide or water and heat; once a metal is ignited,
oxidants promote its combustion, the result being a metal salt.
R1) Reductants react with metal oxides to produce metals.
R2) Reductants make possible the combustion of chemical
substances.
R3) Reactions involving reductants are typically reversible
under appropriate circumstances.
M1) Metals in reaction with acids produce a metal salt and
hydrogen gas. (A)
M2) Metals in reaction with oxidants produce oxide(s) and/or
salt(s) of the original metal.
M3) Metal atoms readily lose electrons to form positive ions.
M4) Metal atoms form metallic bonds with other metal atoms
and ionic bonds with nonmetal atoms.
Table 4.1: List of sui generis chemical laws.
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4.2

Micro-reduction

Another account of reduction has been offered by Kemeny and Oppenheim in
their 1956 paper “On Reduction” and by Putnam and Oppenheim in their 1958
article titled “The Unity of Science as Working Hypothesis”. The approach to
reduction advocated by Kemeny, Oppenheim and Putnam (henceforth KOP)
is in some respects a reaction to another model of reduction, advocated by
Nagel (1949, 1961). KOP’s account is not as widely known as Nagel’s, and it
has not been discussed to the same extent. Nonetheless, KOP’s account has
its virtues and its authors argue that it is superior to that of Nagel.
In their treatment of inter-theoretic reduction KOP distinguish between
what they call internal reduction (when the vocabulary of the base theory, T1,
is a subset of the vocabulary of the target theory, T2) and branch reduction
(when the two theories, T1 and T2, belong to two distinct branches of science,
B1 and B2) (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, p. 9). Branch reduction is also
called micro-reduction (Putnam and Oppenheim 1958, p. 6).
How does KOP’s model apply specifically to the reduction of chemistry to
physics? Since chemistry and physics are two branches of science, the issue
becomes whether chemistry micro-reduces to physics. According to KOP, this
happens if the following conditions are met:
1. The objects in the universe of discourse of chemistry are wholes which
possess a decomposition into proper parts all of which belong to the
universe of discourse of physics.
2. Given a physical theory T1 , a chemical theory T2 , and some observational
data O:
(a) The vocabulary of the chemical theory T2 contains terms that are
not in the vocabulary of the physical theory T1 .
(b) Any part of O explainable by means of T2 is explainable by T1 .
(c) T1 is at least as well systematized as T2 .
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One of KOP’s motivations for reduction is the elimination of unnecessary
theoretical terms, or ontological parsimony.
“Nevertheless, since theoretical terms are in a sense a luxury, we
want to know if we can get along without some of them. It is, then,
of considerable interest to know that a set of theoretical terms is
superfluous since we can replace the theories using these by others in which they do not occur, without sacrificing the degree of
systematization achieved by science to this day”. (Kemeny and
Oppenheim 1956, p. 12)
Two characteristics of KOP’s model distinguish it profoundly from Nagel’s
model. The first is the absence of bridge laws and the relativization of intertheoretic reductions to observational data. The second is the requirement that
the base theory is at least as well systematized as the target theory.11
Let us now consider the first difference between the two models in the
context of the reduction of chemistry to physics. In Nagel’s model, the reduction of chemistry to physics is accomplished when the laws of chemistry
are derived from the laws of physics. This derivation cannot obtain unless
the theoretical terms that occur in the vocabulary of chemistry are translated
via bridge laws into terms present in the vocabulary of physics. Bridge laws,
if they can be found, guarantee a direct connection between chemistry and
physics. But KOP would deny that a direct connection between chemistry
and physics is necessary for reduction. They argue that the connection between two theories may be effected indirectly, via their respective connections
with the observational data. For KOP, theories are practical theoretical devices for explaining and predicting observations. They claim that any theory
11

The post-positivist philosophy of science has raised serious doubts with respect to the
dichotomy between theoretic and observational terms. However, it is worth considering the
issue whether the spirit of the KOP’s model really requires maintaining this discredited
distinction. It has been claimed that, likely, a version of the view could be refined that
replaced the notion of explaining observations with an appeal to explaining phenomena
more generally (Ney 2008). In my discussion of KOP’s model I will continue to employ
their terminology. The goal is to see whether KOP’s model is viable independently of what
views on the theoretic-observational dichotomy one may hold.
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can be replaced, for the purposes of explanation and prediction, by the set of
all observational statements that follow from it. KOP emphasize that a theory
cannot add anything to the set of observational data that follows from it. A
theory is nothing over and above a set of observations, and for this reason the
two are cognitively equivalent. Admittedly, the set of observations to which
a theory is equivalent is infinite. But it is recursively enumerable. A theory
organizes these observational facts into a practically manageable form; a theory is just a simple, economical and systematic proxy for a set of observations.
For KOP, a theory has the same explanatory ability as the long (or infinite)
list of statements, but it is much more simple and therefore preferable to such
a list.
The need for introducing theoretical terms is justified only insofar as it
makes the body of observations more manageable for the purposes of explanation and prediction. KOP emphasize that anything that can be said about
actual observations can be said without theoretical terms, but their introduction allows a much more systematized treatment of our total knowledge.
Since chemistry and physics are theories in KOP’s sense, each is equivalent
with a set of observations. As a result, chemistry is replaceable by physics
insofar as the set of observations to which it is equivalent is explainable by
means of physics alone. The connection between chemistry and physics can
be effected indirectly, without translating chemical terms into physical terms
via bridge laws.
“If one theory is to follow from another, it must be translatable into
the vocabulary of the latter. But it is entirely possible that a theory
should be able to explain all facts that another can, without there
being any method of translation. Of course, each set of theoretical
terms must be connected to observational terms, and hence to each
other, but this connection is normally much weaker than a full
translation.” (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, p. 16).
KOP argue that the requirement of direct connections between theories has the
unavoidable consequence of producing a very narrow definition of reduction.
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This is what they find unsatisfactory about Nagel’s definition of reduction.
Nagel’s definition of reduction, KOP suggest, is too narrow in that excludes
most actual cases of reduction, including the reduction of chemistry to physics
(quantum mechanics, to be precise). KOP claim that “while some attempts
have been made to show that something like biconditional translation does exist, this certainly is not the case if quantum mechanics is taken as the reducing
science” (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, p. 16).12 KOP do not exclude the
possibility that some reductions may be accomplished by means of a translation of theories via bridge laws, à la Nagel. But they claim that Nagelian
reductions cover what is an extremely special case of reduction. Therefore,
in KOP’s view, their model is more comprehensive than Nagel’s as it applies
even to cases in which bridge laws cannot be found, such as the case of the
reduction of chemistry to physics.
Before examining some aspects of the reduction of chemistry to physics
according to KOP’s model, it is worth noting that KOP’s model of reduction
is deeply eliminativist. If the reduction of chemistry to physics is successful, chemistry is replaced by physics, allowing us to effect an economy in the
theoretical vocabulary of science. Kemeny and Oppenheim would relate the reduction of chemistry to physics to the possibility of forming a theory in physics
which can take the place of the totality of chemical theories.13 They would
argue that such a theory would have to explain all phenomena explainable by
means of chemical theories, without introducing undue complexity into the
theoretical structure of science. Kemeny and Oppenheim would claim that if
this is achieved, then all the theoretical terms of chemistry could be eliminated
from the vocabulary of science. Given this extreme eliminativism, it appears
that the hope for the ontological autonomy of the chemistry in relation to
physics vanishes.
Let us now turn to the issue of how the existence of specific chemical terms
12

According to KOP, another case of actual reduction in which there is nothing that even
remotely resembles the translation by means of biconditionals is the reduction of Newtonian
mechanics to relativity theory.
13
The case that Kemeny and Oppenheim consider explicitly is the reduction of biology to
physics, but their remarks equally apply to the reduction of chemistry.
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impacts KOP’s theory of reduction. If chemistry employs terms that do not
occur in the vocabulary of physics, could it micro-reduce to physics in the
sense KOP argued?
Let us grant that the first condition of KOP’s definition of micro-reduction
is met. That is, let us grant that the concrete objects in the universe of
discourse of chemistry (atoms, ions, molecules) are wholly composed of objects
that belong to the universe of discourse of physics (protons, neutrons and
electrons). The issue now becomes whether the second condition of KOP’s
definition obtains. If one grants the that the first condition is met, the issue of
whether chemistry micro-reduces to physics boils down to conditions (b) and
(c):
(b)

Any observation that is explainable by a theory of chemistry is
explainable by a theory of physics.

(c)

That theory of physics is at least as well systematized as the theory
of chemistry.

Neither of these claims is uncontroversial. The belief that for any observation
that is explainable by chemistry there is a correct quantum-mechanical explanation is often an act of faith, given that such explanations are usually difficult
to obtain in practice. The defenders of reductionism would argue that in this
case, faith is grounded in reason: the fruitfulness of the quantum-mechanical
approach in chemistry is undeniable, and if empirical success is the mark of
truth, then any particular chemical truth is in fact a complicated quantummechanical truth – in some cases perhaps too complicated to be ever known.
I do not wish to enter the debate about the truth of condition (b) here. Instead, I will focus on condition (c), namely the requirement that the theory of
physics that explains an observation should be at least as well systematized
as the chemical theory that explains the same observation.
Kemeny and Oppenheim conceive of the systematic character of a theory
as a combination of that theory’s simplicity and its explanatory power. The
systematic character of a theory may be unchanged or it may even increase if
any loss in simplicity is compensated for by a sufficient gain in its explanatory
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and predictive strength. Putnam and Oppenheim require that the “ratio” of
simplicity to explanatory power should be at least as great in the case of the
reducing theory as in the case of the reduced theory (Putnam and Oppenheim
1958, p. 5).
Kemeny and Oppenheim do not say much about what motivates subcondition (c). But they say that replacement of one theory by another should not
be regarded as progress unless the new theory compares favorably with the old
one in systematicity. Presumably, the requirement of systematicity originates
in the need for ontological parsimony.
Kemeny and Oppenheim admit that the concept of simplicity is in need of
a precise definition. They claim that simplicity is a purely syntactic concept
applicable to theories as a whole, and they want to distinguish it from certain
nonsyntactic concepts. In a footnote, Kemeny and Oppenheim write:
“In some cases there will be complete agreement among scientists
as to which of two theories is simpler; for example, if one can be
stated in a single line, while the other – using the same vocabulary
– requires several pages to state, then there would be little room
for argument” (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, p. 18).
I agree that in the case of internal reductions, where the two theories share the
same vocabulary, judging which theory is simpler can be a purely syntactical
matter. The issue, however, is to determine which of two theories is simpler in
the case of micro-reductions, i.e., when the two theories do not share the same
vocabulary. In such cases, it is at least conceivable that there could be disagreement about which theory is simpler. And if there could be disagreement
about which theory is simpler, there could also be disagreement about which
theory is more systematized. Given that the presumed reduction of chemistry
to physics is a case of micro-reduction, let us ask the following question: could
it be that the chemical theory which explains a certain observational data is
in fact more systematized than the physical theory which explains the same
data?
As far as I was able to determine, the only philosopher of science who
approached this question was Klee (1997). He argued for an affirmative answer:
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“Consider the reduction of chemical theory to quantum physical
theory. This is surely a reduction going in the correct direction;
yet, it is just as surely a reduction of a fairly well systematized body
of theory to one that is notoriously, if not infamously, conceptually
problematic and simply not as well systematized.” (Klee 1997, p.
88)
Although I agree with Klee that the answer to our question should be in the
affirmative, I find Klee’s argument not entirely convincing. Quantum mechanics may be fraught with interpretational problems, but it is not at all clear
that these problems make the theory unsystematized in the sense of KOP. In
particular, it is hard to see how the lack of a widely accepted interpretation of
the quantum-mechanical formalism affects its ratio of simplicity to explanatory
power. I think that an affirmative answer to our question could be supported
by a more elaborate argument, one that does not hinge upon controversies in
the foundations of quantum mechanics. I will now attempt to present such an
argument.
The argument starts with the following scenario. Suppose that a chemist
working in a chemistry laboratory needs some hydrogen gas for a combustion
reaction. The power is off and he cannot use the electrolysis device to produce
hydrogen by splitting up water; he has to find another solution. Luckily he
has some sulfuric acid and iron filings lying around and he decides to generate
hydrogen gas by performing the following reaction:
A1)

H2 SO4 + Fe −→ FeSO4 + H2 ↑

At the point when the chemist confirms the presence of hydrogen gas in the
flask, a physicist steps in the lab and asks him why did hydrogen gas appear
in the flask. The chemist gives him a chemical explanation:
P1)

Acids in reaction with metals produce hydrogen gas.14

P2)

In this flask, an acid reacted with a metal.

14

The conception of acids and bases assumed here is that of the Brønsted-Lowry theory.
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C)

This is why hydrogen gas appeared in the flask.

This is a simple but perfectly valid explanation for why hydrogen gas appeared
in the flask. The explanation above is a standard deductive-nomological explanation, and as far as deductive-nomological explanations go, it is perfectly
acceptable. However, it relies on concepts that are not in the vocabulary of
the physicist. Both “acid” and “metal” are concepts whose meaning is made
precise in the context of chemistry. Acids are defined in the context of chemical reactions as proton donors, while metals are elements that readily lose
electrons and can be identified by looking at the periodic table, which is a
chemical theoretical device par excellence.
But if condition (b) is true, the physicist could offer a different explanation, one that is deeper in that it involves quantum mechanics and references
to atomic and molecular wavefunctions. If the physicist has enough knowledge
of the initial state of the system and sufficient mathematical skill and computing power, he could give an alternative explanation as to why hydrogen gas
appeared in the flask; or so reductionists would argue.
Now suppose the chemist needs more hydrogen gas, but he has used up
his supply of sulfuric acid and iron filings. He looks into his chemical cabinet
and he finds some hydrochloric acid and zinc pellets, some acetic acid and
calcium and some phosphoric acid and magnesium. He decides to generate
more hydrogen gas by performing the following reactions:15
A2)

2 HCl + Zn −→ ZnCl2 + H2 ↑

A3)

2 CH3 COOH + Ca −→ Ca(OOCCH3 )2 + H2 ↑

A4)

2 H3 PO4 + Mg −→ Mg(H2 PO4 )2 + H2 ↑

Now the physicist asks a different type of why-question: “Why did hydrogen
gas appear in all four reactions? Why, despite of the diversity of the reactants,
all these reactions lead to the formation of hydrogen gas?”16 The chemist’s
15

All reactions below take place in aqueous solutions.
This distinction between two types of why-questions is very similar to the one made by
Batterman (2002, p. 23).
16
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answer is straightforward: “Because all these reactions are in fact acid-metal
reactions and it is a chemical law that acid-metal reactions generate hydrogen
gas.”
The chemist’s explanation of why hydrogen gas appeared in all four reactions is unified: despite the fact that the reactants in each reaction are
different, the chemist’s explanation recognizes these reactions as instances of
a single type of reaction (i.e., acid-metal reactions).
The physicist’s explanation, however, is not unified. Since the physicist
does not have the concept of an acid, he will also lack the concept of acidmetal reactions. Therefore, he will not realize that the four different reactions
are in fact instances of the same type of chemical reaction, one which produces
hydrogen gas. To answer the question of why hydrogen gas appeared in all four
reactions, the physicist must apply the principles of the physical theory to each
chemical reaction; he will have to consider each pair of reactants individually
and calculate what the reaction products will be. Grant that after a complicated and resource-demanding process, the physicist will eventually arrive at
an explanation of why hydrogen gas appears in reaction A1, for instance. But
he will not be able to use that explanation to account for the occurrence of
hydrogen in the other three cases, for the initial conditions in are different in
each case. To explain the occurrence of hydrogen gas when phosphoric acid
reacts with magnesium (reaction A4), the physicist will have to start “from
scratch” so to speak, and go through another resource-demanding process.
The chemist, on the other hand, is not confined to the vocabulary of the
physicist. By classifying entities not according to their physical characteristics
(e.g., charge, mass, spin, etc.) as the physicist does, but according to their
behaviour in reactions, the chemist is able to talk about acids, metals, and
acid-metal reactions.
Many terms in the chemist’s vocabulary, including “acid”, “base”, “oxidant”, “reductant”, refer to substances that are defined by their behaviour
in chemical reactions, not by some shared physical constituent possessed by
them and only by them. For example, according to the Brønsted-Lowry theory, the term “acid” denotes those compounds that donate protons in chemi-
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cal reactions. In the same theory, the term “base” refers to proton acceptors.
Reductants are defined as those substances that donate electrons to another
chemical species, while oxidants are those that receive them. All of these types
of substances are defined functionally, by reference to their role in chemical
reactions. In order to be able to recognize the existence of properties like acidity, one needs to take a step back and notice similarity in behaviour among
systems whose physical descriptions are very different.
The existence of specific chemical terms allows for the possibility of unified, overarching chemical explanations, like the one offered by our chemist.
In our lab scenario, the unified character of the chemist’s explanation is made
possible by the existence of chemical terms like “acid” and "metal". If the unified chemical explanation was possible, it was because the chemist recognized
H2 SO4 , HCl, CH3 COOH and H3 PO4 , on the one hand, and Fe, Zn, Ca, Mg,
on the other, as entities belonging to certain classes of substances that have
certain functional descriptions (acids, respectively metals). This is chemical
knowledge, which is as such unavailable to the physicist, whose vocabulary
does not include terms like “acid”.
One may object. Couldn’t the physicist give an equally unified explanation
that doesn’t use specific chemical terms? Couldn’t he give an explanation
identical to the one given by the chemist, but in which the terms “acid” and
“metal” are replaced with expressions containing purely physical terms?
There are several problems with this suggestion. First, it is hard to see
how a strategy that relies on translating specific chemical terms into purely
physical terms can be accommodated within KOP’s model of reduction given
this model’s explicit disavowal of bridge laws. If the micro-reductionist insists
that the physicist could give an equally unified explanation if he is allowed
to translate the specific chemical terms into expressions that do figure in the
physicist’s vocabulary, then it looks like KOP’s micro-reduction is after all
not that different from Nagelian reduction. Both models of reduction would
embrace the use of bridge laws, although they would disagree about which
stage in the reduction process the bridge laws would come in – the advocate
of Nagelian reduction appeals to bridge laws in the early stages of reduction
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process, before the crucial explanatory step takes place, whereas the advocate
of micro-reduction would appeal to bridge laws in the final stage, after this
step would have occurred.
Another problem is that of actually finding translations of the specific
chemical terms into purely physical terms. As mentioned, metals are defined
with reference to the position they occupy in the periodic table of elements,
a chemical theoretical device par excellence. However, leading philosophers
of chemistry have argued that the periodic table continues to resist physical
axiomatization (Scerri 1997). Finally, even if the physicist could find such
translations, it could be argued that by using them he would be expanding
the conceptual inventory of physics. In other words, he would not be doing just
physics anymore. Moreover, if the physicist decided to use these translations
in his explanation, it could be argued that he would be doing this in an ad
hoc manner, prompted by the challenge ahead of him, and not by independent
reasons having to do with furthering the goals of his discipline.
I take it that the unity of the explanations given by a theory is an important aspect of the systematicity of that theory. It is hard to consider a theory
systematized if some of the explanations that it offers are disunified. But does
the disunified character of the physicist’s answer to the second why-question
pose a problem for the idea that chemistry is micro-reducible to physics as
KOP hoped? Micro-reduction demands that any observational data that is
explainable by chemistry is also explainable by physics. Notice however that
by “observational data” one can mean two things: an observable instance of
a phenomenon (e.g., the occurrence of hydrogen gas in any of the reactions
above), or an observable pattern (e.g., the occurrence of hydrogen gas in all
of the reactions above). If the explanandum is an observable instance, then
one could perhaps argue that the physical explanation is at least as systematized as the chemical explanation; one could say that although it may be
more complicated than the chemical explanation, the physical explanation is
deeper and more powerful, so any loss in simplicity is compensated by a gain
in explanatory power. However, if what needs to be explained is the occurrence of an observable pattern (in our case the occurrence of hydrogen gas in

136

all four reactions), then there are reasons to question the idea that a similarly
systematized physical explanation is possible. This is because there are reasons to think that the physical explanation is less unified than the chemical
explanation, as the lab scenario shows.
As mentioned, the model of reduction that KOP propose is deeply eliminativist. If the reduction of chemistry to physics is achieved, then all the
theoretical terms of chemistry are superfluous and should be eliminated from
the vocabulary of science. Terms like “acid”, “base”, “oxidant”, “reductant”,
etc. will become otiose, since whatever can be done with these terms (e.g.,
explaining) could be done just as well if not better with a more fine-grained
theory in which these terms do not figure.
I argued that some things that are in need of explanation (i.e., patterns
of chemical behaviour) cannot be explained in a unified manner by physics,
but they can be so explained by chemistry. What seems to be required for
a unified explanation of patterns of chemical behaviour is not knowledge of
the micro-details that the fine-grained physical theory provides, but quite the
opposite: abstraction from those details, which enables one to see similarities
between systems that are regarded as different by the fine-grained theory.
If for some explananda the chemical explanantia are more unified than the
corresponding physical explanantia, the idea that physics and chemistry are
equally well systematized becomes problematic. But if this is the case, there
are grounds to question that subcondition (c) of KOP’s account of reduction
is met. This result, in turn, raises doubts that KOP’s account of reduction
can be effectively applied to chemistry.

4.3

Functional reduction

The next model of reduction that I will be examining is the one elaborated
by Kim (1999, 2005). Kim suggests that his model is distinct from Nagel’s
and superior to it insofar as it does not require bridge laws to connect the
vocabularies of the two theories. Although Kim’s model is aimed at the reduction of the mental properties to the neurophysiological ones, it is intended
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to apply more generally to the reduction of the special sciences to physics.
Here’s a general formulation of Kim’s functional model of reduction: if E is
a higher level property that is a candidate for reduction and B is the domain
of properties serving as a reduction base, the functional reduction of E to B
involves three steps (Kim 1999, p. 10-11).
Step 1: E must be functionalized – that is, E must be construed,
or reconstrued, as a property defined by its causal/nomic relations
to other properties, specifically properties in the reduction base B.
Step 2: Find realizers of E in B. If the reduction, or reductive explanation, of a particular instance of E in a given system is wanted,
find the particular realizing property P in virtue of which E is instantiated on this occasion in this system; similarly, for classes of
systems belonging to the same species or structure types.
Step 3: Find a theory (at the level of B) that explains how realizers
of E perform the causal task that is constitutive of E (i.e., the
causal role specified in Step 1). Such a theory may also explain
other significant causal/nomic relations in which E plays a role.
Let’s see how this model of reduction is supposed to apply to chemistry. Consider the property of being an acid. The first step consists in construing acidity
as a property defined by its causal/nomic relations to physical properties in
the reduction base.
Step 1*: Acidity = the ability of some substances to donate protons in chemical reactions.
The second step would be to find those physical properties that realize the
causal role that defines acidity; that is, find those systems of electrons and nuclei that donate protons in chemical reactions. Step 2 above explicitly considers
the reduction of a particular instance of E to a particular realizing property
P. Applied to our case, step 2 tells us that in order to to reduce a particular
instance of acidity (i.e., a particular acid) we need to find a particular physical
system of electrons and nuclei. So applied to our case, step 2 will be
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Step 2*: Acid A is realized by system of electrons and nuclei P.
Step 3 tells us that we need to find a physical theory that explains how these
physical systems of electrons and nuclei donate protons to other systems of
electrons and nuclei. So applied to our case, step 3 will be
Step 3*: How system of electrons and nuclei P donates protons is
explained by quantum mechanics.
As a result of applying these steps, acid A is said to be reduced to its realizer
P. But it is worth emphasizing: the functional model of reduction allows us
to reduce an instance of a higher level property to an instance of a lower
level property. It does not does not allow us to reduce a higher level property
simpliciter to a lower level property. For example, if the property candidate
for reduction is pain, the functional model of reduction would – at best –
allow the identification of pain as instantiated in some type of organism (or
species) with some neurophysiological property that is characteristic of that
organisms or species. Therefore, functional reduction delivers at most “local”
or “species-specific” reductions: e.g., it allows us to reduce human pain to one
neurophysiological property Nh , reptilian pain to another neurophysiological
property Nr , etc. It does not allow us to reduce the general property of being in
pain to a certain lower level property common to all beings that can experience
pain.
If the functional model of reduction is applied to chemical properties like
acidity, it allows us to reduce an instance of a higher level property (acid
A) to an instance of a lower level property (physical system P). According
to this model of reduction, the general property of being an acid (i.e., acidity
simpliciter) would be fragmented into multiple species of acidity, each of which
could be reduced to a certain physical property. For example, Kim’s model
implies that there must be a hydrochloric-acid type of acidity, a sulfuric-acid
type of acidity, etc., and each of these types would be reducible to a certain
physical property (e.g., being an HCl molecule, or being an H2 SO4 molecule,
etc.). This model would imply that beyond these species-specific notions of
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acidity, there is no notion of acidity as such.17
In order to evaluate the consequences of Kim’s model of reduction for functional emergence, it is worth pointing out to the distinction between physicalism and reductionism. Fodor (1974) argued that physicalism (the idea that all
that the sciences talk about are physical events, even if they are not using the
physical vocabulary) is a thesis weaker than what he called reductivism (what
I called reductionism), reductivism being the conjunction of physicalism with
the assumption that there are natural kind predicates in an ideally completed
physics which correspond to each natural kind predicate in any ideally completed special science. The distinction was also recognized by Hellman and
Thompson (1975):
“Traditionally, physicalism has taken the form of reductionism –
roughly, that all scientific terms can be given explicit definitions in
physical terms. Of late there has been growing awareness, however,
that reductionism is an unreasonably strong demand.” (1975, p.
551).
It seems pretty clear now that if functional reduction can be obtained, it
proves something that is closer to physicalism (or token reductionism), rather
than full fledged reductionism. Kim’s model of reduction may be successful
in providing local or species-specific reductions, but it does not deliver the
reduction of properties simpliciter. It may be able to reduce human pain,
reptilian pain, etc., to corresponding neurophysiological properties, but it is
incapable of reducing pain as such. Similarly, it may be able to reduce the
acidity of the various chemical species into as many physical properties, but
it is incapable of reducing acidity itself. Therefore, this model of reduction
leaves open the possibility of there being sui generis chemical properties (or
sui generis special science properties, more generally).
Functional emergence embraces physicalism while at the same time maintaining that chemical properties are irreducible to physical properties because
17

In the next chapter I will argue that this claim is not warranted by the theory and
practice of the science of chemistry.
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the former are multiply realizable across various types of physical systems.
Kim’s functional reduction does not establish reductionism about the special
science properties unless it is complemented by an argument to the effect that
the properties that are the objects of study for the special sciences are not
multiply realizable. Indeed, Kim offers an argument to the effect that multiply realizable properties cannot be legitimate objects of a unified scientific
inquiry (Kim 1992). In Kim’s view, there can be no science of pain. If Kim’s
reasoning is followed consistently, it leads us to the perplexing conclusion that
there can be no science of acidity. I will discuss Kim’s arguments in the next
chapter, which will be dedicated to the evaluation of the various philosophical
arguments against the thesis of multiple realization.
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Chapter 5
A defense of functional
emergence
Since multiple realizability is an important ingredient in functional emergence,
challenges to the multiple realizability argument against reductionism are also
challenges to functional emergence. This chapter responds to the various criticisms that have been brought to multiple realizability as an anti-reductionist
strategy or to the multiple realizability thesis itself. With the help of examples
of chemical functionally emergent properties such as acidity or piezoelectricity, I argue that some of these criticisms do not pose a threat to functional
emergence, while the others do not succeed.

5.1

Shapiro’s challenge

Shapiro (2000) claims that the thesis that a given kind is multiply realizable
has been accepted too uncritically by philosophers. He complains that despite
its wide acceptance, the thesis of multiply realizability is not precise. This,
in Shapiro’s view, is because it is not clear what the satisfaction conditions
for the multiple realizability thesis are. Shapiro notices that the philosophical
discussion of the multiple realizability thesis is dominated by examples that
appeal to the intuitive force of the thesis, such as mousetraps, carburetors and
minds. However, he points out that a rigorous formulation of the multiple

143

realizability thesis is lacking. He complains that so far, no philosopher has
ever tried to complete the sentence, “N and M are distinct realizations of T
when and only when ...” (Shapiro 2000, p. 636).
Shapiro’s concern is twofold. He demands an answer to the question of how
different two realizations have to be before we call them distinct realizations
of a certain kind. But he also asks the question of how much similarity must
realizers bear to each other to justify the claim that they are realizations of the
same kind. Shapiro argues that once various conceptual issues are clarified, the
task of demonstrating multiple realizability leaves this thesis far more difficult
to establish than philosophers have thought.
My goal in this section is to propose a way of completing the sentence
that Shapiro talks about and put it to the test. I will use the notion of
a microconstitutive property developed in chapter 3 to provide the precise
definition of multiple realizability that Shapiro requires and I will investigate
whether this definition delivers the same (correct, I agree) conclusions about
the different cases that Shapiro considers. In addition, I will show how the
various chemical functional properties examined meet the criteria of multiple
realizability that I put forward and why they should be considered genuine
cases of multiple realizability.
Let’s consider the first of Shapiro’s concerns: how different two realizations
have to be before we call them distinct realizations of a certain kind? Shapiro
asks:
“Are corkscrews that differ in composition only – one is made of
steel and the other of aluminum – different realizations of the same
kind? Are corkscrews which are identical in composition but which
differ only in color – one is painted yellow and the other red –
different realizations of a corkscrew? Are corkscrews that differ in
mechanism as well as in composition – a waiter’s corkscrew relies
on a simple lever whereas a "winged" corkscrew utilizes a rack and
pinion – different realizations of the same kind?”(Shapiro 2000, p.
636).
Shapiro’s conclusion is that showing that a kind is multiply realizable, or that
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two realizations of a kind are in fact distinct, requires some work. In particular,
one must show that the realizations in question differ in causally relevant ways.
For example, he denies that two corkscrews that differ only in color are different
realizations of a corkscrew because color is not a property that contributes to
their capacity to remove corks. On the other hand, a waiter’s corkscrew and
a winged corkscrew do count as distinct realizations of a corkscrew because
they accomplish their function in non-identical ways. The moral, according
to Shapiro, is that multiple realizations count truly as multiple realizations
when they differ in causally relevant properties – in properties that make a
difference to how they contribute to the capacity under investigation.
How about two corkscrews that differ in composition only? Does a corkscrew
made of aluminum and one made of steel count as a different realizations of
the kind corkscrew? Shapiro’s answer is negative. He writes:
“Steel and aluminum are not different realizations of a waiter’s
corkscrew because, relative to the properties that make them suitable for removing corks, they are identical. The fact that one
corkscrew is steel and the other aluminum is no more a reason to
characterize them as different realizations than the fact that one
might be yellow and the other red.” (Shapiro 2000, p. 644).
I think that Shapiro’s claim that a difference in composition is no more reason
to characterize two corkscrews as different than a difference in color needs to
be qualified. Although I agree with Shapiro that differences in composition
and differences in color are not sufficient to establish differences in realization, such differences are not on a par. The reason is that color does not
play any role in how well a corkscrew accomplishes its function, whereas the
material a corkscrew is made of does. Corkscrews of any color do an equally
good job at removing corks (provided that color is the only difference between
them), whereas corkscrews made of different materials (steel and aluminum,
for example) may differ in their performance (e.g., if a corkscrew is made of a
type of a steel that has an extremely high strength due to an extremely high
carbon concentration, the corkscrew may break more easily than an identical
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one made of aluminum). So while Shapiro is right to claim that the material
composition does not make a difference in the function of a corkscrew (function depends primarily on design/form, not on composition), it could make a
difference in the how well that function is carried out.
That being said, I think that Shapiro’s argument is correct: unless two
realizations of a kind carry out their functional role in distinct ways there is
no reason to consider them different realizations of that kind. Corkscrews that
differ only in the material they are made of or in color should not be considered
different realizations of a corkscrew because material composition and color do
not make a real difference in the way the corkscrew accomplishes its functional
role. On the other hand, a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged corkscrew are
considered by Shapiro as truly distinct realizations of a corkscrew:
“The waiter’s corkscrew relies on a lever to pry the cork out of the
bottle whereas the winged corkscrew uses a rack and two pinions to
do the same job. Levers and rack and pinions are different mechanisms that require different manipulations, they are described by
different laws, and so on. The causally relevant properties of these
two devices differ; a fortiori they qualify as different realizations of
a corkscrew.” (Shapiro 2000, p. 644).
Now let’s see if the the notion of a microconstitutive property developed in
chapter 3 can be used to provide a precise definition of multiple realizability
that would deliver the same (correct) verdict about the cases discussed by
Shapiro. I suggest the following definition of multiple realization. Two lower
level properties N and M are distinct realizations of a higher level property T
when and only when
1)

The instantiation of either N or M in an individual S is sufficient
for the instantiation of T in S. (REALIZATION)

2)

There is no microconstitutive property P such that the instantiation of P in an individual S is sufficient for the instantiation of
either N or M in S. In other words, N and M have no microcon-
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stitutive feature in common (simply put, T is not a constitutive
property). (DISTINCTNESS)
As discussed in chapter 3, a microconstitutive feature of a property is a feature
that is possessed by all the instantiations of that property and only by them,
and which determines the characteristics that define the property in question
(e.g., the microconstitutive feature of the property of being a mammal is the
possession of mammary glands, the microconstitutive feature of the property
of being an alcohol is the possession of a hydroxyl group bound to a saturated
carbon).
The first condition (REALIZATION) is broadly compatible with both accounts of realization currently on the market (the standard account and the
subset account). According to the standard account, a property realizes another just in case it fills the causal role that defines the realized property. If
the instantiation of a property in an individual is sufficient for the instantiation of another property in the same individual, then it is also the case that
the causal profile of the latter obtains in virtue of the instantiation of the
former. On the subset account, a property realizes another if and only if its
causal powers include the causal powers of the realized property as a subset
(Shoemaker 2007). If the instantiation of either N or M in an individual S is
sufficient for the instantiation of T in S, and N and M are distinct, then the
set of causal powers of T cannot be coextensive with the set of causal powers
of either N or M – it must be a subset of the causal powers of either of them.
Does this definition of multiple realization deliver the correct conclusions
about the different cases considered by Shapiro? Let’s see. Consider the case
of two corkscrews that differ only in material composition. Say, we have two
waiter’s corkscrews similar in all respects with the exception of the material
they are made of: one is made of steel, the other is made of aluminum. Are
they distinct realizations of a waiter’s corkscrew according to the definition of
multiple realization just proposed?
According to the definition of multiple realization above, a waiter’s corkscrew
made of aluminum and one made of steel are distinct realizations of a waiter’s
corkscrew when and only when:
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1)

The instantiation of either of them is sufficient for the instantiation
of the kind waiter’s corkscrew.

2)

There is no microconstitutive property P such that the instantiation of P in an individual S is sufficient for the instantiation
of either the property of being an aluminum or a steel waiter’s
corkscrew in S. In other words, there is no microconstitutive feature common to both an aluminum waiter’s corkscrew and a steel
one.

In this case, 1 is satisfied: if you have either an aluminum waiter’s corkscrew
or a steel one then you have a waiter’s corkscrew. But condition 2 is not met:
both the aluminum and the steel corkscrew are systems consisting of a helix
(worm) and a class 2 lever.1 Thus, the property of being a worm + class 2 lever
system is a microconstitutive property of the waiter’s corkscrew: the presence
of a worm + class 2 lever system explains the ability of the waiter’s corkscrew
to remove corks. In explaining the ability of the waiter’s corkscrew to remove
corks, the explanation stops at the description of the worm + class 2 lever
system and need not mention what the worm or the lever are made of. As
Shapiro would put it, the shared microconstitutive feature of being a worm +
class 2 lever screens off the differences between steel and aluminum relative to
their function in a waiter’s corkscrew. Therefore, a waiter’s corkscrew made
of aluminum and one made of steel are not distinct realizations of the kind
waiter’s corkscrew.
A similar argument can be made for the idea that two corkscrews that
differ only in color are not distinct realizations of the kind they realize. Two
corkscrews that differ only in color share the same microconstitutive feature
– a feature that explains the ability of the type of corkscrew in question to
remove corks. The explanation of how the corkscrew achieves its function
stops at this shared microconstitutive feature, and need not go further and
mention the color; nor should it, because the color is not part of the shared
1

In the case of class 2 levers, the load is situated between the fulcrum and the applied
force. In class 1 levers the fulcrum is situated between the applied force and the load.
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microconstitutive feature.
How about a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged corkscrew? Are they distinct
realizations of the kind corkscrew? According to the definition of multiple
realization above, a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged corkscrew are distinct
realization of a corkscrew when and only when:
1)

The instantiation of either of them is sufficient for the instantiation
of the kind corkscrew.

2)

There is no microconstitutive property P such that the instantiation of P in an individual S is sufficient for the instantiation in S of
either the property of being a waiter’s corkscrew or that of being
a winged corkscrew. In other words, there is no microconstitutive
feature common to both a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged one –
the property of being a corkscrew is not constitutive.

In this case, both 1 and 2 are satisfied. A waiter’s corkscrew is realized by a
system consisting of a worm and a class 2 lever, whereas a winged corkscrew is
realized by a system that ultimately consists in a worm and two class 1 levers.
In the case of the lever of the waiter’s corkscrew, the load is situated between
the fulcrum and the force (class 2 lever), whereas in the case of the levers of
the winged corkscrew the fulcrum is located between the applied force and the
load (class 1 lever). This results in a different operation of the two corkscrews:
the waiter’s corkscrew needs a pulling motion to remove the cork, whereas the
winged corkscrew needs a pushing motion. What about the worm? The worm
is present in both the winged corkscrew and in waiter’s corkscrew. Isn’t the
worm a microconstitutive feature of both corkscrews? It is not. Despite being
a constituent of both types of corkscrew the worm alone does not amount to
a microconstitutive property of corkscrews: the presence of the worm alone
cannot explain how each of the two types of corkscrew can remove corks;
it explains how the cork is gripped, but it does not explain how the cork is
extracted (the lever or the rack and pinions do). So the presence of the worm is
not sufficient to explain the function of either corkscrew. Therefore the worm
is not (by itself) a microconstitutive feature shared by the two corkscrews.
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Thus, a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged corkscrew have no microconstitutive
feature in common (and thus being a corkscrew is not a constitutive property).
As a result, a winged corkscrew and a waiter’s corkscrew are truly distinct
realizations of the kind corkscrew.
Do the functional properties considered in chapter 3 meet the criteria of
multiple realizability that I put forward? Are acids, bases, reductants, oxidants, piezoelectrics genuinely multiply realized? The answer is affirmative
because in all these cases both conditions are met. First consider acids and
bases. As argued in chapter 3, there is no microconstitutive feature that is
shared by all acids and only by them. Acids are not defined as those substances that contain a H atom. Bases are not defined as those substances that
have a hydroxyl group. Thus, the second condition is met.2
The same with the property of being an oxidant: both oxygen and fluorine
are good oxidants. But does this ability derive from a common microconstitutive property? This can be investigated by looking at their microphysical
descriptions. Oxygen has 8 protons in its nucleus and 6 electrons on the last
shell, whereas fluorine has 9 protons in its nucleus and 7 electrons on the last
shell. Admittedly, both oxygen and fluorine have the first shell full (2 electrons
on the 1s orbital), but so does any other element in the periodic table with
the exception of hydrogen. Thus, having a first shell full is not a microconstitutive property. Also, having the first shell full does not explain the oxidizing
properties of oxygen and chlorine. What does explain these properties is their
ability to accept electrons, which is related to a magnitude called the redox potential. In aqueous solutions, the redox potential is a measure of the tendency
of the solution to either gain or lose electrons when it is subject to change by
introduction of a new species. A solution with a higher (more positive) reduction potential than the new species will have a tendency to gain electrons
from the new species (i.e. to be reduced by oxidizing the new species) and a
solution with a lower (more negative) reduction potential will have a tendency
to lose electrons to the new species (i.e. to be oxidized by reducing the new
2

In all cases considered, the first condition is met in an uninteresting way. The contentious condition that is related to Shapiro’s criticisms is condition 2.
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species). Thus, there is an important relational aspect to this ability, which
further prevents the possibility of attributing it to a microconstitutive property. Therefore, the ability to gain electrons is not the result of a microphysical
ingredient common to both oxygen and fluorine, but that of an interplay of
various forces such as the electrostatic attraction of the nucleus and the electron shielding. For this reason, the property of being an oxidant and that of
being a reductant should be regarded as genuinely multiply realized.
The same holds for piezoelectrics. Because of the diverse nature of the
mechanisms responsible for the piezoelectric behaviour of various materials
it becomes obvious that piezoelectricity is a multiply realized property – the
mechanism of piezoelectricity of crystals (ionic displacement) is distinct from
that of polymers (dipole rotation), which is distinct from that of interface
materials like cement and bone (streaming current).
Two questions remain, however. The first is this: admittedly, piezoelectricity is realized by three categories of phenomena, but couldn’t we reduce
the piezoelectricity of crystals to ion displacement, that of polymers to dipole
rotation, and that of interface materials to streaming currents? Take the case
of crystals: couldn’t we define the piezoelectricity of crystals microconstitutively, with reference to the creation of a dipole moment which is caused by ion
displacement in noncentrosymmetric crystals? As argued in chapter 3 (subsubsection 3.3.3.1), noncentrosymmetry is not a microconstitutive property
because there are various nonequivalent ways in which a crystal can fail to
be centrosymmetric (noncentrosymmetry is itself functional). However, what
about those piezoelectric crystals that are structurally identical? Why claim
that two crystals that have the same structure are different realizations of
the property of being a piezoelectric crystal? Take, for example quartz (SiO4
tetrahedra) and gallium orthophosphate, which is structurally identical but
the silicon atoms are alternately substituted with gallium and phosphorus
(GaPO4 tetrahedra). Why claim that quartz and gallium orthophosphate are
distinct realizations of the property of being a piezoelectric crystal? Since the
piezoelectricity of crystals is mainly the result of their structural properties,
Shapiro would probably argue that two piezoelectric crystals that are struc-
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turally identical should not count as different realizations of the property of
being a piezoelectric crystal. I suspect that in Shapiro’s view, the differences
between a quartz and a gallium orthophosphate crystal would be as relevant as
the differences between a steel corkscrew and one made of aluminum; in both
cases, Shapiro would argue, the properties that make them suitable for accomplishing their role (producing piezoelectricity, respectively removing corks) are
identical. So Shapiro may agree that piezoelectricity can be multiply realized,
but he would probably deny that the piezoelectricity of structurally identical
crystals is multiply realized.
The stance that Shapiro would take is tempting. Agreeing with it would not
be a major concession: even if structurally identical crystals are not different
realizations of crystal piezoelectricity, piezoelectricity as a general property is
still multiply realized (i.e., Shapiro would most certainly grant that the mechanism of piezoelectricity in cement or wet bone is not similar with the one in
crystals, and even that the piezoelectricity of crystals with dissimilar structures is multiply realized). However, it is worth investigating whether the case
of structurally identical crystals parallels the case of corkscrews identical in all
respects but composition. So are quartz and gallium orthophosphate different realizations of crystal piezoelectricity any more than a waiter’s corkscrew
made of aluminum and one made of steel are different realizations of the kind
waiter’s corkscrew?
To answer this question, we need to see whether the way in which these
objects (i.e., aluminum vs. steel corkscrew, respectively quartz vs. gallium
orthophosphate) accomplish their respective functions is genuinely different.
Take the case of corkscrews first. Do we have a satisfactory explanation of the
way in which a waiter’s corkscrew made of aluminum accomplishes its function
of removing corks? It turns out that we do. A waiter’s corkscrew made of
aluminum is able to remove the cork from a bottle by a two-step process: 1)
the grip, which happens when the worm penetrates the cork; 2) the pull, which
happens when the class 2 lever is deployed on the lip of the bottle and the
waiter pulls the handle of the corkscrew, thereby removing the cork. This is a
perfectly satisfactory description of the way in which a waiter’s corkscrew made
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of aluminum works. But how does a waiter’s corkscrew made of steel work?
It turns out that the process is identical. The two explanations are identical,
and neither of them makes reference to the material from which the corkscrew
is made. The words “aluminum” or “steel” do not occur in the description of
the ways in which these corkscrews accomplish their function. In explaining
the ability of the waiter’s corkscrew to remove corks, the explanation does not
mention what the worm or the lever are made of; it only mentions how the
grip and the pull are realized (the grip is realized by the worm penetrating the
cork, and the pull is realized by the class 2 lever system). For this reason, any
corkscrew (regardless of the kind of material it is made of) that removes corks
precisely in the way described above would not count as a different realization
of a waiter’s corkscrew.
To what extent does this analysis carry over to the case of a piezoelectric
made of quartz and one made of gallium orthophosphate? What is the way
in which a quartz crystal converts mechanical stress into surface charge, and
does it differ from the way in which gallium orthophosphate accomplishes the
same thing? The mechanism of quartz piezoelectricity has been described in
detail in chapter 3. For our purpose here it is important to recall that an explanation of quartz’s piezoelectric properties makes a reference to silicon and
oxygen atoms, as well as to the geometrical structure whose nodes these atoms
occupy (tetrahedra). Similarly, an explanation of the way in which a gallium
orthophosphate converts mechanical stress into surface charge will make a reference to the same type of geometric structure (tetrahedra), but it will also
mention the atoms that occupy the center and the tips of the tetrahedra (alternating gallium and phosphorus in the centers, and and oxygen at the tips).
Therefore, despite being very similar, the two explanations are not quite identical: the explanation of quartz’s piezoelectricity mentions silicon and oxygen,
while that of gallium orthophosphate mentions gallium and phosphorus as well
as oxygen. This is where the case of quartz and gallium orthophosphate differs
from the case of aluminum and steel corkscrews. This difference shows that
the case of crystals is not as simple as the case of corkscrews, and it lends
some support to the idea that quartz and gallium orthophosphate are distinct
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realizations of the property of being a piezoelectric crystal.
To conclude, Shapiro’s remarks do indeed discipline the talk of multiple
realizability that philosophers have been engaged in. In truth, the thesis of
multiple realizability had been accepted too uncritically by philosophers. But
in this section I have attempted to show that the talk of multiple realization can
be made rigorous. Using the notion of a microconstitutive property developed
in chapter 3, I suggested a criterion for multiple realization and I showed that
the chemical properties considered in chapter 3 meet it.

5.2

Kim’s argument from two metaphysical principles

As stated in the previous chapter, Kim’s functional reduction does not establish reductionism about the special science properties unless it is complemented
by an argument to the effect that the properties that are the objects of study
for the special sciences are not multiply realizable. Indeed, Kim offers arguments to the effect that multiply realizable properties cannot be legitimate
objects of a unified scientific inquiry (Kim 1992). In this section I will present
Kim’s arguments and evaluate them.
Kim takes issue with a claim shared by functionalists about special science
properties. The claim is that disjunctions of heterogeneous kinds (or disjunctive properties) are unfit for laws (Kim 1992, p. 10). In section 3.1 I illustrated
this claim with the following example: while it is a law that sulfuric acid in
reaction with iron produces iron sulfate, and it is a law that hydrochloric acid
in reaction with zinc produces zinc dichloride, it is not a law that either sulfuric acid or hydrochloric acid in reaction with either iron or zinc produces
either iron sulfate or zinc dichloride. I claimed that nonetheless, the more
general claim, asserting that acids in reactions with metals produce a metal
salt is a law. The general idea here is that the kinds that the special sciences
talk about are natural kinds which figure in true universal generalizations but
they are realized by a variety of lower level kinds which cannot replace them
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in those generalizations. Being an acid is a genuine property which can figure
in true chemical generalizations, but being a molecule of H2 SO4 _or_HCl is a
disjunctive property which cannot. Kim’s problem with this claim is this: if
the kinds that the special sciences talk about are realized by wildly disjunctive and obviously nonnomic lower level kinds, why aren’t themselves equally
heterogeneous and nonnomic?
Kim thinks that this question is prompted by examining the case of jade.
It turns out that being jade is a disjunctive property: all samples of jade are
either samples of jadeite or nephrite. Kim argues that since jade is disjunctive,
it cannot be a mineral kind – jade does not pass the projectibility test. If we
discovered (suppose) that all the millions of observed samples of green jade
turn out to have been samples of jadeite, and none of nephrite, we clearly
would not, and should not – Kim argues – continue to think of the universal
generalization “Jade is green” as well confirmed (Kim 1992, p. 12). Therefore
there can be no laws about jade; the universal generalization “Jade is green”
lacks nomic character, since it is just the conjunction between two other claims,
which admittedly do have nomic character: “Jadeite is green” and “Nephrite
is green”. As a result, there can be no science of jade (or at least no unified
science of jade).
Kim thinks that there is a strong and instructive analogy between jade
and multiply realized special science properties (Kim’s favourite example is
pain). Kim argues that just like jade and because of the same reason, the
multiply realized properties cannot be the object of a unified science. Kim
further supports this conclusion by invoking two principles.
• The Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds: Kinds in science
are individuated on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects and events
fall under a kind, or share in a property, insofar as they have similar
causal powers (Kim 1992, p. 17).
• The Causal Inheritance Principle: If a higher-order property M is
realized in a system at t in virtue of physical realization base P, the
causal powers of this instance of M are identical with the causal powers
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of P (Kim 1992, p. 18).
Applied to the case of jade, these two principles lead to the conclusion that
samples of jade that consist of nephrite must be grouped under one kind and
those that consist of jadeite must be grouped under another (By the Causal
Inheritance Principle, samples of jade that consist of jadeite have the causal
powers of jadeite and those that consist of nephrite have the causal powers
of nephrite; and by the Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds, jadejadeite
and jadenephrite have different causal powers and thus fall under distinct kinds.)
The upshot is that the disjunctive nature of jade prevents the possibility of
there being laws about it – as a result, there can be no science of jade.
According to Kim, the same fate befalls all special science kinds that are
multiply realized (including mental kinds M).
“The reasoning is simple: instances of M that are realized by the
same physical base must be grouped under one kind, since ex hypothesi the physical base is a causal kind; and instances of M with
different realization bases must be grouped under distinct kinds,
since, again ex hypothesi, these realization bases are distinct as
causal kinds. Given that mental kinds are realized by diverse physical causal kinds, therefore, it follows that mental kinds are not
causal kinds, and hence are disqualified as proper scientific kinds.
Each mental kind is sundered into as many kinds as there are
physical realization bases for it, and psychology as a science with
disciplinary unity turns out to be an impossible project.” (Kim
1992, p. 18).
If correct, Kim’s arguments show that the multiply realized properties cannot
as such be legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. If Kim is right, there cannot
be a unified science of jade or a unified science of pain, or a science of any
multiply realized property, in point of fact.
“There are no scientific theories of jade, and we don’t need any; if
you insist on having one, you can help yourself with the conjunction of the theory of jadeite and the theory of nephrite. In the same
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way, there will be theories about human pains (instances of Nh ),
reptilian pains (instances of Nr ), and so on; but there will be no unified, integrated theory encompassing all pains in all pain-capable
organisms, only a conjunction of pain theories for appropriately individuated biological species and physical structure-types. Scientific psychology, like the theory of jade, gives way to a conjunction
of structure-specific theories.” (Kim 1992, p. 17).
Consequently, the autonomy of the special sciences is threatened:
“If this is right, the correct conclusion to be drawn from the MRinspired antireductionist argument is not the claim that psychology
is an irreducible and autonomous science, but something that contradicts it, namely that it cannot be a science with a unified subject
matter.” (Kim 1992, p. 17).
According to Kim, the thesis of multiple realizability seriously compromises
the disciplinary unity and autonomy of the special sciences. If Kim’s reasoning
is followed consistently, it leads us to the perplexing conclusion that there can
be no science of acidity (or at least not a unified one). So if we follow Kim’s
reasoning, either there is no science of chemistry or chemistry is fragmented
into as many chemistries as kinds of acids there are. This conclusion is indeed
puzzling. Before we turn to evaluate this possibility, let us first ask the following questions. Could the case of psychology that Kim discusses be relevantly
different from that of other special sciences such as chemistry? Or perhaps the
kind that Kim relies on in his analogy (jade) is fundamentally different from
the kinds of both psychology and chemistry?
I think that the analogy between special science properties (pain, acidity)
and jade is not justified, let alone strong and instructive as Kim believes.
The reason is simple: jade is not a functional kind, despite the fact that it is
multiply (or rather, doubly) instantiated. Although jade artifacts have a role
(i.e., an ornamental role), the property of being jade is not itself defined by a
functional role. Jade is not defined by the way it reflects light, for example. If
you cook up something that reflects light like jade, and is in its macroscopic
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appearance indiscernible from jade, you have not made jade (unless you have
made either jadeite or nephrite). If you try to sell it as jade, you risk getting
arrested.3 However, if you invent something that traps mice, you have made
a mousetrap. Selling the mice-catching device that you invented as a mouse
trap will make you a legit enterpriser, while selling something that has the
macroscopic appearance of jade as jade will make you a counterfeiter.
Now, the functional properties of chemistry are more like mousetraps than
like jade. If you cook up a substance that plays the causal role of acids (donates
protons in chemical reactions), you have made an acid. This is what people
working in synthetic chemistry do, and they get paid for it. Kim’s mistake
is that he conflates disjunctive properties like jade with functional properties,
like acidity: the latter are disjunctively-based, but not disjunctive. This is
why I think it is improper to say that jade is multiply realized; saying this
implies that jade is a functional property when it is not. Unlike the property
of being an acid, being jade is not defined by a certain causal role (say, the
ability to reflect light in a certain manner). Being jade is simply a disjunctive
property (being either jadeite or nephrite), not a multiply realized one. For
this reason, there is no wonder that there are no laws about jade, and thus
there is no wonder that there is no science of jade. However, there are laws
about acids and there is a unified science of acidity, or at least it appears that
way.
Shapiro (2005) has argued that even if one accepts The Principle of Causal
Individuation of Kinds and The Causal Inheritance Principle the conclusion
that the special sciences which talk about multiply realized kinds are disunified
still does not follow. This, in Shapiro’s view, is because The Principle of Causal
Individuation of Kinds does not entail that kinds with distinct causal powers
cannot realize the same higher level kind (Shapiro 2005, p. 957). Interestingly,
Shapiro invokes the case of acids: “Sulfuric acid and deoxyribonucleic acid
differ in their causal powers. One has the causal powers of a gene and the
other does not. However, it does not follow from this difference that they do
not share a scientific property – they are both acids after all” (Shapiro 2005, p.
3

This argument is due to Fodor (1997).
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957). According to Shapiro, if Kim maintains that every difference in a kind’s
substrate implies a difference in kind, this leads to an absurd consequence:
that acid is not a kind. Shapiro writes:
“Because acids can be multiply realized, the reasoning of the Master Argument [Kim’s argument] leads to the rejection of chemistry
as a unified science. There must, it turns out, be at best local
chemistries: a chemistry in which sulfuric acid is an acid; a chemistry in which hydrochloric acid is an acid; a chemistry in which
DNA is an acid. There will be as many chemistries as there are,
not just actual acids, but nomologically possible acids. I was pretty
good at chemistry in high school, but of course those were the days
when there was only one chemistry.” (Shapiro 2005, p. 957).
Shapiro finds it absurd that chemistry is a disunified science and thus he
constructs a reductio against Kim’s argument. But is the idea that chemistry
is a disunified science absurd? Not if acidity is a fragmented property, as
Kim’s principles would seem to entail. Let us now examine the possibility
that for various reasons (social, institutional, etc.) people mistakenly believed
that chemistry is a unified science. Let us not dismiss out of hand what Kim
suggests, namely that the sciences that talk about multiply realized kinds are
in fact fragmented or disunified, and hence unprojectible. If we stick to the
case of chemistry, Kim’s reasoning leads us to the conclusion that chemistry
is a disunified science because it talks about properties like acidity, which are
realized by a variety of nuclei-electrons systems. But is this conclusion right?
The claim that the property of being an acid, for example, can be fragmented into a HCl acidity, a H2 SO4 acidity, a HNO3 acidity and so on depending on its physical realization base is without theoretical support. Chemists
would balk at this idea, as Shapiro in fact does. They would be entitled to do
so because such subdivisions lack any theoretical grounding and they are unwarranted by scientific practice. According to Brønsted-Lowry theory of acids
and bases, substances like HCl, H2 SO4 , HNO3 are all acids because they donate protons in chemical reactions. The substances we call acids are composed
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of different elements, and they have different chemical structures, but they are
unified by a certain behaviour which can be objectively determined. Even if
acids were to be subdivided along some criteria, the subdivisions would not be
made using constitutive criteria, but functional ones. For example, depending on what is the functional property considered as defining acidity we have
Lewis acids (electron-pair acceptors), Brønsted-Lowry acids (proton donors),
Arrhenius acids (increase the concentration of the hydronium ion when dissolved in water). In the case of the Brønsted-Lowry acids, depending on how
much they dissociate and whether they stay like that, we have weak acids and
strong acids. Depending on the number of protons donated by each acidic
compound, we have monoprotic acids or polyprotic acids.4
The fragmentation of acidity that Kim’s argument commends would not
be motivated by scientific considerations, but by a commitment to a priori
metaphysical principles. As discussed above, Shapiro claims that Kim’s two
principles do not jointly entail that kinds that are multiply realized must be
disunified. The Causal Inheritance Principle is relatively unproblematic, so the
point of contention is The Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds. Shapiro
is of the view that this principle does not entail that every difference in a kind’s
physical substrates implies a difference in kind. I agree with Shapiro, but I am
not sure Kim would. As stated by Kim, The Principle of Causal Individuation
of Kinds is compatible with two readings, depending on how “similar causal
powers” is understood. One possible reading is this:
• The (Strong) Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds: Kinds
in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects
and events fall under a kind, or share in a property, insofar as they have
the same (i.e., identical) causal powers.
On this interpretation, if two objects fall under a kind they have all of their
causal powers in common. Conversely, if two objects share some of their
causal powers but not others, the two objects will fall under two different
kinds. Another possible reading is this:
4

A similar point was made in the philosophy of biology by Kincaid (1990).
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• The (Weak) Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds: Kinds
in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects
and events fall under a kind, or share in a property, insofar as they have
most (or their most relevant) causal powers in common.
On this interpretation, if two objects have most (or their most relevant) causal
powers in common then the two objects may be legitimately grouped under
the same kind. Likewise, if two objects belong to the same kind, the they
share most of their causal powers (or at least a sufficient number of their most
relevant causal powers).
The second (weak) interpretation is more charitable than the first. Two
objects that are classified as belonging to distinct kinds according to the strong
formulation of the Causal Individuation of Kinds Principle could very well be
classified as belonging to the same kind according to the weak version. Since
Shapiro is of the view that The Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds
does not entail that every difference in a kind’s physical substrates implies a
difference in kind, it is pretty obvious that he endorses the weak reading of this
principle (differences in a kind’s physical substrate determine some differences
in causal powers).
But the weak version defines sameness of kind in terms of the causal powers
that are deemed relevant. And when talking about causal powers, relevancy
may differ in accordance to our interests. Consider Shapiro’s example: if you
are a biologist, DNA and sulfuric acid belong to different kinds (one has a
role in biological heredity, the other doesn’t). But if you’re a chemist, DNA
and sulfuric acid belong to the same kind (both donate protons). The strong
version of the principle does not allow this sort of relativization.5 At the same
time, the strong version of the principle has some undesirable consequences. It
entails that any difference, no matter how small or irrelevant, suffices to establish a difference in kind. For example, two individuals of the same biological
species would fall under different kinds if one is heavier, or more aggressive,
or has a darker coat than the other. Samples of two different substances be5

This sort of relativization is neither dangerous nor should it be avoided; in fact, it is
productive for the sciences.
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longing to a certain group of the periodic table (group 11) would fail to be
classified as belonging to the same kind (metal) if they consist of atoms having different atomic numbers (e.g., silver has atomic number 47 and gold has
atomic number 79).
Another reason why the weak version of the principle is to be preferred
is its compatibility with the idea that kinds could be individuated on the
basis of the causal role they perform, and this sort of individuation is to be
preferred in many contexts (including in science). Imagine a hardware store
organized according to Kim’s principles. Such a store would go out of business
pretty quickly, for mousetrap buyers will have hard times finding an electric
mousetrap in the electric-circuitry based devices section of the store, on the
same aisle where photo cameras and telephone sets would be located. If the
buyer is cautious and they want to shop-around and compare the different
types of mousetraps available in the store, they will give up pretty quickly, for
spending a full day criss-crossing a hardware store from the electric-circuitrybased devices aisle to spring-based devices aisle to glue-based-devices aisle is
not fun. Of course, mousetraps are not scientific kinds, and hardware stores
are not research institutions. But this does not affect the point I am making,
namely that kinds in general may be individuated not on the basis of their
constitution, but on the basis of their causal roles, i.e., functionally. This allows
individuating kinds on the basis of a relevant subset of the causal powers of
the entities instantiating that kind. Thus, two objects belonging to different
physical kinds may be legitimately grouped under the same chemical kind if
they share a relevant subset of their causal powers, namely those causal powers
that are deemed as defining the chemical kind in question. Fodor was entitled
to ask: “Why... should not the natural kind predicates of the special sciences
cross-classify the physical natural kinds?” (1974, p. 408). There is no reason
why, and in my view chemical kinds like acid are the living proof of this.
In my view, these are pretty compelling reasons to reject the strong version
of the principle in favor of the weak version. But if the weak version is preferred, Kim’s argument does not succeed and his conclusion that there cannot
be a science whose kinds are multiply realized does not follow.
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5.3

The argument from the general failure of
special-science causal closure and the argument from the idiosyncratic nature of
special science properties

More recently, while maintaining his old argument that multiply realizable
properties/kinds cannot figure in laws, Kim (2010) argued that there can be
no strict laws in the special sciences. Presumably, this weaker claim is intended
to support Kim’s views about the impossibility of a science whose kinds are
multiply realized.6 In this section I will present Kim’s arguments and argue
that they do not support this conclusion.
One of the arguments that Kim presents is inspired by Davidson’s view on
mental anomalism. Davidson was of the view that the mental was anomalous,
i.e., there can be no laws connecting mental phenomena with other mental
phenomena. This is because every instance of mental to mental causation is
vulnerable to disruption by the occurrence of a nonmental (physical) event.
Kim calls this the “massive failure of causal closure for the mental”:
“Let M and M* be mental event kinds and consider a putative
causal relation from an M-event to an M*-event. Then there always
is a physical event kind P such that if a P-event were to occur
along with the M-event, that would prevent the M*-event from
occurring. That is, every mental-to-mental causal relation is liable
to disruption by the occurrence of a physical event.” (Kim 2010,
p. 292)
Kim believes that this sort of argument generalizes to the special sciences:
• General failure of special-science causal closure: For any putative
causal relation from an S1 -event to an S2 -event, involving special-science
kinds S1 and S2 , there always is a lower level condition C such that if
6

It should be noted however that Kim does not make this argument explicitly.
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C were to occur along with the S1 -event, that would disrupt the causal
process and prevent the S2 -event from occurring. (Kim 2010, p. 292)
According to Kim, the general failure of special-science causal closure entails
the nonexistence of strict special-science laws: for any special science kinds
S1 and S2 , there is no strict law of the form kinds S1 → S2 . Because the
causal/nomological relations at higher levels studied by the special sciences are
always susceptible to disruption from below (i.e., to interference from events
occurring at a lower level) it follows that strict laws can be found only in
fundamental physics, where the danger of disruption from below does not
exist because at the most fundamental physical level there is no “below”. Kim
claims that the physical level being the bottom level, physical causal relations
at the fundamental level suffer no similar vulnerability, and this allows for the
possibility of strict physical laws.
The other argument presented by Kim is based on an argument made by
J.J.C. Smart (1963). In his book Philosophy and Scientific Realism, Smart
argues for the same conclusion as Kim, namely that there are no strict laws in
the special sciences. Like Kim, Smart thinks that physics is the only science
in the business of discovering and formulating laws. He writes:
“Not only do I deny the existence of emergent laws and properties,
but I even deny that in biology and psychology there are laws in the
strict sense at all. There are, of course, empirical generalizations.
There are not any biological laws for the very same reason that
there are not any laws of engineering. Writers who have tried
to axiomatise biological and psychological theories seem to me to
be barking up the same gum tree as would a man who tried to
produce the first, second, and third laws of electronics, or of bridge
building. We are not puzzled that there are no laws of electronics or
of bridge building, though we recognize that the electronic engineer
or bridge designer must use laws, namely laws of physics...I shall
try to show that the important analogy is not between biology and
the physical sciences but between biology and the technologies,
such as electronics.” (Smart 1963, p. 52)
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By “laws in the strict sense” Smart means laws that are universal in the sense
that they apply everywhere in space and time.7 Therefore, strict laws are
exceptionless. According to Smart, examples of strict laws are the laws of
motion in classical mechanics, the laws of electrodynamics, and the equations
of quantum mechanics. Interestingly, Smart does not think of chemistry as
different from physics with respect to the kind of laws that it affords (1963,
p. 53). The two sciences are viewed as being on the same side of the fence,
so to speak, in contradistinction to sciences like biology or psychology, which
cannot afford strict laws. So in Smart’s book, chemistry is not quite a special
science. On the other hand, biology and psychology are. Their relation with
the former emulates the relation between physics and engineering. For Smart,
biology is related to physics and chemistry the way radio-engineering is related
to the theory of electromagnetism. He claims that just as the radio-engineer
uses physics to explain why a circuit with a certain wiring diagram behaves as
it does, so the biologist uses physics and chemistry to explain why organisms
or parts of organisms with a certain natural-history description behave as they
do (Smart 1963, p. 57). For Smart, therefore, biology is “applied” chemistry
and physics in the same way in which engineering is “applied” physics: the
laws of chemistry and physics explain the behaviour of biological entities in
the same way the laws of physics explain the workings of a radio receiver.
Even if one grants that the special sciences are like engineering, why should
one accept that they cannot have strict laws, like physics? Smart’s answer
is this. Both engineering and biology involve complex systems and entities
– much more complex than those of the basic science, physics (or physicochemistry). For this reason, the entities of the special sciences are highly
idiosyncratic. For example, no two cells are exactly alike, even those accomplishing the same function in the same organism. From this it follows that no
two cells behave exactly the same way. As a result – according to Smart –
we cannot expect to find strict laws about them. So according to Smart, the
7

Smarts adds here the condition that proper laws should be able to be expressed in
perfectly general terms without making use of proper names or tacit reference to proper
names.
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individual variability among the kinds of any given special science preclude
the possibility of strict laws in that science.
Unsurprisingly, Kim supports Smart’s argument. Kim thinks that the similarity in the behaviour of some entities (that the nomological character of
the claims about those entities requires) is determined by the similarity in the
microphysical constitution of those entities, and conversely, the greater the
dissimilarity in microphysical constitution, the greater the behavioural dissimilarity. Kim’s argument is basically a version of the one presented in the
previous section, where I also pointed out what’s wrong with it. But it is worth
noting a difference between Kim and Smart. While Smart argues that there
are no strict laws in the special sciences, Kim wants to go further. He argues
not only that there are no strict laws in the special sciences (2010), but also
that the so-called special sciences are not in fact sciences (1992). Kim insists
that this does not have to be taken as a negative message. Special sciences
can still flourish if they turn to providing explanations of the phenomena they
study at a more basic level. In Kim’s view, a special science like psychology
remains scientific, though perhaps not a science (Kim 1992, p. 26). It is not a
science because the kinds that it talks about are too dissimilar from the point
of view of their realizations to be legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. It
remains scientific insofar as it dedicates its research programs to elucidating
the more basic mechanisms that make the species-specific kinds possible.
Before evaluating the arguments inspired by Davidson and Smart we should
look at two claims that Kim isn’t very careful to distinguish – indeed, one may
argue that Kim is in fact interested to blur the distinction between them and
to take both of them as supporting his view of the special sciences: it is one
thing to claim that the special sciences cannot afford strict laws and quite
another to claim that the kinds that the special sciences talk about cannot
be legitimate objects of scientific inquiry because they are too disunified to be
laws about them. The former claim states something about the nature of the
special-science laws, while the latter calls into question the very possibility of
there being special-science laws. The former claim is about the nature of the
special sciences qua sciences, while the latter doubts that the special sciences
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can be that – namely sciences.
In the light of the clarification above, one may see that Kim’s general
failure of special-science causal closure supports at most the idea that the
laws formulated by the special sciences are not exceptionless. The same with
Smart’s argument based on the idiosyncratic and complex nature of the special
science kinds. Neither argument purports or is able to show that there can
be no science whose kinds are multiply realized. At best, they show that the
character of a science whose kinds are multiply realized is somewhat different
from the character of a science whose kinds are not. But neither argument
intends or has the force to show that the only science which deserves to be
called like that is physics.
Now let’s turn to Kim’s arguments inspired by Davidson and Smart. Does
the general failure of special-science causal closure affect the scientific status of
the special sciences? I don’t see why this should be the case. I don’t see why
the possibility of disruption from below endangers the nomological status of the
relations between higher level properties. Consider this example. Admittedly,
an acid and a metal won’t react to produce hydrogen if the temperature is near
0 K. This is a standard example of what Kim means by physical conditions
disrupting chemical behaviour “from below”. Does it follow from here that
“acids in reaction with metals produce hydrogen” is not “a real” law, or that
it is just a rule of thumb devoid of nomological content? It doesn’t. What
follows is that the statement in question is susceptible to being interfered with
by some factors (which in this case are known, but could be unknown as well)
such that if those factors obtain, the antecedent does not give rise to the
consequent (acids and metals may come in contact, but hydrogen will not be
produced). But this possibility arises with respect to the laws of physics as
well. For example, if you wait long enough, heat may “flow” from a cooler
body to a hotter one, thereby violating the second law of thermodynamics.8
Of course, one may object by saying that thermodynamics is not a fundamental theory in the sense in which Kim or Smart use the word. But are
8

I am considering here the Clausius formulation: “No process is possible whose sole result
is the transfer of heat from a body of lower temperature to a body of higher temperature”.
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there any more reasons to consider the laws of fundamental physics as strict?
Even if we grant that the danger of disruption from below does not arise in
relation to the causal/nomological relations between entities populating the
most fundamental physical level, these relations may still be sensitive to other
factors. For example, the notion that the laws of basic physics are changing
with time is currently being taken seriously by particle physicists, astronomers
and cosmologists. There is evidence that the coupling constant characterizing
the strength of the electromagnetic interaction (the so-called fine structure
constant) may not actually be a constant. If this is the case, pace Smart, the
laws of the electrodynamics are not strict – they did not apply in the present
form to the early universe, and they may cease to hold in the future. Does
the fact that the laws of basic physics evolve with time threaten the scientific
character of fundamental physics? It does not. Fundamental physics remains a
science even if there are no strict laws in the sense of Kim or Smart; physicists
can still formulate explanations and predictions using these laws, even if they
do not hold universally in time. Similarly, researchers in any of the special sciences can still formulate explanations and predictions with the laws available
in their own domains, even if these laws are not exceptionless – that is, they
can still do science. The exceptional “disruptions from below” that Kim talks
about are just that – exceptions. They do not threaten the scientific character
of chemistry any more than the evolving nature of physical laws threatens the
scientific character of physics. The low frequency of these disruptions in the
laws of a given domain allows for reliable explanations and predictions using
those laws; and this is what is required from a science. If one demands that
the laws of a domain be exceptionless in order for them to be considered “real
laws” (and in order for that domain to be considered “scientific”) then not only
is one setting the bar of what it means to be scientific unreasonably high so
that no actual science can reach it, but one is also misrepresenting the nature
of science.
What about Smart’s claim that the special sciences resemble more technologies or engineering than they resemble physics? This claim, as well as the
claim that the laws of the special sciences are not strict, are intended to depict
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a certain image of the special sciences as significantly different from physics
(or from fundamental physics). According to this image, physics affords strict
laws, the special sciences do not. Physics alone is science, biology and other
special sciences are just engineering; the special sciences involve applications
of the laws of physics but they do not have laws of their own. Smart says that
“there are no real laws of biology for the very same reason that there are no
special laws of engineering”. He suggests that trying to find laws in the special
sciences is as futile as trying to find laws in electronics. However, as a matter
of fact, there are laws in electronics:
• Ohm’s law: in a circuit, the amount of current flowing between two
points is directly proportional to the potential difference across the two
points, and inversely proportional to the resistance between them.
• Kirchhoff’s current law: in a circuit, the sum of the currents flowing
to a point is equal to the sum of the currents flowing away from that
point.
These laws are not laws of physics.9 These laws are neither laws of classical
mechanics, nor of electromagnetism or quantum mechanics, or of any other
branch of physics, although they, like any other regularity, are the result of
the existence of such laws.10 These laws are grounded in Maxwell’s equations,
but they are not themselves the laws of electromagnetism. The laws mentioned
above are not as much about the physical behaviour of the elementary particles
known as electrons as they are about the properties of circuits (they are also
called “circuit laws”). Indeed, these laws apply mutatis mutandis to hydraulics
as well; thus, they are about electrons as much as hydraulics is about water
(hydraulics is not about water, it is about the properties of fluid flow).
What if one insists that my notion of “physics” is too narrow and that
the laws of electronics mentioned above should in fact be also considered laws
of physics? If that is the case, then Smart’s distinction about science and
9

The term “electrical circuit” which is referenced in these laws belongs to engineering,
not to physics as such.
10
E.g., they depend on the conservation of electric charge, a conservation law.
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engineering cannot be maintained and his claim that special sciences like biology are more like engineering than like physics loses its support. But even if
the laws of electronics are considered to be laws of physics, they are certainly
not the exceptionless laws of fundamental physics that Smart and Kim talk
about; they admit of exceptions just like the laws of the special sciences do.
For example, Ohm’s law fails to obtain if there are temperature or conductivity
fluctuations across the circuit, Kirchhoff’s law fails if the charge density fluctuates at the point to which it is applied, etc. The fact that Kirchhoff’s laws fail
in certain circumstances while Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism continue to
hold in those circumstances further supports the previous argument that the
laws mentioned above are not the laws of electromagnetism under a different
guise.
The arguments above aimed to show that even if the special sciences are like
engineering (in the sense of their domain being populated by complex entities
whose parts obey more fundamental physical laws), this does not necessarily
preclude the possibility of laws existing in their restricted domains (special
science laws). On this view, there could be laws in biology or in any other
special science just as there are laws in some branches of engineering such
as electronics. There is no reason to believe that the special sciences cannot
be nomic or that they cannot use laws formulated in their own restricted
domains to propose explanations and make predictions, or to formulate and
test hypotheses. In short, there is no reason to think that at least some of
these engineering analogues cannot be sciences.11
I do not claim that all engineering is like electronics. Most certainly, there
are branches of engineering in which rigorous mathematical laws are replaced
by rough and ready empirical generalizations or even heuristic rules (just think
of social engineering).12 There could be branches of engineering with few rigorous laws or no rigorous laws at all, and branches in which even the much
11

If Smart’s reasoning is followed consistently, it leads to the paradoxical conclusion that
legitimate branches of physics such as thermodynamics are in fact engineering.
12
In my opinion, the difference between the former and the latter is not sharp. Indeed,
why can’t nomicity come in degrees? Laws express interdictions, thereby placing constraints
on the logical space of events. Why can’t some of these constraints be stronger than others?

170

less rigorous heuristic rules are scarce. But as long as some branches of engineering afford some sort of nomicity, the argument put forward by Smart and
endorsed by Kim does not work as intended.

5.4

The analyticity objection

A number of authors including Millikan (1999), Boyd (1999), Shapiro (2000)
have expressed similar concerns about the possibility of a science whose kinds
are functional. Like Kim (1992), they doubt that functional kinds that are multiply realizable will figure in any interesting generalizations. However, there is
a point that these authors are explicitly making that Kim doesn’t – namely,
that the laws (or universal generalizations if you prefer) in which functional
kinds or properties figure would be analytic and thus uninformative.13 As a
result, any science talking about functional kinds would be a priori. If one
holds the requirement that natural sciences are by their very nature empirical
investigations of the world, the same concern voiced by Kim emerges: there
can’t be a science of multiply realized kinds. In this section I will try to formulate the concerns that these authors have univocally, as similar instances
of what I will call the “analiticity objection”. In formulating the analyticity
objection I may ignore the possible differences between these authors. My goal
is to give a clear and unambiguous formulation of a problem that arises with
respect to functional kinds, and then see how one can respond to it.
The analyticity objection can be seen as related to the objections put forward by Kim and presented in section 2 of this chapter. Perhaps it could
even be seen as a special case of Kim’s argument. In any case, the analyticity
objection shares with Kim’s argument two crucial premises. Each starts from
the observation that functional kinds are heterogeneous in their realizations.
And each agrees that as a result of this heterogeneity, the instantiations of
these kinds will differ in their causal properties. From these premises Kim
concluded that functional kinds are too disunified to be of scientific interest:
13

Some of these authors are more clear than others. It is not clear whether Millikan is
making the same point as Shapiro and Boyd.
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they are fragmented, they are unprojectible, so they can’t figure in laws. The
analyticity objection contends that even if there are laws in which functional
kinds figure, these laws will be analytic.
The reasoning behind the analyticity objection is as follows. Functional
kinds are heterogeneous in their realizations. As a result, they differ in their
causal properties. But if they are so different in their causal properties, there
is not much that can be said about them as a kind. Take mouse traps as an
example. There are spring-loaded bar mouse traps, electric mouse traps, glue
mouse traps, etc. All these devices are truly different in their causal properties
(i.e., spring-loaded bar mouse traps store mechanical energy and kill the mouse
by releasing it suddenly, electric mouse traps use electrical energy and kill the
mouse by electrocuting it, while glue mouse traps use natural or synthetic
adhesive to immobilize the mouse). Now the following question may be asked,
and it has been: “Given that different realizations of mousetraps have different
causally relevant properties, what more can be said about mousetraps other
than that they are all used to catch mice?” (Shapiro 2000, p. 649). By
contrast, consider the macro-level laws about scientifically legitimate kinds,
such as water. The macro-level law that water freezes at 0 degrees Celsius
derives from empirical investigation, but it can conceivably be challenged and
found to be false. The fact that water freezes around 0 degrees Celsius in
normal conditions cannot be found by simply reflecting upon the concept of
water; on the other hand, the fact that mouse traps kill or trap mice can
be found by simply reflecting on the concept of a mouse trap. The worry is
that while laws about kinds that are not multiply realizable such as water are
genuinely empirical, laws about kinds that are functional are not.
The laws about water obtain in virtue of the uniformity of the microphysical
description of all samples of water. Any instance of water has a lot in common
at the level of its microphysical constitution with any other instance of water.
Thus, it is to be expected that macrolevel regularities will obtain in virtue
of the microlevel commonalities. As Shapiro puts it, “macrolevel laws about
water are true because certain microlevel laws about water are true. But, more
significantly, macrolevel laws about all samples of water are possible because
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the same microlevel laws are true of all samples of water” (Shapiro 2000, p.
649). From this, the following worry emerges: if the microlevel uniformities
across instances of a kind are few or absent, then the macrolevel laws about
that kind will be few or absent:
“There exist laws about the viscosity, specific gravity, freezing
point, and so on of all samples of water, because all samples of
water are composed of H2 O and are thereby determined, according to the microlevel laws that describe the behaviour of H2 O, to
exhibit similarities in their viscosity, and so on. Contrast this now
with so-called functional kinds like eyes. We can say nothing more
about what camera eyes and compound eyes have in common other
than that they have the function to see; this is because they differ in
their causally relevant properties. Because, that is, microlevel laws
about camera eyes and compound eyes are very different, there is
no reason to expect that there will be any interesting macrolevel
generalizations common to both.” (Shapiro 2000, p. 650)
This worry has also been recognized by Boyd:
“The various different realizations of such kinds are too diverse
for there to be any a posteriori laws about them. They are not
projectible, so any “laws” applying to all instantiations of such
functional kinds would not be a posteriori – they would follow just
from the analytic functional definitions of the kinds in question.”
(Boyd 1999, p. 68)
For many philosophers (including Shapiro), the laws about functional kinds
must do more than simply state the capacity in virtue of which a functional
kind is the kind that it is (Shapiro 2000, p. 649). To be considered legitimate
scientific kinds, functional kinds should support more than a single generalization – namely, what can be said about them should not be limited to the
description of their functional role. But if there isn’t anything to say about
functional multiply realizable kinds other than they all carry out the functional role that defines them, why think of them as legitimate scientific kinds?
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If there aren’t any a posteriori laws about them, what justifies the belief that
there can be sciences about them? As Millikan puts it,
“No science consists of a single generalization, nor of a heap of
generalizations about different kinds of things. A science begins
only when, at minimum, a number of generalizations can be made
over instances of a single kind.” (Millikan 1999, p. 48)
So if there aren’t enough interesting (i.e., empirical) generalizations about
functional multiply realizable kinds, they are not legitimate objects of scientific
inquiry – they are not really scientific kinds, just as mouse traps are not
scientific kinds. They may still hold some interest for science, but only insofar
as scientists are interested in elucidating the various microphysical constituents
that make the functional kind possible.
In order to examine how the analyticity objection could be responded to
let’s first see how this objection applies to the kinds/properties that I discussed
in detail in chapter 3. If we consider acids as an example, the analyticity
objection could be formulated as follows: acids do not form a genuine chemical
kind because there isn’t anything to be said about them besides that they all
have the property that defines them (that they all donate protons in chemical
reactions). The same for piezoelectrics: if piezoelectrics are to be accepted as a
genuine scientific kind, there should be more to be said about them other than
they all generate electricity when subjected to mechanical stress. If functional
kinds like acids, oxidants, piezoelectrics are like mouse traps in that all that
can be said about them is that they all have the property that defines them,
then the laws in which these kinds would figure will be all analytical (they will
be nothing more than statements expressing the definitions of these terms).
But if that’s the case, then there is no real science of these kinds, nor could
there be one. For example, if all that can be said about piezoelectrics is that
they generate electricity when subjected to mechanical stress, then they do not
hold any more interest for science than mouse traps do. Thus, the analyticity
objection brings forth the same old worry about the possibility of there being
a science whose kinds are multiply realized: given that there is no science of
mouse traps, why should there be a science of piezoelectricity?
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Before seeing how this question could be answered, I want to pause for some
reflection. Insofar as the analyticity objection places a restriction on the kinds
or properties that can be of interest for science, it is an instance of philosophy
being prescriptive towards science – it tells science which kinds or properties
are legitimate objects of scientific inquiry and which are not. But can philosophy be prescriptive towards science in this way? Isn’t philosophy overstepping
its boundaries when it tells science what is scientifically interesting and what
is not? In the case of acids, oxidants, piezoelectrics, the fact of the matter is
that they – unlike mouse traps – are regarded as scientifically interesting by
chemists, regardless what philosophers may think is or should be the case. So
perhaps it would be a good idea if our philosophical reflections started with
this brute fact, rather than deny it based on philosophical argument.
Now back to responding the objection. One possible strategy to deal with
the analyticity objection is pointed out by Funkhouser (2007):
“Jaegwon Kim (1993), Ruth Millikan (1999), and Richard Boyd
(1999) have even argued that there cannot be a science of multiply
realized (functional) kinds. They claim that we should not expect
any generalizations/explanations to hold for such kinds, except for
those captured by their functional specification. For such generalizations are blocked by the very diversity of lower level realizations.
Their claim certainly runs counter to standard methodological assumptions of functionalists and cognitive scientists. The best way
to refute their position, and certainly the most straightforward, is
simply to discover such interesting generalizations.” (Funkhouser
2007, p. 308)
I agree with Funkhouser that in order to address the analyticity objection it
is a good idea to take a look at the actual science – in our case chemistry. In
the case of acids, what more can be said about them except that they donate
protons in chemical reactions? In the case of piezoelectrics, what more can be
said about them that they generate electricity when subjected to mechanical
stress? As it turns out, there are laws about piezoelectrics and acids that are
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genuinely empirical. Most of the laws enumerated in Table 1 (chapter 3) are
in fact empirical. Consider the laws about acids:
A)

Acids in reaction with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen
gas.

B)

Acids in reaction with metal carbonates produce water, CO2 and
a salt.

C)

Acids in reaction with metal hydroxides and metal oxides produce
water and a salt.

None of these laws is true in virtue of the meaning of term “acid”. Consider
law A. Nowhere in the concept of a proton donor (acid) can be found that it
produces a metal salt and hydrogen gas when it reacts with metals. The same
with laws B and C. Unlike “Acids donate protons in chemical reactions” which
is in fact the definition of acids and thus analytical, all three laws above are
genuinely empirical.
Now consider the laws about bases.
B1)

Bases accept hydrogen ions from the chemical species to which
they react. (Brønsted-Lowry definition)

B2)

Bases donate electron pairs in chemical reactions. (Lewis definition)

B3)

Bases react with triglycerides to produce soaps (reaction known as
saponification).

B4)

Bases react with acids to produce salts and water.

B5)

Bases can act as insoluble heterogeneous catalysts for chemical
reactions.

If we assume the Brønsted-Lowry definition of bases, then B1 is analytical,
but B2 isn’t. Nowhere in the concept of proton acceptor can be found the
concept of electron-pair donor. Conversely, if we assume the Lewis definition
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B2 will be analytical but B1 won’t be. Regardless of the adopted definition,
the laws B3, B4, B5 are all empirical. Nowhere in the concept of a base can
be found the ability to react with triglycerides to produce soaps. Nowhere in
the concept of a proton acceptor can be found the ability to react with proton
donors to produce salts and water. And nowhere in the concept of a base can
be found that it may catalyze chemical reactions. The same with the laws
about oxidants, reductants, and metals – most of them are empirical.
What about piezoelectrics? What more can be said about piezoelectric
materials except that they all have piezoelectric properties, which is not at all
informative? It turns out that there are interesting universal generalizations
which are not accidental about piezoelectrics:
P1)

All piezoelectrics are dielectric, but not all dielectrics are piezoelectric. (Tilley 2004, p. 344)

P2)

All piezoelectrics are temperature-dependent.
108)

P3)

All piezoelectrics are anisotropic. (Park and Lakes 2007, p. 85)

(Broch 1980, p.

To the truths above one may add the following:
P4)

Not all piezoelectric materials are pyroelectric, but all pyroelectric
materials are piezoelectric.

P5)

Not all piezoelectrics are ferroelectric, but all ferroelectrics are
piezoelectric.

All these truths are genuinely empirical. If a material produces electricity
when subjected to mechanical stress it is still an empirical question whether
that material is an insulator that can be polarized by an applied electric field.
Nowhere in the concept of a piezoelectric can be found that its piezoelectric
properties vary with temperature. And one cannot infer that piezoelectric
materials are anisotropic by simply reflecting on the fact that they produce
electricity when subjected to mechanical stress; in other words, whether the
structure of piezoelectric materials is direction independent or not remains an

177

empirical question. Thus, the fact of the matter is that there are plenty of
empirical laws in which functional kinds figure. This shows that the analyticity
objection is de facto untenable. It also indicates that something must be wrong
among the premises of the analyticity objection. But what?
The supporters of the analyticity objection appeal in their argument to
the principle that the macrolevel regularities obtain in virtue of the uniformity
existing at the microlevel (I will call this the Macro-Micro Principle). Shapiro
is one of the proponents of the analyticity objection who are endorsing the
Macro-Micro Principle (without naming it so). As already mentioned, Shapiro
thinks that macrolevel laws about the instances of a kind are uniformly true
because certain microlevel laws about those instances are uniformly true. He
gives the example of the laws about water (the laws regarding viscosity, specific
gravity, freezing point, etc.) and he argues that they are true because all
samples of water are composed of H2 O molecules, which obey the same set of
microlevel laws.
As in the case of the Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds to which
it resembles, the Macro-Micro principle is compatible with two readings. On
one reading, the principle is saying that if microlevel uniformity is present,
macrolevel regularities obtain. On another reading, the principle is saying that
macrolevel regularities require microlevel uniformity. What the supporters of
the analyticity objection need for their argument is not the idea that microlevel
uniformity makes possible macrolevel regularities, but the idea that in the
absence of microlevel uniformity, macrolevel regularities cannot occur. The
supporters of functional kinds may well agree that the more uniformity there
is at the microlevel, the more macrolevel regularities there will be. What
they would deny, however, is that microlevel uniformity is the only source
of macrolevel regularities. But this is exactly what the proponents of the
analyticity objection need to argue if they want to show that the absence of
microlevel uniformity prevents the formulation of interesting macrolevel laws.
The analyticity objection claims that in the absence of commonalities in
the microphysical constitution of the instances of a functional kind, there won’t
be any empirical truths to be said about that kind at the macrolevel. But this
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ignores the fact that most of the laws in which functional kinds figure obtain
not in virtue of the microlevel commonalities among the instances of those
kinds, but in virtue of how those instances are relating to other instances; it
ignores the fact that one and the same kind of behaviour can be exhibited by
entities that are diverse from the point of view of their microphysical description. The laws about acids, for example, are true not because all acids are
similar at the microphysical level (they aren’t!) but because they all behave
similarly towards other chemical species – they all donate protons in chemical
reactions. For example, the macrolevel law that acids in reaction with metals produce hydrogen is true not because acids are uniform with respect to
their microphysical constitution, but because they are uniform with respect
to their behaviour despite being non-uniform in constitution. The proponents
of the analyticity objection cannot see why there should be any similarities
in behaviour unless there is similarity in constitution. But as the examples
considered in chapter 3 show, the fact of the matter is that there are such
similarities.
Now, the fact that such similarities obtain despite the lack of uniformity
at the microconstitutive level has been considered by some “a metaphysical
mystery” (Fodor 1997). Batterman (2000) has showed that this need not be
a mystery at all: there are principled (mathematical) reasons why there are
macrolevel similarities despite microlevel heterogeneity – why, for example,
fluids behave similarly despite having different molecular constitutions.
I agree that in many cases the explanation for the similarity in behaviour
despite dissimilarity in constitution (what I will call behavioural convergence)
can be be given a principled explanation that is elegant (e.g., Batterman appeals to the mathematical tool of renormalization). Wherever such principled
explanations are available, they should be sought. But are such explanations
always available? Consider the cases studied in chapter 3. Why do molecules
as varied as H2 SO4 , HBF4 and HCl donate protons in chemical reactions (while
molecules like HNa don’t)? Why do materials as varied as cement, collagen
and quartz exhibit a surface charge when placed under mechanical stress? In
such cases there does not seem to be a unique explanation for the sameness
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of behaviour. There doesn’t seem to be a single argument explaining the behaviour of all acids or all piezoelectrics. In the case of acid molecules, they
all donate protons in chemical reactions because of thermodynamic reasons
having to do with the minimization of energy in the context of the chemical
reactions. In every non-reversible chemical reaction the products of the reaction form molecular structures that are more stable than the reagents. Some of
the molecules entering the reaction will achieve reaction equilibrium by donating protons to the other species; it is these molecules that we call acids. Asking
why acids donate protons in chemical reactions is not the same as asking why
various liquids have the same critical exponent – the ability to donate protons
is part of the definition of acids, whereas having a certain critical exponent is
not part of the definition of liquids. Asking why acids donate protons is more
like asking why liquids take the shape of their container – substances that do
not take the shape of their container are not called liquids. In the case of
materials under mechanical stress, some of them will develop a surface charge,
others won’t. The first belong to the class of piezoelectrics, the latter do not.
Cement, collagen and quartz belong to this class. There isn’t a unique reason
why these materials develop a surface charge under mechanical stress. But
why should there be one? It would be an even greater metaphysical mystery
if behavioural convergence would never just happen.14
So far I have argued that the functional properties examined in chapter 3
are de facto objects of scientific inquiry. If these properties are truly functional,
as I have argued, then the issue of whether there could be a science about them
is not a matter of philosophical argument – it is a matter of fact. I supported
this by showing that there are laws about functional properties studied by
chemistry that are genuinely empirical, and I presented a few examples of
such laws.
But what if there are properties which do not figure in a great number of
laws? If we found a functional property/kind about which not much could be
said except what defines it, would we be forced to conclude that there cannot
be a science about that kind/property? Even if we accept the analyticity
14

A similar point is made by Shapiro (2005).
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objection, are we forced to accept its alleged consequence, that there can be
no science of functional kinds?
I will try to answer the questions above by considering the example of functional property which I deem the most vulnerable to the analyticity objection
– piezoelectricity. Suppose nothing could be said about piezoelectrics aside
from the fact that they all generate a surface charge when compressed. Would
there still be a science of piezoelectricity? I think the answer is affirmative.
The reason is that unlike mouse traps, piezoelectrics are interesting for science
– the fact that a certain material develops a surface charge when compressed
is a remarkable phenomenon. However, those who argue that there cannot
be a science of multiply realized kinds may very well agree with this claim.
Kim, for example, would have no problem accepting that the study of piezoelectricity remains scientific; he would claim that piezoelectricity is of interest
to science insofar as it is worthwhile elucidating the more basic mechanisms
that make this phenomenon possible in various materials. But he would deny
that beyond the reductionistic inquiry into the lower level mechanisms that
give rise to it, piezoelectricity holds any interest for science in and of itself.
To paraphrase Kim, the study of piezoelectricity may remain scientific, but
there could be no science of piezoelectricity (Kim 1992, p. 26). The reason
behind this conclusion is the heterogeneous nature of piezoelectric materials.
Kim’s would think that piezoelectricity is just as disunified as its realizers, and
hence there isn’t much to say about piezoelectrics except that they all have
the property in virtue of which they are called so. In an argument of this sort,
one makes implicit use of the idea espoused by Millikan (1999, p. 48) that
“a science begins only when, at minimum, a number of generalizations can be
made over instances of a single kind”. I will call this Millikan’s dictum.
Two points can be made in response to Millikan’s dictum, but both stem
from the realization that it assumes a certain view about the nature of science
(a view which has become entrenched). First, it could be argued that science
begins not only after one has gathered a hefty number of generalizations over
the instances of a single kind, but when one can make successful predictions
and explanations about a certain property using even a single such general-
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ization. Consider mass in Newtonian mechanics. What more can can be said
about mass in Newtonian mechanics other than it is the property of a body in
virtue of which that body accelerates when a force is applied to it? The fact
that there aren’t a great number of different generalizations that can be made
about mass in Newtonian mechanics does not rule out – as Millikan’s dictum
would – the possibility of a science about mass (viz., mechanics).
There is a second problem with Millikan’s dictum: it stems from a certain
view about the nature of science according to which the goal of science is to describe reality by inventorying a great number of laws. This view about the nature of science is the consequence of a philosophy of science that takes physics
as its central reference point. But this philosophical view of the goals and
methods of science is not as readily applicable to chemistry. Unlike physics,
which aims primarily at describing the world by inventorying its laws, chemistry focuses on changing the world by producing new substances. It is not a
great exaggeration to say that the rule of the game in physics is the discovery of new laws, whereas the rule of the game in chemistry is the synthesis
of new compounds (just compare the kind of research that has been awarded
the Nobel prize in chemistry with the kind of research that has been awarded
the Nobel prize in physics, especially in more recent decades). The following
quote from Schummer (2006) makes this point convincingly:
“While philosophers of science have been telling us that scientists
aim at a true theoretical description of the natural world, the great
majority of chemists (which also means the great majority of scientists) have actually been engaged in synthesizing new substances,
i.e., changing the natural world. Chemical synthesis is, to be sure,
the most obvious peculiarity of chemistry, albeit the most neglected
one because it is foreign to any received idea of philosophy of science.” (Schummer 2006, p. 32-33)
If we turn to the example of piezoelectricity, the following point can be made.
Even if nothing could be said about piezoelectrics aside from the fact that
they all generate a surface charge when compressed, there would still be a
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science of piezoelectricity: predictions and explanations could still be made
about piezoelectrics (e.g., the prediction that piezoelectric properties would be
found in amorphous and polycrystalline materials (Shubnikov), the explanation of the transition from the piezoelectric paraelectric phase to a ferroelastic
phase (Swada and Nakamura), and the explanation of relaxation in piezoelectric materials (Arit)).15 But, perhaps more importantly, there is a science of
piezoelectricity because because there are a lot of scientists that spend their
time in the lab investigating and producing new piezoelectric materials (e.g.,
materials with remarkable piezoelectric properties like lead zirconate titanate
(PZT), a man-made ceramic, or polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF), a synthetic
polymer whose piezoelectric properties exceed several times those of quartz).
In conclusion, even if nothing could be said about a kind except that it has
the property that defines it, this does not by itself undermine the possibility of
a science of that kind. A systematic investigation of the kind in question that
involves successful explanations and predictions could still be possible even
with a modest number of “laws”. More importantly, if one uses the methods
of science not merely to describe the natural world but also to change it by
producing new entities (as chemistry does), then the label “science” should
equally apply to this sort of creative activity. Millikan’s dictum does not take
into account the disciplinary specificity of sciences like chemistry, and for this
reason it does not express a condition of scientificity tout court. Contrary to
what Millikan thinks, we have a science of chemistry not just because we have
laws about acids, bases, oxidants, reductants and piezoelectrics, but also because (or, I should say mainly because) scientists spend their time discovering
new acids, bases, oxidants, reductants and piezoelectrics, often by synthesis.
Thus, even if the analyticity objection is true (which in the case of chemical
functional properties isn’t, as I have argued) the conclusion that there cannot
be a science of multiply realized kinds does not follow.

15

For a more comprehensive description of the science of piezoelectricity see Taylor (1985).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis was motivated by the following question: “If all there is consists
of the kind of entities that microphysics talks about, why do we have sciences
other than microphysics?” I have considered a specific version of this question,
namely why do we have chemistry instead of just applied quantum mechanics,
and I have argued for a certain way of answering it.
I approached the specific question through a case study. I looked at the case
of chemistry and investigated whether there are even such things as chemical
properties, truths, and explanations as opposed to merely complex quantummechanical properties, truths, and explanations. I have argued for an affirmative answer. With the help of a distinction introduced in chapter 3 (that between constitutive and functional properties), I argued for the existence of sui
generis chemical properties, laws and explanations. By sui generis chemical
properties, laws, and explanations I meant properties, laws and explanations
that cannot be construed as (possibly complex) quantum-mechanical properties, laws, or explanations. The reason for this was the existence of properties
which are defined by their functional role, and not by a shared microphysical
constituent. I have argued that properties like acidity, being an oxidant, a
metal or a piezoelectric, are properties defined by a common behaviour, which
is carried out by a variety of quantum-mechanical systems of electrons and
nuclei. Thus, properties like acidity are higher level properties, which cannot
be reductively identified with a unique lower level (microphysical) property.
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I called such properties functionally emergent and I claimed that they can
ground the ontological autonomy of chemistry in relation to the underlying
microphysics.
Why is the term “emergence” suitable to characterize the functional properties that chemistry talks about? What makes the functionalist view of chemistry that I defended in this thesis an “emergentist” view? As mentioned in
chapter 1, the term “emergence” does not have a unified meaning amongst
philosophers. However, there are several features that the emergentist accounts typically share. The first is a layered view of the world. As mentioned
in 1.2.5, virtually all emergentist positions hold some form of the view that
the world consists of a hierarchy of levels or ontological strata (the physical,
the chemical, the biological, the psychological, and so on). The second feature
of emergentism is that each ontological stratum depends on the previous one.
Thus, the chemical level depends on the physical level, the biological depends
on the chemical, and so on, such that if a certain level were to disappear, all
the subsequent levels will vanish as well – biology would not be possible without chemistry, chemistry would not be possible without microphysics. The
third feature that many emergentist accounts share is a conflict with certain
notions of reductionism – the higher levels are viewed as dependent on, but
not wholly reducible to the lower levels.
The functionalist view of chemistry that I advocate has all three features
discussed above. As argued in chapter 4, functional chemical properties pose
problems for the reduction of chemistry to physics on some accounts of intertheoretic reduction, such as that of Nagel and that of Kemeny, Putnam and
Oppenheim. For Nagel’s account the problems arise with regard the connectability condition. Terms like “acid” or “metal” are terms that do not
occur in the vocabulary of physics; therefore “bridge laws” are needed to connect the vocabulary of chemistry with that of physics. But, as argued in
4.1, the heterogeneous nature of the physical descriptions of acids does not
allow one-to-one connections between the terms present in the vocabulary of
chemistry and terms or expressions referring to physical kinds; moreover, the
relational nature of many chemical kinds further prevents construing them as
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physical kinds. As a result, the connectability condition is not met; consequently, the derivability condition cannot be met. This shows that the laws in
which functional chemical terms occur are not Nagel-reducible to the laws of
physics, although they are made possible by them.
For the account of reduction advocated by Kemeny, Putnam and Oppenheim the problems arise with the condition asking that the theory of physics
be at least as well systematized as the theory of chemistry that we want to
reduce. But the unity of the explanations given by a theory is an important
aspect of the systematicity of that theory. In 4.2. I argued that the existence
of specific chemical terms allows for the possibility of chemical explanations
that are more unified than the rival physical explanations with the same explanandum. I argued that some things that are in need of explanation (i.e.,
patterns of chemical behaviour) cannot be explained in a unified manner by
physics, but they can be so explained by chemistry. I claimed that what is
required for a unified explanation of patterns of chemical behaviour is not
knowledge of the micro-details that the fine-grained physical theory provides,
but quite the opposite: abstraction from those details, which enables one to see
similarities between systems that are regarded as different by the fine-grained
theory. Therefore, if for some explananda the chemical explanantia are more
unified than the corresponding physical explanantia, the idea that physics and
chemistry are equally well systematized becomes problematic. But if this is the
case, the account of reduction advocated by Kemeny, Putnam and Oppenheim
cannot be effectively applied to chemistry.
The second feature of emergence mentioned above is also possessed by the
functionalist account I advocate. Chemistry is made possible by the underlying
physics, such that if the underlying physics were to disappear, chemistry and
everything that depends on it would disappear as well. This is indeed a kind of
reductionism. But it is a different kind of reductionism than the one defended
by Nagel or Kemeny, Putnam and Oppenheim. Those two accounts aimed for
ontological parsimony; their goal was to effect an economy in the ontology of
science. But the kind of reductionism that characterizes emergence does not
have such goals or consequences. The kind of reductionism that most emergen-
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tist accounts embrace and even require is what philosophers have called token
reductionism (or physicalism) – the notion that every thing or process consists
ultimately of the kinds of things or processes that microphysics talks about
and that there are no non-physical property instances, vitalistic substances,
entelechies, etc., occurring at any stage of complexity. However, physicalism
is a relatively modest thesis. Given the naturalist worldview that became established with the advent of modern science, the thesis of physicalism as it
applies to chemistry appears quite indisputable; today, everyone accepts that
there are no chemical souls or vitalistic chemical essences and that all chemical substances and processes consist exclusively of microphysical substances or
processes. From the perspective of scientific naturalism, the thesis of token reductionism appears quite uninteresting. Of course, there remains the problem
whether given a certain instance of a chemical property (say, a molecule) one
could predict all its intrinsic properties (e.g., bond energies, dipole moments,
etc.) on the basis of ab initio quantum-mechanical calculations (i.e., calculations from first principles). For most systems such a task requires not only
computing power but also mathematical flair and creativity. Of course, there
are practical and theoretical obstacles to full fledged ab initio derivations.
But the success physical chemistry has had so far (see the case of disilyne
mentioned in 2.1.3) reveals the unquestionable truth of physicalism. The difficulties that the ab initio derivations encounter do not tell against the modest
form of reductionism that some philosophers have called token reductionism
(or physicalism).
But the truth of this modest form of reductionism does not entail that
chemistry is just applied quantum mechanics. If various systems of electrons
and nuclei display the same behavioural pattern in spite of having disparate
microphysical constitutions, the pattern is real and should be treated as such.
In chemistry, patterns of chemical behaviour such as those exhibited by acids,
bases, oxidants, reductants, metals, piezoelectrics are just as real as those exhibited by noble gases and alcohols. But, as I argued in chapter 3, there is
an important difference between the former and the latter. The latter are just
microphysical properties in disguise, whereas the former are chemical proper-
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ties in their own right, which cannot be reductively identified with physical
properties. Chemistry is not just applied quantum mechanics also because it
has its own laws, which are not reducible to the laws of physics (what I called
sui generis chemical laws). Of course, given the truth of physicalism, these
laws are made possible by the laws of physics, which govern all events (including chemical events). However, it would be a mistake to think that if all
events are governed by physical laws, then all laws must be physical. The law
that acids in reaction with metals produce hydrogen gas is made possible by
the laws of quantum mechanics (the electrons and nuclei from which acids and
metals consist of obey the Schrödinger equation), but, as argued in 4.1, this
law has no quantum-mechanical derivation. As argued in 4.2., the sui generis
laws of chemistry can be used in chemical explanations which are more unified
and overarching than the rival physical explanations.
As argued in chapter 3, the sui generis chemical laws are “indiscriminate”
or “promiscuous”, i.e., they are indifferent to the various ways in which the
properties they relate are constituted at the lower level of description. For example, the first equation of piezoelectricity relates mechanical stress to electric
polarization in various materials, but is insensitive to how the latter is constituted at the microphysical level (ion displacement in crystals like quartz, dipole
rotations in polymers like collagen, streaming potential in interface materials
like bone or cement). The law does not “care” how polarization is brought
about in various materials, it only “cares” about its relation to stress. In the
same way, the sui generis laws of chemistry mentioned in Table 4.1 are also
promiscuous. For example, the chemical law stating that acids in reaction
with metals produce a metal salt and hydrogen gas is promiscuous because
it could be rendered true by a great variety of physical systems composed of
electrons and nuclei. Similarly, the chemical law that oxidants corrode metals
is promiscuous because the physical systems of electrons and nuclei that serve
as an oxidizing agent, respectively a metal are wildly heterogeneous from the
point of view of their microphysical makeup. As mentioned in 3.3.3.5, promiscuous laws enjoy a degree of independence from the basal conditions that the
laws of microphysics typically do not. For this reason, they should be regarded
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as higher level laws which are not just complex physical laws in disguise; such
laws should be regarded as chemical laws in their own right.
The sui generis nature of the functional properties, laws and explanations justifies the idea that chemistry investigates its own stratum of reality
or domain, distinct from the domain of microphysics. Thus, the first feature
of emergence mentioned earlier is also possessed by the functionalist view of
chemistry I advocate. Therefore, the functionalist view of chemistry qualifies
as an emergentist view because it is committed to the idea that chemistry
has its own ontology, which depends on, but is irreducible to the ontology
of physics. However, the functional emergentist view of chemistry differs
markedly from the more orthodox accounts of emergence in chemistry. For
example, unlike Broad’s account based on non-physical configurational forces
(1925), or the recent account based on configurational Hamiltonians (Hendry
2006), functional emergence is not at odds with the conservation of energy.
Also, unlike the emergentist account based on fusion defended by Humphreys
(1997b, 1997a, 2008), functional emergence does not threaten the idea of a
compositional ontology. But despite being less ambitious than other emergentist accounts, functional emergence can still justify the ontological autonomy
of chemistry in relation to the underlying microphysics insofar as it acknowledges the existence of sui generis chemical properties and regularities. The
existence of sui generis chemical properties and regularities makes chemistry
autonomous from microphysics not merely in an epistemic or pragmatic sense,
but also in an ontological one. I admitted, however, that the ontological autonomy of chemistry from microphysics is not radical: if the entities that
microphysics talks about were to vanish, there would be no chemical properties, no laws relating these properties, and no explanations employing those
laws.
Is the kind of emergence defended in this thesis weak or strong? In the
introduction, where I made the distinction between strong and weak emergence, I suggested that if the kind of reductionism with which a given account
of emergence is deemed to be incompatible is reductionism in practice, then
that account of emergence would be considered weak. If, however, that ac-
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count of emergence presupposed irreducibility in principle, the account would
be considered strong. However, the answer to the question is complicated by
the existence of another distinction, that between properties and property instances (section 1.3). So the question of whether functional emergence counts
as weak or strong depends on whether we talk about type or token reductionism (see 2.3). Functional emergence qualifies as strong if we talk about the
reduction of properties as such (type reductionism), but it qualifies as weak if
we talk about the reduction of property instances, with which it is compatible
(token reductionism).
As I noted in chapter 3, not all chemical properties are functionally emergent. What does this situation tell us with respect to the nature of chemistry
as a science? In my view, this situation reflects the status of chemistry as “the
first” of the special sciences. Chemical substances are made of microphysical
systems that consist of electrons and nuclei; hence, many of their chemical
properties are the reflection of commonalities in their physical makeup, as illustrated in the case of alcohols or noble gases. As a result, some chemical
properties will receive constitutive definitions and thus they will be reductively
identified with physical properties. Others, however, are able to receive only
functional definitions, and they will not be identifiable with particular physical
properties. This depicts an image of chemistry as a “mixed” science – a science
that is close enough to physics so that some of the properties it talks about are
physical properties, but also a science that begins to emancipate itself from
the base, and deals with genuinely new properties. The “mixed” character
of chemistry further qualifies how the notion that chemistry is ontologically
autonomous from physics should be interpreted. Nonetheless, the ontological
autonomy of chemistry persists because the sui generis properties and regularities that chemistry talks about are sufficiently numerous and pervasive. It
would be wrong to conclude that the mixed character of chemistry makes the
ontology of this discipline as a whole a sub-domain of the ontology of physics.
This image of chemistry as a “mixed science” offers only a partial support
to the classical layer-cake model of science that has been assumed by many
reductionists, anti-reductionists and emergentists alike. In the light of section
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5.3, where I discussed the argument from the general failure of special-science
causal closure and the argument from the idiosyncratic nature of special science properties, it becomes apparent that chemical properties and regularities
are always susceptible of disruptions “from below”. In other words, chemical
properties and regularities can always be affected by physical or microphysical
factors. The most simple and clear example is the influence of temperature
on chemical reactions, but numerous other examples could be found. Physical factors such as electromagnetic fields, pressure, even gravity may affect
chemical properties and regularities, no matter how sui generis these are.
Thus, chemistry, although ontologically autonomous from physics, is not “insulated” from physics. To express this in the terms of the layer-cake metaphor,
chemistry is not a perfectly distinct layer that lays flat on top of the physical layer. Instead of the layer-cake model, perhaps a better model could be
suggested, one which captures more accurately the relationships between the
various sciences. For the lack of a better metaphor, this could be called the
“Easter-bread” model. In the Easter-bread model, the sciences are not arranged neatly in distinct layers, with physics at the base and then followed
by chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.; rather, they interweave and penetrate
each other globally, although locally they typically retain their distinctness.
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